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Abstract
The neuronal underpinnings of visual awareness has recently become the primary 
question of interest for many researchers, with many theories suggesting distinct 
mechanisms. The aim of this thesis was to test predictions o f the low-level modular 
theory of visual awareness. This modular view is encapsulated in the 
‘microconsciousness5 framework (Zeki & Bartels, 1999) in which each visual 
processing system, such as that for colour, is capable o f generating a conscious 
correlate autonomously in parallel across space, within each of the different 
functionally specialised areas o f the visual brain, and across time, with different 
attributes perceived at different times. Given the scope of this topic, we approached it 
from three diverse angles: (1) Two psychophysical experiments investigated temporal 
aspects of visual perception -  in particular these addressed the issue of whether the 
timing of awareness is an ‘online* phenomenon rather than integrated into a temporal 
buffer zone prior to awareness. We measured the relative perceptual times of different 
magnitudes of direction changes and investigated the ‘flash-lag’ effect (Nijhawan, 
1994) and related illusions of positional localisation. (2) The first two fMRI 
experiments examined the necessity of frontal and parietal areas for visual awareness 
in the context of bistable figures, combined with dynamic causal modelling (Friston et 
al., 2003), and perception outside the focus of attention. (3) We looked to extend the 
concept of modularity of awareness to that of ‘access consciousness’, that is the 
ability to give a report of a conscious experience (Block, 1996), in addition to the 
previous studies on phenomenal consciousness. To this end, we combined 
psychophysics with fMRI to investigate the interaction between report modality and 
visual perception. We conclude that the low-level modular theory of stands up to 
direct tests of its predictions and remains a viable theory of visual awareness.
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Introduction
1.1 Overview
The route from a visual stimulus to explicit conscious perception has become o f great 
interest to neuroscientists in the last decade or so. The neuronal underpinnings o f what 
Bertrand Russell (1921) referred to as ‘pure sensation' has moved from an interesting 
footnote to the primary question of interest for many researchers. However, there is 
no agreement on what constitutes the necessary and sufficient neural conditions for 
visual awareness; in other words, the ‘easy’ problem of consciousness (Searle, 1993) 
is a misnomer. Our knowledge of this phenomenon is both primitive and, more often 
than not, contradictory, which necessarily means that current theories of what 
constitutes brain states capable of producing visual awareness are composed of broad 
strokes.
Low-level theorists posit that visual awareness arises in the cortex where 
visual attributes are processed. The predominant thinking in this camp is the theory o f 
‘microconsciousness’ (Zeki & Bartels, 1999), which argues that visual awareness for 
a percept, such as colour, is generated in the area that processes the attribute, such as 
V4. While visual processing in a particular area may occur without awareness, an 
increase in activity leads to conscious perception independently o f any other area(s) 
(Moutoussis & Zeki, 2002). Implicit in this assumption is that conscious perception 
may occur in a feed-forward manner, without feedback to earlier areas, or top-down 
influences from higher areas such as the parietal or frontal cortices. Furthermore, it 
also implies that if the processing of visual information takes different times for 
different attributes, visual awareness for these shall occur at different times 
(Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997a), leading to perceptual asynchrony. In direct opposition to
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this account, advocates of the high-level camp argue that for visual awareness to arise, 
there needs to be activity in ‘higher’ areas such as the frontal and parietal cortices, in 
tandem with activity in the visual cortex (e.g. Dehaene et al., 2003; Rees & Lavie, 
2001). This type of theory has multifariously been referred to as ‘the global neuronal 
workspace’ (Dehaene et al., 1998), the ‘fronto-parietal network’ (Rees et al., 2002) 
and the ‘central executive’ (Shallice, 1988).
The conceptual motivation for this thesis is to empirically test the idea that 
visual awareness can occur in a low-level manner, generated autonomously in the 
visual cortex. To do this, we have used two lines of attack: (1) use psychophysical 
studies to measure the timing of visual perception, (2) fMRI to measure brain activity 
whilst tracking subjective reports of perception.
14
1.2 What is consciousness?
‘Consciousness’ is a nebulous term with a wide spectrum of meanings, depending on 
whom you happen to be talking to. Much of the debate on this topic seems to get lost 
in a quagmire of semantics; therefore it is important to provide at least a general 
working definition for this thesis. Synaptic transmission was not defined in a rigid 
way before its basic workings were unveiled, as it was not known how neurons pass 
on electrical signals; the analytic definition came after the mechanisms were 
discovered. This is the goal, not the starting point of science and the same principle 
applies consciousness (Searle, 1998). Thus ‘consciousness’ in the present context 
simply refers to phenomenal subjective experience and will often be used 
interchangeably with ‘visual awareness’, referring to purely subjective visual 
phenomena that are perceived. This is a reflection of the fact that vision is the system 
adopted by most neuroscientists to study consciousness. It is important to note that 
this definition is distinct from self-consciousness, which refers to a complex self- 
referential awareness, and knowledge, in that you may be aware of the colour red, but 
have no knowledge o f its history, associations and so on. It is also important to 
consider the notion that there may be more than one type o f consciousness. Block 
(1996; 2005) has previously argued that there are two definitions o f consciousness: 
phenomenal or p-consciousness, and access or a-consciousness. P-consciousness can 
be taken to mean the definition described above, the pure qualia, whereas a- 
consciousness refers to the availability o f this information for voluntary report.
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1.3 Is consciousness a neurobiological problem?
“The body is our medium for having a world.”
—  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception (1962)
What relation does consciousness have to the brain? Before we can even begin to find 
the neurobiological mechanisms for awareness, it is important to ask if this is possible 
at all. This is the modem formulation of the classic mind-body problem, which in 
Western thought can be traced back at least as far as Plato, although the best-known 
formulation is that of Rene Descartes (1641). He argued from a staunchly dualist 
position, by distinguishing the mind, including consciousness, from the brain, thereby 
reflecting the two fundamental properties of the world, mental and material. In direct 
contrast to this view, an implicit assumption of modem neuroscience, and of this 
thesis, is that every mental operation, including consciousness, has a neural 
underpinning. Perhaps this is most elegantly demonstrated by examples from the 
neuropsychological literature, such as in the case o f akinetopsia, the loss o f ability to 
perceive visual motion (Zeki, 1991). This syndrome was reported in a patient with 
bilateral lesions o f the extrastriate cortex (Zihl et al., 1993), over V5, an area known 
to process visual motion (Zeki et al., 1991). Furthermore, in macaques it was shown 
that by stimulating the analogous visual area with microelectrodes, the animals’ 
perception of motion could change (Salzman et al., 1990). Therefore there is both 
correlational and causal evidence that neural activity in V5 underlies the perception of 
motion.
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However, even if consciousness is completely dependent on the physical 
brain, it is not clear that a scientific study o f these processes can explain 
consciousness. To be able to give a scientific account of consciousness, one must be 
able to make an intelligible connection between subjective states like perceiving 
motion and objective phenomena such as the firing of neurons in V5. Thus the 
problem of consciousness can be divided into two parts (Chalmers, 1995): the easy 
problem - the relation between consciousness and brain states, and the hard problem - 
how third-person objective neurobiological phenomena give rise to subjective, first 
person states. The former is essentially an empirical endeavour and is already some 
way to being solved as illustrated by the work on V5 described above. However the 
latter is more problematic.
A typical scientific explanation for a phenomenon is reductionistic i.e. it is 
reduced to a cause. Thus the heat of a gas is reduced to the mean kinetic energy of the 
molecule movements. A neurobiological reductionist account of consciousness would 
reduce consciousness to neural activity. There is nothing but neural activity. However, 
it should seem obvious that this sort of explanation fails. Unlike the case of the heat of 
the gas, this explanation fails as it leaves out precisely what we are trying to explain 
i.e. subjective experience; in other words ‘the theory has left out the mind’ (Searle 
1992). To know everything about neural activity would take us no closer to knowing 
what it is like to have, for example, an echolocatory sense such as bats do (Nagel, 
1979). In short, there is an ‘explanatory gap’ between subjective experience and 
objective brain activity (Levine, 1983).
The mistake that a reductionist account o f consciousness makes is that it 
assumes neural activity and conscious processes share ontological identity. When I 
see the colour blue of my pen it is ontologically subjective, in the sense that it is only
17
experienced by me. In this sense, all conscious states and perceptions are 
ontologically subjective. However, the neuronal activity in my area V4 which occurs 
when I experience colour is ontologically objective, in the sense that it does not need 
to be experienced by myself or any other being, in order for it to exist. Furthermore, 
this activity can be verified by anyone with the appropriate instruments to do so. The 
reductionistic account fails to recognise these as distinct phenomena. Therefore to get 
round the hard problem of consciousness, one has to accept that brain activity and 
subjective experience are simply two different irreducible perspectives of the same 
phenomenon (Velmans, 2000), and do not share the same ontological identity. A 
scientific account of consciousness is possible and can progress by mapping the 
subjective aspects of experience with the objective measurements o f neuroscientific 
techniques such as functional brain imaging. Subjective experience may be measured 
by introspective reports such as verbal or button presses in humans, and, arguably, 
behaviour in higher primates, going on the assumption that these are conscious 
beings. While equating reports with subjective experience is in itself problematic, 
especially when considering a- and p-consciousness (this issue is addressed in detail 
in chapter 3.3), the broad scientific framework has been established to solve the ‘easy 
problem'. In the next sections we review the experiments that have utilised such 
paradigms and the corresponding neurobiological theories inspired from this.
18
1.4 Neural Basis of Visual Perception
The modem study of perception has its roots reaching into 17th century British 
empiricist philosophy, with philosophers such as John Locke and David Hume. This 
doctrine stressed that knowledge about the world is the result o f experience provided 
by the senses. However, not until the early 19th century was perception considered to 
be a candidate for objective scientific investigation. Key in this development were the 
seminal works o f the German scientists Gustav Fechner, and Hermann von 
Helmholtz, both credited with establishing modem psychophysics. This new scientific 
field forged a method by which the relationship between the physical aspects o f the 
stimulus and the subjective percept could be objectively measured. It provided a clear 
framework in which to understand the mechanisms of subjective perception.
In 1912 Max Wertheimer published ‘Experimental Studies o f the Perception 
of Movement', a paper on stroboscopic motion, and launched the highly influential 
Gestalt movement of psychology. The central tenant of this school was the role that 
context plays in perception; thus stimuli do not remain insulated from each other, they 
interact so that visual awareness is the sum of these separate ‘sensations’. This is 
perhaps best illustrated by multistable figures, such as the Necker cube, where 
observers perceive such stimuli to be in one of two states, which periodically ‘flip’ 
from one state to another, despite the retinal input remaining constant. This 
demonstrates the Gestalt emphasis on the holistic form creating processes of our 
perception. Although the movement was relatively short-lived, many of its ideas form 
the basis of contemporary vision research, including the present thesis.
Independently of psychophysical studies o f visual perception, neurological 
evidence was already providing keen insights into the neural mechanisms of visual
19
awareness. Indeed, the window into perception offered by brain damage had been 
known since a least ancient Greek times, with early physicians such as Hippocrates, 
who stated that the ‘brain is the seat o f sensation'. However, it was not until the 19th 
century that real progress was made. One of the most insightful papers came from a 
Swiss ophthalmologist named Louis Verrey, who published the paper entitled 
‘Hemiachromatopsie droite absolue’ (1888). It describes the case of a 60-year-old 
woman who had suffered a stroke resulting in damage to the occipital cortex o f the 
left hemisphere. This resulted in total blindness in her upper-right hemifield, and the 
selective inability to perceive colour in the lower-right hemifield. Thus not only does 
this demonstrate that a certain area of the brain is necessary for colour vision; it shows 
that this area is functionally specialised for the representation o f colour. More 
substantial evidence for the retinotopic organisation in the human visual cortex came 
in the following century from case studies of individuals suffering from gunshot 
wounds, head trauma, or stroke (Holmes & Lister, 1916; Holmes, 1918). During 
World War I, the neurologist Holmes conducted a series of studies on cases of 
gunshots or other war-related brain damaged patients. In some cases, a very confined 
area o f the brain was damaged due to gunshot from which Holmes estimated the 
anatomical locations o f the brain lesions and measured the resulting visual-field 
defects. Holmes (1918) drew a retinotopic map of the visual cortex by putting 
drawings o f the occipital lobe and visual field side-by-side and indicated the 
correspondence between different regions on each map. These studies demonstrated 
that the left visual field projects to the right hemisphere and vice versa for the right 
visual field. Therefore he was able to demonstrate a vital role for VI in visual 
awareness and its retinotopic specificity.
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However, many of these neurological findings, especially achromatopsia, were 
not to gain much credence or clarity until the introduction of electrophysiological 
methods in the middle of the 20th century, when it became possible to objectively 
measure the responses of individual neurons to controlled visual stimuli (Hartline 
1938; Kuffler 1953; Hubei and Wiesel 1959; Werner and Mountcastle 1963). The 
most important early discoveries studied the neuronal properties of the mammalian 
visual system. Using single-cell recording Kuffler (1953) established the receptive 
fields of retinal ganglion cells by describing the area of the retina on which stimuli 
can either excite or inhibit the cell. Figure 1.4.1a illustrates two types o f cells found: 
on-centre, off-surround cells and off-centre, on-surround cells. The latter is maximally 
active when less photons fall on the centre, but more fall on the surround. The former 
has the opposite response profile. However, the major advance in our understanding 
of the properties of neurons in the visual cortex came from Hubei and Weisel, first in 
the cat and then in the monkey. Through the fortuitous discovery that the edge of the 
microscope slide they were using with their projector elicited more vigorous burst of 
firing from neurons than any o f their actual stimuli, they established the existence of 
simple cells in cortical area V I, with receptive fields resembling Gabor functions 
(1959). These receptive fields were thought to be constructed from the converging 
inputs of simple cells. After further mapping of more complex receptive fields, they 
envisaged a hierarchy in which complex receptive field properties could be built by 
combining the outputs o f the simple cells, and so on (Hubei & Wiesel, 1962; figure 
1.4.1b). An extreme version of this view has become known as the ‘grandmother celT 
hypothesis (Barlow, 1972) in which the complexity o f the cells in the hierarchy 
increase until there is a single cell which only fires in response to ones grandmother. 
However, the extent of such a proposal was questioned by a series of
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electrophysiological experiments recording from the prestriate cortex of macaques in 
the 1970s by Zeki. These demonstrated the existence of functionally specialised areas 
that selectively respond to specific stimulus attributes (figure 1.4.2), such as colour 
(Zeki, 1973; Zeki, 1978b) or motion (Zeki, 1974). This led Zeki to propose that the 
visual system is organized into multiple parallel, functionally specialised subsystems 
(Zeki, 1978a): a view still very much prevalent today.
Simple-cells: Off-centre/on-surround On-centre/off-surround
(a)
Complex cell Complex cell response profile
(b)
Figure 1.4.1. Schematic diagram of (a) simple cells and (b) complex cells. 
Positive and negative symbols represent optimal stimuli for the cells.
Further advances in anatomy, computational neuroscience and brain imaging 
in recent years have enhanced our understanding of the primate visual system, 
particularly in humans. Increasingly, the study of visual perception is becoming a
22
cross-disciplinary science, with converging disciplines constructing a broader picture 
of the mechanisms of vision.
V5
V4
Figure 1.4.2. Parallel processing in the primate visual system. Visual information 
passes into the retina, through the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) in the 
thalamus before reaching the primary visual cortex (VI) via the optic radiation. 
Information is processed in a parallel fashion with area V5 processing motion 
information on the dorsal side, while V4 processes colour information on the 
ventral surface.
23
1.5 Subjective Experience as an Objective
Phenomenon
The previous section discusses the historical roots that led to the present-day 
understanding of the architecture and functional properties of the primate visual brain. 
However, these functions could be conceived of without subjective awareness, purely 
in terms of stimulus processing, much like a machine. The majority of these 
experiments correlate only stimulus properties with neuronal activity, such as the 
early electrophysiological experiments that used animals under anaesthesia. It is 
therefore a logical question to ask ‘how does activity in these neuronal areas which 
process visual stimuli relate to subjective visual awareness?’ Using behavioural 
reports as a measure of subjective perception, many studies have sought to decouple 
perceptual reports from the stimulus and measure the concomitant changes in 
neuronal activity. In this way, experimenters have a pure measure of the correlates of 
visual awareness and not simply stimulus correlates. Thus, just as Helmholtz and 
Fechner were able to correlate stimulus properties with subjective perception, modem 
experimenters are able to correlate brain activity with subjective perception. In this 
section, we review studies that have used this experimental framework in conjunction 
with a variety o f techniques. The most common paradigms have measured neuronal 
activity either with changes in subjective perception despite stimulus remaining 
constant (e.g. binocular rivalry), no changes in subjective perception despite stimulus 
changing (e.g. He et al., 1996), or have tracked changes in subjective perception that 
accompany cortical lesions (e.g. Zihl et al., 1983).
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1.5.1. Neuropsychology
Cerebral Achromatopsia & Akinetopsia
The selective loss of the ability to see colours or motion after damage to specific areas 
of the prestriate cortex is referred to achromatopsia or akinetopsia respectively. These 
losses may be partial or complete and may accompany other deficits. For instance 
often achromatopsia is accompanied by prosopagnosia (failure to recognise faces), but 
not always (Zeki, 1990). As discussed in the last section, a selective deficit in colour 
perception was described by Verrey (1888), but selective visual deficits for colour or 
motion have only been fully accepted since the establishment of functional 
specialisation as an organising principle in visual system. With the demonstration in 
humans of a functionally specialised cortical areas for colour in V4 (Lueck et al., 
1989) and motion (Zeki et al., 1991) in V5. it became apparent that these selective 
deficits were due to specific lesions to these functionally specialised visual areas 
(figure 1.4.2). This neuropsychological evidence demonstrates that the visual areas 
that process features are necessary to perceive them.
‘Blindsight’
Blindsight is a term coined by Weiskrantz (1986) to describe a condition in patients 
with damage to V 1 who retain the visual discriminative capacities in their blind fields 
despite reporting a complete lack of visual awareness. In the original paper (Poppel et 
al., 1973), subjects successfully localised the presence of a brief stimulus, even 
though they denied seeing it at all. Similar results were subsequently reported for 
acuity (Weiskrantz, 1986), orientation, colour (Stoerig & Cowey, 1989) and motion
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(Barbur et al., 1993). It has been suggested that visual information is able to reach 
cortical areas such as V4 or V5 in the absence o f the primary visual cortex through 
subcortical connections via the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) or the superior 
colliculus (Cowey & Stoerig, 1989). Indeed, an fMRI study o f the patient G.Y. 
showed that V5 responds to visual motion presented in the ‘blind’ visual field (Zeki & 
ffytche, 1998).
However, even the existence of blindsight has been a controversial topic. 
While it has been questioned on the basis of the residual functioning o f VI (Campion 
et al., 1983; Fendrich et al., 1992), perhaps the most fatal finding is the revelation 
that, when pressed, these patients do report some sort of awareness for the stimuli 
(Barbur et al., 1993). In many of these studies the subjects reported a vague ‘feeling’ 
or a sense that ‘something was there’. While in no way comparable to the rich 
phenomenal experience of normal vision, it is difficult not to concede that some sort 
of visual experience occurs. If the patient is aware of the stimuli, then discriminative 
capacity o f the patient for stimuli in the ‘blind’ hemifield may simply be due to the 
fact that the patient is still able to base the decision on the fragments of conscious 
vision that remain. Therefore, according to this account discrimination in the absence 
o f visual awareness does not occur in these patients. In recognition of this, Zeki and 
ffytche chose to refer to this condition as ‘Riddoch Syndrome’ instead, as an 
acknowledgement of the British army neurologist who first described it in patients 
suffering from gunshot wounds after the first World War (Zeki & ffytche, 1998; 
Riddoch, 1917).
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Agnosia
In 1890 the neurologist Lissauer distinguished deficits in form recognition based on 
extracting basic features from those based on recognition, despite intact shape 
processing, naming them ‘apperceptive’ and ‘associative’ agnosia respectively. 
Patients with apperceptive agnosia are typically described as being unable to process 
basic configural properties such as size, orientation or shape and are unable to 
recognise or copy even simple line drawings (Efron, 1968; Milner et al., 1991). 
However, other abilities such as colour, motion and luminance discrimination remain 
intact. While patients suffering from these perceptual deficits are unable to 
consciously discriminate form properties, there have been instances in which some 
residual from information is available for motor behaviour. Patient D.F. suffered from 
anoxia due to carbon monoxide poisoning causing severe damage to the lateral 
occipital cortex (James et al., 2003), resulting in a deficit in form processing, such as 
recognition or line drawing and was at chance at making basic form discriminations 
such as orientation (Milner et al., 1991). However, even with these severe perceptual 
deficits, she was able to make accurate grasping actions and could correctly place a 
card through a narrow slot at different orientations despite being unable to make an 
accurate explicit judgement of slot orientation. These observations form the 
cornerstone to Milner and Goodale’s ventral and dorsal stream hypothesis: they 
propose that dorsal areas code for spatial location and actions (‘how’), whereas 
ventral areas are crucial for object recognition (‘what’) (Milner & Goodale, 1992). 
This theory, based on the ‘two cortical visual systems’ originally put forward by 
Ungerlieder and Mishkin (1982), proposes that ventral visual areas underlie conscious 
visual perception. As patient D.F. shows, damage to these areas affects explicit 
conscious perception of objects, without affecting action toward them.
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In contrast, patients with associative agnosia have grossly preserved shape 
recognition, although experience difficulty when naming or categorising shapes. One 
of the earliest reported cases for this deficit was by Taylor and Warrington (1971), 
who described an agnosic patient who despite being unable to recognise pictures was 
able to correct misoriented images to their correct orientation and sort them into the 
appropriate semantic categories. This is thought to be due to a deficit in accessing the 
semantic information associated with the object or in the words of Teuber (1968), a 
“normal perception stripped o f  its meaning. ” Correspondingly, patients displaying 
these characteristic symptoms usually have lesions to the left occipito-temporal cortex 
(Ferro & Santos, 1984), a region believed to be involved in the storage o f semantic 
information.
However, this classical distinction between apperceptive/ associative agnosia 
has been questioned and Farah (1990; 1994) has proposed an alternative account of 
these deficits. It is argued that instead there lies a distinction between discriminating 
the global holistic features of objects and the local elements. This proposal derives 
from the compound o f deficits that these patients display: object agnosia is never 
found without other deficits, and prosopagnosia and alexia are not found without 
object agnosia. Therefore according to this framework face perception is impaired due 
to a deficit in global processing, whereas a deficit in local processes results in a deficit 
in word recognition. However, patients who show good object discrimination but are 
unable to recognise them are problematic for this alternative account and provide 
good evidence for the classic apperceptive/ associative distinction (Humphreys & 
Riddoch, 1993).
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Neglect
Unilateral neglect is the deficit in ability o f patients with unilateral brain damage to 
explore the side of space contralateral to the lesion, and to report stimuli presented in 
that portion o f space. Most commonly, patients sustain damage to the supramarginal 
gyrus in the inferior parietal lobule, at the temporo-parietal junction, and deficits are 
most severe after damage to the right cerebral hemisphere of right-handed subjects; 
therefore producing left side deficits in the majority o f cases (Pouget & Driver, 2000). 
What is particularly interesting for visual awareness is that these deficits are observed 
even though there is no damage to the visual cortex, suggesting that the inferior 
parietal lobe may play a role in awareness. This suggestion is consistent with the non- 
retinotopic aspects of neglect. For instance, whether stimulus in a fixed retinal 
position enters awareness can depend on eye and head posture as shown by 
performance of the line bisection task by patients with unilateral neglect (Vuilleumier 
et al., 1999). Correspondingly, neurons in area 7a of the posterior parietal lobe 
respond not only to retinotopic receptive field changes, but also to the angle o f gaze 
(Anderson et al., 1985), and activity of the cell can be described as a function of the 
two. Furthermore, they are consistent with a more recent single-cell study of cells the 
parietal lobe o f the monkey parietal cortex found that the activities of the cells in area 
7a are world-referenced whereas cells in LIP are body-referenced (Snyder et al, 
1998). The activity is thought to result from inputs from the neck proprioceptors for a 
body-referenced frames and world-referenced frames from vestibular inputs. This 
may explain the results of Vuilleumier and colleagues, who described the effects of 
eye and head rotation on the symptoms of neglect (1999).
Another interesting aspect is the fact that much visual processing remains 
intact, despite the patient having no awareness o f the stimuli. Behavioural studies
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show that a considerable amount of semantic priming can occur from neglected 
objects (McGlinchey-Berroth et al., 1993), in contrast to the lack of priming with 
unseen objects in patients with unilateral occipital damage. In line with this, recent 
fMRI results show that selective processing of complex objects such as faces or 
houses still occurs despite them being in the patients’ extinguished field (Rees et al.,
2000). These results have been interpreted by some to be evidence for the necessity of 
parietal areas, in addition to visual activity, for visual awareness (Driver & 
Mattingley, 1998; Rees et al., 2002).
Reversible lesions (TMS)
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) can be used to transiently disrupt the 
function of a given cortical target, thus creating a temporary ‘virtual brain lesion’, 
making it possible to study two aspects of the contribution of a given cortical region 
to visual awareness. Its relatively good spatial localization and high temporal 
resolution allows the experimenter to ask ‘what does it do?’ and ‘when does it do it?’. 
One of the earliest studies using this technique was that of Beckers and Zeki (1995), 
who disrupted V5 and VI while subjects performed a motion discrimination task. 
They found that while TMS over V5 was effective at disrupting motion perception at 
between -20 to +10 ms before or after the onset of visual stimulation, magnetic 
stimulation of VI abolished motion perception only at delays 60-70ms after stimulus 
onset. These simple observations led them to conclude that perceptually effective 
signals reach V5 before V I, and therefore bypass the primary sensory area.
Further studies have used TMS to investigate the role of cortical feedback in 
visual awareness. A recent study used TMS to elicit the perception of moving 
phosphenes by stimulating V5 and investigated if subthreshold stimulation of VI
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could disrupt the perception of the phosphenes (Pascal-Leone & Walsh, 2001). They 
found that VI pulses at around 45ms after V5 stimulation (although the brain area 
stimulated is actually closer to V3) were able to disrupt the perception of the moving 
phosphenes; most subjects reported the presence o f stationary phosphenes only. The 
authors interpreted this to be evidence for feedback connections to VI to be critical 
for the awareness of motion. Subsequent studies have used TMS to investigate the 
influence o f back-projections from the frontal eye fields (Grosbras & Paus, 2003; 
Ruff et al., 2006) and the parietal cortex (Hilgetag et al., 2001; Beck et al., 2006) on 
visual perception, finding that such projections also have an influence on visual 
awareness.
1.5.2. Electrophysiology
Correlating neural activity with psychophysical performance
Some of the earliest studies to correlate single-cell firing and awake monkeys’ 
perception (or at the very least psychophysical perfonnance) investigated the 
relationship between V5 firing and performance during a motion discrimination task 
(Britten et al., 1992). The task required a monkey to discriminate the direction o f a 
moving dot stimulus, which could be parametrically modulated in difficulty by 
varying the motion coherence of the array (figure 1.5.1a). The motion information in 
the random dots task is represented by direction selective neurons in area V5. When 
random dot motion appears in the receptive field of a V5 neuron, there is a large initial 
burst followed by a sustained response whose magnitude depends on the strength and 
direction of motion. Moreover, the animal’s ability to discriminate weak motion
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appears to be limited by variability in the response of these neurons (Parker and 
Newsome, 1998). In addition, evidence from lesion and microstimulation studies 
demonstrates that such responses underlie the monkey’s judgement in the random 
dots task (Newsome and Pare, 1988; Salzman et al., 1990).
However, while the responses of V5 neurons provide the evidence upon which 
the monkey bases its decision about direction, they do not integrate this evidence over 
time to form a decision. Their activity fluctuates with each passing random dot and 
the evidence they provide is therefore transient. While with lower coherence motion 
performance improves with longer viewing time, it never matches the maximal 
performance at high coherence, which occurs with a relatively short viewing time. 
Thus, information relevant to psychophysical performance accumulates over time, 
unlike the activity in V5. It was proposed that other neurons must ‘read out' the 
evidence from V5. Such characteristics were found in the lateral intraparietal area 
(LIP) (Gold & Shadlen, 2001). Neurons in this area not only accurately predict the 
monkey’s behavioural decision, but they also appear to accumulate evidence for the 
decision in response to the stimulus: LIP neurons show increasing ramp-like activity, 
with steeper ramps corresponding to higher coherence of stimuli (figure 1.5.1b). It is 
thought that when this activity crosses a threshold, a decision is made. Note that even 
with zero coherence stimuli, with no net motion, the activity meanders randomly, 
much like Brownian motion, until by chance it crosses the threshold. Such an 
interpretation is backed by recent microstimulation experiments on LIP (Hanks et al., 
2006) where it was found that stimulation of cells increased both the probability of 
saccade response toward the stimulated neurons receptive field and the speed of that 
response.
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While similar profiles have been found in other cortical areas, including the 
frontal eye fields (FEF) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and in subcortical 
structures (Kim & Shadlen, 1999; Horwitz & Newsome, 2001), the relative 
contribution of each of these loci to either the decision process or the perceptual 
process is not known. This highlights a fundamental problem in many experiments 
investigating the neural correlates of subjective perception: that is whether the neural 
activity correlating with behavioural report is a reflection of subjective perception, the 
decision process or both (i.e. these may not be such distinct phenomenon). These 
issues are addressed further in section 3.3.
Figure 1.5.1. Direction discrimination task and neural responses, (a) shows the 
task structure. The monkey fixates for a few hundred milliseconds. Two saccade
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targets appear before the motion stimulus is presented. The monkey indicates 
the perceived direction of motion after the stimulus disappears. In (b) and (c), 
the plots demonstrate how the neural activity unfolds over time after stimulus 
presentation. The ordinate represents the probability of pooled neural activity of 
directionally-selective neurons from LIP (b), and the superior colliculus (c), 
correctly predicting the behavioural response. Each coloured line represents a 
different percentage coherence of motion stimuli, as shown in the key. Adapted 
from Gold and Shadlen (2001).
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Multistable perception
Multistable perception refers to the tendency the perception of ambiguous visual 
images to alternate between two or more interpretations, a classic example being the 
Necker cube (Necker, 1832). As discussed in section 1.4, such images played a key 
role in the Gestalt psychology movement at the beginning o f the 20th century. 
Binocular rivalry is a particular class of this phenomenon whereby perception 
periodically alternates between the different images presented to each eye (see review 
Blake & Logothetis, 2002). This paradigm is an excellent tool to probe neural 
correlates o f visual awareness as the stimulus remains constant while the subjective 
percept changes, thereby controlling for any confounds associated with the stimuli. 
Leopold and Logothetis (1996) recorded from neurons in several visual areas in the 
macaque, from VI to the inferotemporal cortex, while the macaque reported its 
perceptual state under these conditions. The experiments found that only 
approximately 10% of the neurons in V 1 followed the percept, whereas as much as 
95% of the relevant neurons in the inferotemporal region, near the top o f the visual 
hierarchy (Hubei & Wiesel, 1962), did so in an almost all-or-none manner. That is, 
when the monkey signalled that it saw the stimulus, the cell fired. When the preferred 
stimulus o f the cell was present on the retina but the monkey reported that it did not 
perceive it, the cell remained silent. This suggests that neurons in the inferotemporal 
cortex may underlie visual awareness.
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A phenomenon closely related to binocular rivalry is called ‘flash 
suppression.’ If an image is projected monocularly, with nothing presented to the 
other eye, the observer naturally sees this image. I f  a second image is then projected 
or ‘flashed’ to the contralateral eye, the observer sees only this second image and is 
initially blind to the first image, even though it is still coming into that eye (Wolfe, 
1984). The situation can be reversed, such that in one situation, one image is 
perceived, but in a different situation, the other image is perceived. Like binocular 
rivalry, neurons in the superior temporal sulcus of the monkey respond to the 
subjective percept (Sheinberg & Logothetis, 1997). For example, a particular neuron 
may respond vigorously to an ape’s face, but not to a sunburst pattern in isolation. 
This is consistent with previous studies, which show cells in the inferotemporal cortex 
with a response selectivity for faces (Gross et al., 1972: Perrett et al., 1982). If  the 
image of the ape’s face is in the right eye and the sunburst pattern is suddenly 
switched on in the other eye, this neuron follows the percept the monkey signals and 
fails to fire for the ape's face, even though its image is still present in the right eye. 
Thus the neuron’s firing is then highly correlated with the monkey’s percept. The 
large majority of cells in this region, part o f the inferotemporal cortex, follow the 
percept rather than the stimulus.
The perceptual state of the animal while viewing bistable stimuli has also been 
correlated with activity in area LIP (Williams et al., 2003), an area of the parietal 
cortex previously implicated in accumulating evidence for perceptual decisions, as 
discussed in the previous section. While this area correlated with the perceived 
direction of motion of a briefly presented ambiguous motion stimulus, area V5 
showed very weak correlation. Thus, this suggests that V5 is not the basis of 
subjective motion perception and simply correlates with stimulus properties.
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Neuronal synchrony
The ‘binding problem', as named by Von der Malsberg (1981), refers to the 
theoretical problem that the brain has in associating (or binding) different features of 
visual space into a unified percept, since these are processed in the different 
functionally specialised areas o f the visual cortex. A potential neurobiological 
solution was presented when Gray and Singer reported that neurons in the cat visual 
cortex engage in oscillatory firing patterns and coordinate their responses to global 
stimulus properties by synchronising their responses within the gamma range of 40-60 
Hz (Gray et al., 1989). Thus spatially separated cells may display strong 
synchronisation if different parts of the same object fall within their respective 
receptive fields. However, they do not synchronise if the different stimulus parts do 
not belong to the same object. Such a mechanism circumvents the ‘one cell-one 
representation' problem posed by the grandmother-cell theory. This phenomenon was 
subsequently demonstrated to occur sub-cortical neurons in anaesthetised cats (Brecht 
et al., 1999), and cortical neurons in anaesthetised (Livingstone, 1996) and awake 
behaving monkeys (Kreiter & Singer, 1996) and seems to be ubiquitous across a wide 
range of species (see review, Engel & Singer, 2002). To probe its role in visual 
awareness, neural synchrony was investigated in the context of binocular rivalry 
(Fries et al., 1997). Awake strabismic cats were presented with dichoptic stimuli of 
patterns moving in different directions, which underwent binocular rivalry, similar to 
the situation described above in macaques. It was found that the synchronicity and 
regularity of oscillatory firing o f neurons responding to the stimulus as early as V 1 
was increased when that stimulus dominated and was perceived. Importantly, no 
differences in the spiking rates of neurons were observed in these neurons
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representing the dominant stimulus. Such empirical observations are in line with 
theoretical approaches to consciousness, many of which have suggested a close link 
between binding and conscious perception. Thus Crick and Koch (1990) suggested 
that only ‘bound’ neuronal activity can trigger short-term memory and thus become 
available to consciousness.
However, the exact role that oscillatory and synchronous activity has, if  any, 
remains controversial. The significance of the findings described above have been 
heavily criticised on both methodological and conceptual grounds (see Shadlen & 
Movshon, 1999). Moreover, there have been many reports where the perceptual state 
of animals performing tasks relating to binding has not correlated with synchrony. For 
example, Lamme and Spekreijse (1998) recorded from macaque V I, while the animal 
was presented with a figure-ground display composed from orientated line segments. 
They found no significant correlated activity between two recording sites representing 
the same region (figure or ground) or when representing different regions. More 
recently, it was found that in macaque area V5 while directional tuning correlated 
strongly with coherent moving plaid patterns, coherent plaids elicited significantly 
less synchrony than non-coherent plaids (Thiele & Stoner, 2003). One alternative 
function o f synchrony may be its role in top-down attentional processes rather than 
conscious perception per se. In a recent study, Fries and colleagues (2001) recorded 
directly from area V4 in awake macaques while viewing two identical Gabor patches. 
When the animal was cued to attend to one of them, the concomitant activity in V4 
increased synchronisation in the gamma range, while the firing rate remained the 
same. Thus the previous results may be simply due to the animal focussing attention 
on the relevant stimulus. However, this attentional perspective does speak to the long 
established view that attention is the mechanism for binding (Treisman & Gelade,
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1980), and therefore has some consistency with the proposal that synchrony plays a 
role in binding.
Feedback to VI: late modulations
After the presentation of a visual stimulus, there is an initial cascade o f neural activity 
transmitted through feed-forward connections. However the tuning of cells are not 
completely defined by this stage and later components shape the cells' response. For 
example, the preferred orientations of output layer neurons in macaque VI usually 
change with time, and the orientation tuning may have more than one peak (Ringach 
et al., 1997). Simple feed-forward models cannot explain these observed properties, 
although they arise naturally in simulations of feedback networks (e.g. Douglas et al., 
1995). In addition to the firing rate, synchronicity and oscillations of neurons, this late 
response has been shown to correlate with the subjective perception of the stimulus. 
Super and colleagues (2001) presented monkeys with a figure-ground display and 
found that the late response is larger when the receptive field o f the recorded V 1 cell 
is located at the inside of the figure than when the figure is distant from the receptive 
field, even though the stimuli at the classical receptive fields are identical in the two 
conditions. Moreover, this modulation occurred only when the monkey was aware of 
the figure. On trials in which the stimulus was presented, but the monkey did not 
detect it, the late modulation was absent. The onset o f this differential response occurs 
at about 100 ms: about 60 ms later than the onset o f the non-differential initial 
responses (figure 1.5.2). This study therefore provides evidence for the hypothesis 
that feedback connections are essential for phenomenal visual awareness (Lamme, 
2004).
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Figure 1.5.2. Population average responses for cells in macaque VI during 
figure-ground detection task, (a) Response for figure present in bold line, ground 
in thin line. Shaded region shows difference between the figure and ground, (b) 
Responses on trials in which the animal sees the stimulus. The figure-ground 
difference remains, (c) Responses on trails in which the stimulus is presented but 
not reported; no late modulation of the response occurs. Taken from Super et al. 
(2001).
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1.5.3. Human brain imaging
Brain areas correlating with awareness
Although the field of human brain imaging played a major role in opening up visual 
awareness as a legitimate field of study, it is equally responsible for much confusion 
in the matter. Activity in areas of every lobe o f the brain has been correlated with 
subjective perception. It could be cynically noted that this is usually the part of the 
brain that the researcher happens to be working on. The earliest area in the visual 
hierarchy that has been shown to correlate with visual awareness is the LGN. Two 
papers recently demonstrated that activity in this subcortical nucleus correlates with 
the subjects' perceptual state during binocular rivalry (Haynes et al., 2005b; 
Wunderlich et al., 2005). Moreover, the study o f Haynes and colleagues showed that 
regions of the LGN which have strong eye-preference, show reduced activity when 
the stimulus presented in their preferred eye is perceptually suppressed. This result 
was surprising given that an earlier macaque electrophysiological study did not find 
perceptual correlates in the LGN during binocular rivalry (Lehky & Maunsell, 1996). 
This apparent discrepancy may be due to interspecies differences or the ability of the 
fMRI signal to produce a population measure of neuronal activity, in contrast to 
single-cell firing in electrophysiology (Logothetis & Wandell, 2004).
Preceding this finding, it was demonstrated that the next stage in the visual 
hierarchy, the primary visual cortex (VI), could correlate with subjective perception 
under binocular rivalry, with different studies reporting either activations (Polonsky et 
al., 2000) or deactivations (Lee & Blake, 2002), according to perceptual state. 
Furthermore, many studies have shown that V 1 correlates with perception in detection 
tasks, in agreement with the electrophysiological studies described in the previous
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section. For example, when subjects were required to detect a threshold pattern, VI 
activity correlated with correct detection and false alarms (Ress & Heeger., 2003). 
Thus even when no stimulus was presented, but the subjects’ incorrectly identified its 
presence, V 1 responded as if it were presented. Furthermore, a combined EEG and 
fMRI study (ffytche & Pins, 2003) using a simple contrast detection task, showed that 
VI activity correlates with subjective perception as early as 100ms, suggesting that 
awareness is subsumed by processes early in the visual hierarchy, without recourse to 
late top-down enhancement. In addition, a recent experiment has shown that 
perceptual completion has correlates as early as V 1, indicating a possible role for this 
area in illusory filling in (Meng et al., 2005).
The next stages in the visual hierarchy, such as extrastriate areas or mid-level 
form regions, have been some of the most reliable in demonstrating the neural 
correlates of visual awareness. As with human VI or electrophysiological studies, 
many of these experiments used binocular rivalry'. For instance, Tong and colleagues 
exploited the well-known fact that faces and ‘places’ are processed in two 
functionally localised areas of the ventral cortex, the ‘fusiform face area’ (FFA) 
(Kanwisher et al., 1997) and the ‘parahippocampal place area’ (PPA) (Epstein & 
Kanwisher, 1998). House stimuli were presented to one eye, while face stimuli were 
presented to the other, resulting in perceptual rivalry. Like previous macaque studies 
(e.g. Logothetis et al., 1989), the subjects’ subjective reports were positively 
correlated with neural activity, in this instance the mean activity in the FFA and PPA, 
when the face and house stimuli were dominant respectively. Similarly, activity in 
extrastriate area V5 has been shown to correlate with the subjective percept, and not 
simply the stimulus, in patient G.Y. when he consciously detected motion in his 
‘blind’ hemifield (Zeki & ffytche, 1998).
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Figure 1.5.3. Mean BOLD activated in the parahippocampal place area (PPA) 
and fusiform face area (FFA) after perceptual switches during binocular rivalry. 
Taken from Tong et al., 1998.
However in addition to these visual processing areas, more recent functional imaging 
studies have also shown non-visual areas such as the parietal cortex to correlate with 
visual awareness. As discussed in more detail in section 3.2, many recent studies have 
found a right-biased fronto-parietal network of brain areas correlating with visual 
awareness, in addition to areas of the visual cortex. A clear example is a recent fMRI 
study of the ‘attentional blink’ (AB; Marois et al., 2000), which occurs when a subject 
detects one target stimulus in a stream of distractors but consequently fails to detect a 
second target presented within around 500ms or so of the first. In the study of Marois 
and colleagues, they set the interval time between the first target stimulus and the 
second such that the second stimulus was only detected on some trials and missed on 
others. Comparing whole brain activity on ‘hit’ trials with ‘miss’ trials thereby 
showed the neural correlates of subjective perception, while the stimulus was 
identical. This contrast revealed multiple right-biased frontal and parietal regions,
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suggesting that these are critical for target detection in AB. Activations in similar 
areas have been reported in other fMRI studies o f perceptual transitions during 
binocular rivalry (Lumer et al., 1997) and viewing of bistable figures (Kleinschmidt et 
al., 1998), change detection (Beck et al., 2001) and semantic priming (Dehaene et al.,
2001). Figure 1.5.4 shows a recent meta-analysis o f studies showing frontal and 
parietal correlates of awareness (Rees et al., 2002).
Figure 1.5.4. Meta-analysis of frontal and parietal areas that correlate with 
visual awareness. Each coloured circle corresponds to the most significant voxel 
observed in each of the studies represented in the key. Consistent activations 
have been observed in the superior parietal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices, 
as highlighted with the large grey circles (adapted from Rees et al., 2002).
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An alternative perspective from investigating which brain areas correlate with 
perception is to observe which areas correlate with the stimulus and not with visual 
awareness. This would imply that activity in such an area is insufficient to generate 
the percept. However, like areas that correlate with subjective perception, this has 
been shown to occur with almost every area of the cortex from VI onwards. Using a 
multivariate pattern classifier Haynes and colleagues (Haynes & Rees, 2005) showed 
that V 1 still distinguishes between different orientations o f gratings even when made 
perceptually invisible through metacontrast masking. Mid-level object areas such as 
the FFA or PPA may also be selectively activated by stimuli rendered invisible by 
flicker fusion (Moutoussis & Zeki, 2002). Furthermore, recent results show that 
extremely abstract representations such as task-set that occur in the prefrontal cortex 
may be activated in the absence of the observers' awareness (Lau & Passingham, 
personal communication). Similarly, activity in the primary motor cortex can correlate 
with unconscious semantic stimuli that prime the subsequent motor response 
(Dehaene et al., 1998).
Gamma band activity correlates with awareness
Numerous animal electrophysiological studies reviewed in section 1.5.2 demonstrate 
a correlation between synchronous neuronal activity, especially in the gamma range, 
and visual awareness. Correspondingly, numerous studies have also found that 
synchronous activity can correlate with perception in humans using techniques with 
high temporal resolution, such as electroencephalogram (EEG) or 
magnetoencephalogram (MEG). For instance, EEG was recorded while subjects 
viewed an ambiguous visual stimulus (‘Mooney faces’) that could be perceived as 
either a face or as a meaningless shape (Rodriguez et al., 1999). When subjects
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reported seeing a face, phase synchronization at the gamma frequency occurred across 
widely separated brain areas encompassing anterior non-visual brain regions and 
posterior sensory regions likely to correspond to the visual cortex. Moreover, such a 
pattern of activity was absent when subjects reported seeing a meaningless shape. 
Similar results have also been shown in the context o f binocular rivalry, during the 
perceptual changes in conscious awareness of one or the other o f the two rivaling 
stimuli (Tononi et al., 1998). These transitions were accompanied by a change in the 
synchrony of firing of neurons representing the stimuli. In addition, widespread 
coherence occurred between the MEG at various non-sensory regions, in lateral and 
anterior brain sites, which may correspond to frontal and parietal cortices, and sensory 
areas responding to the stimulus that dominated perception. In contrast, there was no 
such coherence for the perceptually suppressed stimulus.
Awareness during the sleep-wake cycle
While sleeping and dreaming affects all of consciousness rather than specifically 
visual awareness, the sleep cycle offers a different viewpoint to the other studies 
described. The neural processes that are observed during visual dreaming seem have 
many things in common with those that occur during awake seeing. Sleep is 
conventionally divided into two phases on the basis o f EEG recordings (Aserinsky & 
Kleitman, 1953; Hobson, 1995). During slow-wave sleep (SWS), dreaming typically 
does not occur and the scalp EEG is dominated by high-amplitude, low-frequency 
oscillations. However, during the rapid eye movement (REM) phase of sleep, when 
the EEG has similar patterns of activity to the waking state (characterized by low- 
amplitude, high-frequency signals) dreaming occurs, often resulting in rich visual 
experiences.
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Brain activity measured with fMRI in humans during REM sleep is reduced in the 
primary visual cortex and other low-level visual areas (compared with non-REM 
phases of sleep), whereas mid-level form areas such as the fusiform gyrus are 
activated (Braun et al., 1995). By contrast, during SWS, early visual cortex activation 
is observed, whereas medial temporal areas are deactivated. Furthermore, there is a 
breakdown in the cortical effective connectivity, observed through wakefulness, 
during non-REM sleep, (Massimini et al., 2005). Suppression o f activity in VI during 
REM sleep is consistent with the finding that patients who have lost part or all o f V 1 
continue to dream visually. Complete loss of dreaming is associated with unilateral 
damage to either frontal or parietal cortex (Solms, 1996). However, specific loss of 
visual dreams is associated with bilateral lesions in the medial occipitotemporal 
region (Solms, 1996). Overall, these experiments suggest a dissociation in brain 
activity during dreaming and non-dreaming, in that only areas higher than the primary 
sensory cortices correlate with visual experiences during dreaming.
1.5.4. Human single-unit recording
The opportunity to record directly from the human brain exists with neurosurgery 
procedures, including recordings of intracranial EEG, local field potentials, multiple- 
neuron activity, and the activity of individual neurons. Single- and multiple-neuron 
activity has been recorded both intra-operatively during epilepsy surgery (Ojemann et 
al., 1998) and surgery for movement disorders (Benazzouz et al., 2002; Davis et al., 
2000; Lenz et al., 1994), and extra-operatively through chronically indwelling 
electrodes for treatment of epilepsy (Fried et al., 1997). Similar to those experiments 
in macaques described above, Kreiman et al. (2002) used flash suppression while
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recording from human medial temporal lobe neurons. Approximately two-thirds of 
visually selective neurons tested followed the perceptual alternations rather than the 
retinal input. For instance, a neuron that responded to a line drawing of the ex- 
American president Clinton was active only when the figure was perceived, but not 
when perception of the drawing was suppressed, even though it was still physically 
presented.
In other experiments, the firing of neurons in the hippocampus, amygdala, 
entorhinal cortex and parahippocampal gyrus were characterised both in response to 
the direct perception of objects and the mental imagery of them (Kreiman et al.,
2000). The response to an imagined object, even though no retinal input was present, 
was comparable to that of the real object, both in selectivity and in firing rate. O f the 
neurons that fired selectively during both vision and imagery, the majority (88%) had 
identical selectivity. The firing rate during imagery was approximately 85% of that 
during actual vision. Perhaps a more striking finding is the invariance displayed by 
some of these neurons reported by Quiroga et al. (2005). For instance, one cell in the 
medial temporal lobe responded selectively to pictures of the actress Jennifer Aniston, 
but not to hundreds of other pictures of actresses of the same age or even to a picture 
o f Aniston and the actor Brad Pitt. This extremely selective, sparse nature of these 
cells’ responses borders on the so-called ‘Grandmother cell’ notion that the brain has 
a separate neuron to detect and represent every object encountered (Barlow, 1972). 
However, given that these neurons were found at the border between areas that 
represent visual information about object structure and memory-related conceptual 
information about object identity, it is unknown if they relate purely to visual 
perception or to memory.
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1.5.5. Psychophysics
While the techniques described in the previous sections seek to directly correlate 
subjective awareness and a physiological measurement o f neural activity, many 
studies have been able to make important inferences about the mechanisms 
underlying visual awareness by using psychophysics alone. This is guided by the 
wealth of knowledge we have gained about the visual brain and its responses to 
various stimuli. Perhaps the simplest o f these are those that exploit visual after­
effects. Adaptation has often been referred to as the psychophysicists’ electrode 
(Frisby, 1979) as it allows one to infer the existence of neural populations through 
after-effects. While manipulating awareness, the experimenter may infer what neural 
populations were activated by the stimulus through measuring the extent of the after­
effect.
This logic was applied to test the hypothesis that we are not aware of neural 
activity in VI (He & MacLeod, 2001). Subjects were exposed to gratings so high in 
spatial frequency that they were perceptually identical to a uniform field. 
Consequently, the observers required more contrast to detect a test grating presented 
at the same orientation than one presented at the orthogonal orientation. Subjects also 
experienced a tilt after-effect that depended on the test pattern's tilt and its relation to 
the invisible orientation o f the pre-exposed pattern. Given that visual system is coding 
for orientation of these invisible gratings, the authors conclude that subjects are 
unaware of neural activity in this area: most probably V 1. This type o f logic has also 
been applied to investigate awareness in the context of attention (Rees et al., 1997; 
Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005), midlevel vision (Moradi et al., 2005) and patient studies 
(Humphrey et al., 1995).
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A more recent trend has been to use psychophysics as a tool to investigate the 
timing of visual awareness. More specifically, how perceptual times relate to neural 
times. One of the best examples o f this is the perceptual lag o f colour behind motion 
demonstrated by Moutoussis and Zeki (1997a, b). In these experiments, observers pair 
a colour stimulus with a motion stimulus that occurs 80-100ms earlier, although they 
perceived these at the same time. This suggests that the colour processing system 
encompassing the V4 complex produces conscious percept before the motion 
processing system -  the V5 complex. Moreover, it suggests that the brain does not 
wait to for the other system to finish what it is processing; rather it is ‘online’ and 
binds whatever is processed. Thus these results suggest that there is no higher area 
that information is integrated in or re-routed to before becoming conscious. Other 
studies have focussed on the duration of visual stimuli, rather than the relative 
perceptual times. For instance, a recent study showed that adaptation to oscillatory 
motion or flicker alters the perceived duration of a subsequent stimulus in a 
retinotopic manner (Johnston et al., 2006). Consistent with the study described above, 
this implies, on the timescale of hundreds of milliseconds, that there is not central 
integrative clock mechanism in the brain. Rather, duration is coded for in a low-level 
distributed manner.
However, there is psychophysical evidence suggesting that what is perceived 
can be influenced retrospectively by subsequent events — a framework known as 
‘post-diction’. Visual information is integrated into a temporal buffer zone before it is 
perceived. While this proposal is consistent with a range o f experiments including 
backward masking (Bachmann, 1994), the color-phi phenomenon (Kolers & von 
Grunau, 1976) and the disruption of the perception o f phosphenes (Pascual-Leone & 
Walsh, 2001), it was with the flash-lag effect that this proposal was made most
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explicit (Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000a). This illusion occurs when a moving object 
is accompanied by a spatially aligned stationary flash. Observers perceive the flash to 
spatially lag behind the moving object. Eagleman and Sejnowski proposed that this 
occurs because the perceived position of a moving stimulus is the outcome of an 
averaging process that occurs over 100 ms or so. However, when a salient event 
occurs, such as the flash, the information accumulated for the moving object is 4reset' 
and the visual system must accumulate positional information from scratch before it is 
perceived. Since this process takes 100 ms or so, the new positions for the moving 
object are those which occur after the flash -  therefore the flash is perceived to lag the 
moving object. More recent evidence for such a mechanism come from the timing of 
perception around saccadic eye movements, such as the illusory reversal of temporal 
order (Morrone et al., 2005), or the illusory trans-saccadic filling-in of time 
('chronostasis'; Yarrow, et al., 2001). While there is very little, if  any, evidence for 
what the neurobiological realisation of this 4postdictive' mechanism would be, it has 
been speculated (Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2003) that it could be related to the 
extensive feedback mechanisms in the primate visual system (Shipp & Zeki, 1989).
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1.6 Current theories of visual awareness
As described in the previous section, there is a wealth o f experiments investigating the 
neurobiological foundations of visual awareness. However, rather than providing a 
clear framework from which to work, it has generated multiple theories, with varying 
degrees of compatibility, which are more often than not completely contradictory. A 
feature of most of these hypotheses specifies some ‘magic ingredient’ that 
distinguishes conscious from non-conscious processing of information in the visual 
system. This section reviews the most prominent of these and explains how they link 
to the empirical evidence.
1.6.1. Microconsciousness
The theory of microconsciousness is based on the parallel and modular architecture of 
the primate visual system (Zeki & Bartels, 1999). Combined physiological, 
anatomical and psychophysical evidence suggests that different specialised systems o f 
the visual brain, which process different visual submodalities such as colour and 
motion, are capable of generating percepts independently o f each other. For instance 
in humans clinical evidence (Zihl, et al.. 1983; Zeki, 1990, 1991) shows that damage 
to the visual area that processes colour only affects colour perception and not motion 
perception, and vice versa; therefore the ability to consciously perceive one attribute 
does not depend on the ability to perceive another. Moreover, the residual visual 
functions of patients reviewed in section 1.5 shows that damage to the visual cortex 
may leave only the ability to perceive one visual attribute, in this case motion (Zeki & 
ffytche, 1998). These patients seemed to experience ‘pure’ visual motion without the 
other attributes such as contrast or form that also define the moving dot stimuli in this
study. For instance, one patient reported ‘they [the moving objects] don’t appear to 
have any colour or shape. They look like shadows4. Consistent with this, the fMRI 
results showed that the only visual area active was V5 during perception of the 
stimulus.
It was this modular feature of the visual system that originally motivated the 
study of the perceptual times of visual attributes in order to answer the question of 
whether, in addition to being processed separately in the cortex, they are perceived 
separately in time (Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997a). Colour was found to be perceived 
some 100ms before motion when the two perceptual attributes were paired together, 
findings since confirmed using a colour-contingent motion after-effect (Arnold et al., 
2001; for further discussion see section 2.1). Overall, these results were interpreted to 
mean that once the processing of a stimulus attribute within a specialised subsystem 
of the visual cortex is complete, it is perceived, without recourse to other brain areas; 
a claim backed by the anatomical fact that there is no central area to which all the 
specialised processing systems uniquely project (Shipp & Zeki, 1995). The major 
determinant in whether there is visual awareness is sufficient neural firing within the 
visual cortex.
1.6.2. Feedback to VI
Several of these theories posit that a certain pattern o f neuronal activity may be a 
prerequisite for awareness, rather than simply neuronal activity per se. As discussed in 
the previous section, a number of electrophysiological studies have found shape 
detection to correlate with a late modulation in V 1 activity, although the initial firing 
is identical whether the monkey reports seeing it or not. While these experiments have 
been limited to the use of figure-ground segmentation tasks, some authors have
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argued that this demonstrates feedback to VI is crucial for all forms of visual 
awareness (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2001). Such a proposal has also found support 
from TMS studies in humans (Pascal-Leone & Walsh, 2001) and some earlier studies 
of blindsight patients. To its credit, unlike many neurobiological theories of visual 
awareness, this view makes the distinction between access and phenomenal awareness 
(Block, 1996). Lamme argues that phenomenal awareness is subserved by recurrent 
feedback within visual areas, whereas access to report is contingent upon attention 
and the associated frontal and parietal cortical areas (Lamme, 2004).
While this theory makes sense in light of macaque electrophysiological results 
investigating feedback to V 1, it is difficult to reconcile with reported cases of patients 
, who have VI missing in one hemisphere, but are still able to consciously perceive 
visual stimuli in their respective visual field (Barbur et al., 1993; Zeki & ffytche, 
1998). However, this finding is controversial and it has been debated whether the 
reported experience really constitutes visual awareness at all. For instance, it has been 
claimed that the report of patients’ perceptual experience in the blind hemifield is ‘a 
mere awareness that something happened but with no experience of accompanying 
visual qualia’ (Silvanto et al., 2007).
1.6.3. Neuronal synchrony
One of the most popular physiological candidates for visual awareness is neural 
activity synchronized in the gamma frequency range at -35^45 Hz (Engel & Singer,
2001). This proposal originated in the theoretical suggestion that selective 
synchronization of neuronal firing might provide a basis for figure-ground 
segmentation in vision and the binding of separate features (von der Malsburg, 1981). 
More recently, evidence has accumulated that neurons responding to a single object
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synchronize their activity both within and between visual areas, and synchrony 
increases as a stimulus moves into the focus o f attention (Engel et al., 2001), as 
reviewed in the previous section. We have seen that widespread synchronized activity 
at these frequencies characterizes MEG in the waking state and REM sleep (Llinas & 
Ribary, 1993), and resonance of the auditory evoked potential in the same range has 
been used successfully as a marker of awareness in studies of the measurement of the 
depth of anaesthesia (Munglani et al., 1993). Engel and Singer have proposed that 
synchrony may play a role in all the major processes subserving visual consciousness: 
arousal, sensory segmentation, selective attention and working memory; and also in 
the processes of ‘higher-order’ consciousness: motivation, action planning and 
symbolic processing (Engel et al., 1999).
1.6.4. Thalamo-cortical interactions
Edelman and Tononi have proposed that the key neural mechanism underlying 
conscious experience are rapid re-entrant interactions between posterior thalamo­
cortical areas involved in sensory processing and anterior areas related to memory and 
executive functioning (Edelman, 1992; Tononi & Edelman, 1998). A recent 
formulation has three main tenets, (1) consciousness arises from ‘the fast integration 
of a large amount o f information within a dynamic core o f strongly interacting 
elements’; (2) re-entry, via reciprocal interconnections between regions of the 
thalamo-cortical system, mediates this rapid integration; (3) the emergence of 
‘primary consciousness’ (which roughly corresponds to the definition of phenomenal 
consciousness described earlier) depends upon the integration of current sensory 
processing with previously acquired memories. Tononi argues that this model of a 
constantly shifting ‘dynamic core’ of neural elements accounts for many properties of
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awareness: continuity and changefulness, selectivity, the focus of attention and its 
diffuse surround, and the wide ‘access' o f its contents to other psychological 
operations. The theory stresses the importance of the complex integration of thalamo­
cortical subsystems, which are both functionally segregated and interactive. This 
account has similar features to the synchrony hypothesis, in particular the long-range 
interareal synchronisation of distant cortical sites, and studies showing increased 
synchronisation associated with conscious awareness support both o f these theories.
1.6.5. Brainstem enabling
While many neurobiological theories of awareness are concerned with cortical 
dynamics, one of the most enduring suggestions for a necessary neural component is 
the brainstem -  more specifically, the ascending reticular activating system. There are 
three lines of evidence that suggest a critical role in consciousness: (1) as early as the 
nineteen-forties, in a series of classic experiments, electrical stimulation within the 
reticular formation in lightly anesthetized non-human mammals, was associated with 
a desynchronisation of the electroencephalogram (EEG) that hallmarks awake and 
attentive states (Magoun, 1954); (2) Magoun (1954), and many others since, provided 
evidence that persistent coma resulted after bilateral lesions to the reticular activating 
system in the mesencephalic reticular formation of the brainstem. While this 
obviously addresses the issue of conscious states (wakefulness, sleeping etc.), it is 
more than likely that no sensory awareness exists during coma and the relation to 
visual awareness is clear -  without being in a ‘conscious state’ there can be no 
phenomenal awareness. (3) A functional imaging study of patient G.Y. found that 
activity in the brainstem correlated with awareness o f motion stimuli, thereby
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providing a more tangible link between brainstem activity and sensory awareness 
(Zeki & ffytche, 1998).
1.6.6. Global workspace
The ‘global workspace theory’ of consciousness has its roots in cognitive psychology, 
from the cognitive architecture forged by Newell and Simon (Newell, 1994). Newell 
showed the utility o f a global workspace capacity in a complex system of specialized 
knowledge sources, which could cooperatively solve problems that no single source 
could solve alone. However, it was Baars who was one o f the first to apply this 
framework to consciousness, arguing that consciousness facilitates widespread access 
between otherwise independent brain functions (Baars, 1983). With the proliferation 
of human brain imaging in the last decade or so, this theory has found a more 
empirical footing, and particular favour with those who argue for the necessity of 
frontal and parietal cortices to visual areas for awareness (e.g. Dehaene et al. 2006; 
Rees et al., 2002). Note however, the theoretical origins can equally be applied to 
other theories that advocate large-scale integration of brain states, such Edelman and 
Tononi’s dynamic core, or the brain-stem enabling theory, which was Baars’ original 
candidate for the neurobiological basis o f the workspace.
One of the most prominent neurobiological formulations o f the ‘workspace’ 
hypothesis argues that early sensory activation is necessary but not sufficient for 
conscious access (Dehaene et al., 2006). For instance, when neglect patients are 
presented with stimuli, visual areas still selectively respond to these, even though they 
are unseen .(Vuilleumier et al., 2001). To be aware of the stimulus, there needs to be 
top-down amplification from parietal and frontal areas. Evidence for this proposal 
comes mainly from human brain imaging data, which has shown activity prefrontal
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and parietal areas to correlate with visual awareness (reviewed in the previous 
section). Once the information is conscious, it is globally available to all other 
subsystems of the brain, such as memory, and is eligible for motor report (Dehaene et 
al., 2003).
1.6.7. An emerging theme: global-integrated vs. local-modular
In the previous sections we reviewed the most prominent theories of the 
neurobiological underpinnings of visual awareness. While each of these suggests 
different mechanisms, there is one concept that defines them all: connectivity. Each of 
the theories described may be placed along a continuum defined by the extent and 
location of integration at some stage along the sensory-motor pathway (see figure
1.6 .1).
Anterior cingulate
Sensory inpu
Dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex
Parietal cortex
Premotor cortex
Higher visual areas: e.g. V5
Motor output
Primary sensory area: VI Motor cortex
Thalamus & reticular activating system
Figure 1.6.1. Schematic diagram of the sensorimotor pathway.
58
Thus at one end there is the microconsciousness theory which suggests that a feed­
forward driving input from the retina to the visual cortex is sufficient for awareness 
(Bartels & Zeki, 1999). This proposes that top-down influences are not necessary for 
awareness and visual attributes are perceived asynchronously. Next on the continuum 
Lamme and colleagues suggest that recurrent interactions within the visual cortex, 
through feedback connections from higher visual areas to V 1, are critical for visual 
awareness (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2001). In contrast, widespread thalamic interactions 
(Tononi & Edelman, 1998) or long-range connectivity from the global workspace in 
frontal regions (e.g. Dehaene et al., 2003) are considered to be the ‘magic ingredient’. 
It is therefore the extent o f the integration of brain states that lies at the heart o f the 
current debate of the biological basis for sensory awareness.
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1.7 Thesis aims
The aim of this thesis is to test predictions o f the low-level modular theory of visual 
awareness against competing theories, such as the global workspace hypothesis 
(Dehaene et al., 2003). This modular view is summarised in the ‘microconsciousness’ 
framework (Zeki & Bartels, 1999) in which each visual processing system, such as 
that for colour or motion, is capable of generating a conscious correlate autonomously 
in parallel across space, within each of the different functionally specialised areas of 
the visual brain, and across time, with different attributes perceived at different times 
when each subsystem has finished processing the stimulus. Given the scope and wide- 
ranging implications of this topic, we have approached it from three diverse angles: 
(1) Two psychophysical experiments investigate temporal aspects of visual perception 
-  in particular these address the issue of whether the timing of awareness is an 
‘online' phenomenon rather than integrated into a temporal buffer zone prior to 
awareness. We measure the relative perceptual times of different magnitudes of 
direction changes and investigate the ‘flash-lag’ effect (Nijhawan, 1994) and related 
illusions of positional localisation. (2) The first two fMRl experiments examine the 
necessity o f frontal and parietal areas for visual awareness in the context of bistable 
figures, combined with dynamic causal modelling (Friston et al., 2003), and 
perception outside the focus of attention. (3) We look to extend the concept of 
modularity of awareness to that of ‘access consciousness’, that is the ability to give a 
report o f a conscious experience (Block, 1996), in addition to the previous studies on 
phenomenal consciousness. To this end, we combine psychophysics with fMRI to 
investigate the interaction between report modality and visual awareness.
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Psychophysics
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2.1 The asynchronous perception of direction changes
2.1.1. Introduction
The timing of perceptual events of different visual submodalities has been 
investigated by psychophysical studies that require subjects to pair a colour with a 
direction of motion of alternating stimuli over short time windows. The awareness of 
the former precedes that o f the latter by about 80-100 ms (Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997 a 
and b; Arnold & Clifford, 2002). Therefore over very brief time frames, the brain 
mis-binds the colour that is perceived at time t with the motion that is perceived at 
time t-1. This mis-binding introduces a serious problem which binding studies have 
yet to address, namely its temporal determinants. In simpler terms, the brain does not 
appear to wait for all the processing systems to terminate their tasks. Rather, it seems 
to bind what has already been perceived. This suggests that there is no central area 
that waits for all the processing systems to terminate their tasks before binding them 
together.
The perception of colour and of motion are the results o f activity in two 
different systems, one centred around the colour centre o f the cerebral cortex — the V4 
complex -  and the other around its motion centre -  the V5 complex (Zeki 1978a; 
Zeki, et al., 1991). This has led perceptual asynchrony to be interpreted in terms of 
differences in the processing times required to reach a perceptual state (Zeki & 
Bartels 1999), a suggestion now supported by other psychophysical evidence. For 
example, Arnold and Clifford (2002) demonstrated that the size of the perceptual lag 
between colour and motion varies as a function of the magnitude of direction change. 
This result inspired us to go a step a further and ask whether activity in a single 
cortical system, or even area, can be fractionated in time, in such a way that one
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group of cells in it terminates its processing task, and hence acquires a conscious 
correlate, before another group. This would be so if varying the characteristics of the 
stimulus attributes results in a perceptual asynchrony for different characteristics of 
the same visual submodality. The implications o f this, if  found to be true, are not 
negligible. It would suggest that the binding o f the activity of different groups of 
cells within the same cortical area is also not subject, over brief time windows, to a 
higher control and that any binding that may occur is between the results that a given 
group of cells have achieved at time t with what another group had achieved at time t- 
1. Here we test this by restricting the experiment to the single attribute o f motion. 
This is based on the well-established fact that the response latency for directionally 
selective cells in V5 is greatest if  stimulation in their preferred direction is preceded 
by stimulation in the opposite, null, direction. The time course and degree of 
inhibition is diminished if the preceding stimulus is at, say, 45° to the preferred 
direction (Priebe & Lisberger, 2002). The expectation, therefore, is that, when the two 
direction changes of motion are the same, the same degree o f excitation and inhibition 
would occur in area V5 and hence the two directions o f motion would be perceived 
simultaneously. By contrast, when the two directions o f motion are, say, up and down 
for one side, and up and to the right for the other, the degree of inhibition for the latter 
direction would be much less and hence that the activity in one group of cells will 
reach a perceptual state before the other. The perceptual consequence of this would be 
that the two directions would be perceived asynchronously. The former has been 
tested by pairing of two orthogonal directions of motion, which were found to be 
perceived synchronously as we would predict (Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997a). The latter 
has not, and we report its results here.
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Given the recent precedent to measure relative perceptual times using both a 
pairing task and temporal order judgements (e.g. Johnston & Nishida, 2002; Clifford 
et al., 2003; Bedell, et al., 2003), we use both paradigms to test whether smaller 
directions changes are perceived before larger ones. Our findings confirm our 
hypothesis that smaller changes in direction of motion are perceived before larger 
ones with each task. They thus demonstrate that two visual attributes processed in the 
same visual area and of the same temporal structure may be perceived 
asynchronously.
2.1.2. Materials and Methods
Pairing judgement: Four subjects (3 male and 1 female) with normal or corrected to 
normal vision were instructed to fixate a central cross on a computer monitor (Sony 
Trinitron with a refresh rate o f 60 Hz) at a distance of 50 cm, whilst viewing two sets 
of nine randomly placed moving white squares (1.22° in length) on either side of a 
fixation cross on a black background subtending within a square o f 20° visual angle. 
Both sets of squares moved in either of two directions o f motion at a speed of 6.5° 
sec \  changing direction every 0.5 s. One set (test squares) always moved back and 
forth along the horizontal axis while the other set (condition squares) moved 
rightward along the horizontal axis, and upwards at 45°, 90° or 135° (from rightward 
motion) in three different conditions respectively (see figures 2.1.1 and 2.2.2). The 
last condition, a 180° direction change, acted as a control, with both sets of squares 
moving back and forth along the horizontal axis. The changes in the directions of each 
of these two sets of squares were defined by two square-wave oscillations o f the same 
period of Is, presented at 30 different phase differences with respect to each other, 
within the range of 0-360°. Each phase difference was presented four times in each
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trial in a random order. In all conditions, each trial consisted of the presentation of 
two sets of moving stimuli for around 6s, at the end of which subjects were required 
to determine the direction of motion o f the condition squares when the test squares 
moved to the right in a 2 alternative forced choice. A key-press on the computer 
keyboard recorded their choice. To control for attentional bias, two additional 
experiments were also performed for the 90° condition. (1) Subjects had to pair the 
direction of the condition squares when the test squares moved left. (2) The sides on 
which the test and condition squares were presented were reversed.
Subjects repeated 4 trials for each condition, giving 16 choices for all 30 phase 
differences. For each subject, the responses for each trial were plotted as polar curves, 
which represent response curves (see Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997a). These plot the 
percentage of time that the rightward motion of the test squares was paired with the 
specific direction of the condition squares. For example, in the first condition this 
would be plotted as the percentage of time that the rightward motion of the test 
squares was paired with the 45° rightward motion o f the condition squares. If there is 
no asynchrony in the perception of the change in direction of the two motion stimuli, 
the response curve should resemble the veridical curve, which gives a rotation angle 
o f zero. By treating each point on the graph as a vector, a mean vector was calculated, 
from which a rotation angle could be derived by measuring its angle against the 
vertical. The difference in the relative perceptual times of the two sets of motion 
stimuli was then calculated, as each degree is equal to 1.43ms, since 360° = 515ms, 
and a two-tailed t-test performed to test its significance from zero. Since the pattern of 
results suggested a possible linear relationship for each subject across conditions, the 
correlation coefficient (Pearson’s r) was calculated with a 95% confidence interval for 
z.
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Figure 2.1.1. The direction of motion over time of the reference and test squares 
at three phase differences for the pairing task. ‘Cond’ means the condition 
specific direction of motion. The top row shows the direction of the reference 
squares, which move left and right along the horizontal axis at a constant 
alternation rate. The three rows below show the directions of motion of the test 
squares at three example phase differences, moving between rightward motion 
and the condition specific direction of motion. For example, at 0° phase 
difference (second row) both sets of stimuli move left at exactly the same time, 
whereas at 180° phase difference (last row) each set of stimuli move left at 
exactly the opposite times.
Temporal Order Judgement (TOJ): In this task, one author and 6 naive subjects (4 
male and 3 female) with normal or corrected to normal vision performed a TOJ for a 
45°, 90° and 135° direction change against a 180° change, in three separate sessions 
consisting of 440 trials each (figure 2.1.2). Only one subject who had participated in
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the pairing task took part in this one. The psychometric function for the relative time 
that the two direction changes were perceived was derived by varying the time at 
which the two direction changes occurred over a period spanning 800 ms. We 
obtained 40 data points for each asynchrony difference. For each trial subjects fixated 
a central cross on a computer monitor (Sony Trinitron with a refresh rate of 85 Hz) at 
a distance of 50 cm, while presented with two random dot arrays subtending 20° 
visual angle moving downwards at a constant speed of 6.5°sec_1.The stimuli were 
matched to those used in the pairing judgement The side on which the 180° motion 
change was presented varied randomly from trial to trial. The first direction change 
occurred one second after stimulus presentation plus or minus random jitter time. 
Subjects had to indicate which dot array changed direction first after stimulus 
presentation.
Pairing judgment
1 sec
x 6  repeats
Temporal order 
judgment R esponse
2 sec
Figure 2.1.2. Stimuli for each trial of pairing judgements and temporal order 
judgements. Note that for pairing judgements, each dot array alternated 
between the two directions of motion (indicated by the arrows), whereas for the
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temporal order judgement only one direction change occurred for each array. In 
this example, we were testing when subjects perceived a 45° direction change 
relative to a 180° direction change.
2.1.3. Results
Pairing judgment: The first three conditions (45°, 90° and 135° direction changes) 
produced a significant (p < 0.001) anticlockwise rotation o f the response curve for 
each subject, with the exception of subjects TT in the 135° direction change condition 
and NC in the 45° direction change condition. The large standard deviation and 
subjective reports for the latter led us to conclude that, for this subject, the 
psychophysical task in this condition was too difficult, leading to guessing on each 
trial. This result was therefore discarded. The average rotation of the polar plot for all 
conditions across subjects was calculated and found to be highly significant (p < 
0.00001) in the first three conditions. The last condition (pairing a 180° direction 
change) did not produce a significant rotation of the response curve (p > 0.05) in any 
of the subjects individually, as expected for the control condition using the same 
stimulus. The average rotation of the pooled response curves shows that 45°, 90° and 
135° changes in the direction of motion are seen before 180° changes in direction by 
around 60, 44 and 17 ms respectively. The angle of direction change had a negative 
linear relationship to the perceptual time relative to a 180° direction change. This 
relationship becomes evident when the angle of direction change is plotted against the 
relative perceptual time differences (figure 2.2.3a), and was statistically significant for 
each subject (p < 0.001), giving correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r) o f -0.52, -0.49,
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-0.62 and -0.59. Changing which direction o f the test squares the subjects had to pair 
with the condition squares and the side on which each square array was presented 
gave the same result for the 90° condition, with an average of 50 and 47 ms 
respectively across subjects (t-test across subjects, p < 0.001, significantly different 
from zero; paired t-test for both controls showed no difference from main 90° 
condition across subjects, p > 0.05).
Temporal Order Judgement: We fitted each subjects’ session data with a 
cumulative-Gaussian psychometric curve, which represented the proportion of trials 
on which the observer reported that the smaller change occurred before the 180° 
change in motion direction. From this, we derived the point of subjective simultaneity 
(PSS), which indicates when the observer perceived the two motion changes 
simultaneously. These data are summarized in figure 2.2.3b. In these plots, positive 
times indicate that the smaller change in direction occurs before the 180° change. 
Thus, positive times in these plots can be interpreted to indicate that the perception of 
a smaller motion change leads the perception of a larger motion change. It appears 
that across the 5 subjects the smaller direction change is perceived to occur on 
average ~125ms before the 180° change (p < 0.0001). Unlike the pairing task, there 
seems to be no negative linear relationship between the asynchrony and the magnitude 
o f the direction change, as the PSS remains at an average o f around -125 ms for each 
condition. Remarkably, for two subjects the PSS could not be derived since on over 
98% of trials they rated the smaller direction change to occur first, even when it was 
presented over 400 ms after the 180° change. One subject showed no significant shift 
in the psychophysical curve in all conditions (p > 0.5). The high inter-subject 
variability in the PSS, but not PSS standard deviation, of our results is consistent with
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previous studies of TOJs (Gibbon & Rutschmann, 1969; Cardosa-Leite et al., 2007). 
This variation has been attributed to differences individual response strategies applied 
to such judgements, and, significantly, not to delays in the processing of the stimuli. 
This may explain the null result in one subject, although it is also possible that a 
different cue other than motion, such as motion streaks, which can be used to 
determine motion direction (Geisler, 1999), underlies this subject's responses leading 
to no difference in the TOJs.
70
(a)
•Vo>
m
o03V.
OlQ)
O£>
140 120 80100 40 20 060
Angular difference (degrees)
(b)
•33cp
c5JZo
5
o
43
s
<13
2?03
<33
X»
occ
43
C4)rs
c<c$<«
4)
Ei-
3C0
250
200
150 -
100
50
-SO
- r -
~  ~  ~ ~
^  ^  ~  *•
if
- ..
* -  ... ^  _  .
-------------- __________________________________ f
i ♦
! i
3-
i
b
140 130 120 110 100 90  8 0  70
Angular difference (degrees)
60 50 4 0
Figure 2.1.3. The time taken to perceive a change in direction of a moving 
stimulus before a 180° change plotted against the difference in angle between the 
test and condition squares, (a) perceptual asynchrony for pairing judgments, (b)
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perceptual asynchrony for temporal order judgments. Data for single subjects 
are shown with dashed lines, while average values are shown with the continuous 
bold line. Error bars represent standard error.
2.1.4. Discussion
The psychophysical results presented here show that smaller magnitudes of direction 
change are perceived before larger ones in both a pairing task and a temporal order 
judgement (TOJ). We suggest that our present results may be understood in terms of 
the time it takes to process information neuronally. Single-cell recordings from 
prestriate area V5 of the macaque, which is specialized for visual motion (Zeki, 
1974). show that exposure to conditioning motion stimuli prior to the test stimuli (the 
cells' preferred direction) causes an increase in the latency of the cells’ response 
(Priebe & Lisberger. 2002). The length of this latency varies as a function of the 
difference in the direction of the conditioning motion to that of the test motion. As 
this difference increases, the latency of the cells’ response to the test motion 
increases, with a peak latency when the conditioning motion is 180° from the test 
motion i.e. the opposite direction. These are effectively measures of the cells’ 
responses to changes in the direction of a moving stimulus: larger changes mean 
longer processing times, as indicated by the increased response latencies. If the neural 
processing time really does determine perceptual time, then on the basis of these 
single-cell results one would predict that smaller changes in the direction of a moving 
stimulus would be perceived before larger ones if  presented simultaneously. The 
relative perceptual times o f changes in the direction of motion that we show here can 
therefore be explained in terms of processing time in V5.
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Previous results consistent with the view that differences in neural processing 
times may directly translate into perceptual times have shown that the speed of 
processing of the same attributes may change if they differ in intensity (Roufs, 1963), 
share of covert attention (Carrasco & McElree, 2001) or retinal position (Carrasco et 
al., 2003). In addition, recent studies have demonstrated that other factors known to 
modulate the latency of neural processing such as attention (Paul & Schyns, 2003), 
salience (Adams & Mamassian, 2004) and motion transparency (Clifford et al., 2004) 
also affect colour-motion asynchrony. This contrasts with alternative views, that 
different latencies in perception are due to postdictive or comparator stages 
(Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000; Moradi & Shomojo, 2005; Nishida & Johnston, 
2002). The latter study interpreted the perceptual asynchrony for colour and motion to 
be due to differences in the temporal structure of these attributes, with colour changes 
being first order and motion changes being second order. There is perhaps some 
justice in this argument because for first order changes such as colour to be detected, 
only two points in time need to be sampled. By contrast, for second-order changes, 
such as a change in the direction of motion, a third point in time needs to be sampled. 
Therefore a change in colour will be detected before a change in motion, not because 
of differences in neuronal processing times, but because of the differing temporal 
properties of the changing stimuli. However, two first-order changes, colour and 
orientation, can be perceived asynchronously (Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997b), and here 
we show that two second-order changes can also be perceived asynchronously. 
Therefore, an explanation in terms o f first and second order changes, at least in its 
simplest form, cannot account for perceptual asynchrony.
Our experiments resulted in a temporal asynchrony regardless of whether the 
judgment was one of pairing or detecting the temporal order of direction changes.
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This result is consistent with the results o f Viviani and Aymoz (2001), which show 
that colour precedes motion in TOJs. However, a recent study that used a TOJ for 
different magnitudes of direction change against colour changes (Bedell et al., 2003) 
found that the changes in colour and motion were perceived to occur at around the 
same time, regardless of the size o f the direction change. A subsequent model by the 
same authors (Ogmen et al., 2004) suggests that TOJs are based on neural transients, 
and therefore different sizes o f direction change should be perceived at the same time. 
However, this explanation based on transients is inconsistent. Neurophysiological 
data shows that transients in V5 are delayed when direction changes are larger (Priebe 
& Lisberger, 2002): if the perceptual asynchrony for TOJs are based on neural 
transients, smaller direction changes should be judged to occur before larger ones. 
This is precisely what happens in our experiments. Their model is therefore 
inconsistent with the known physiology, which shows that transients occur 
asynchronously (Priebe & Lisberger 2002), and with our psychophysical findings, 
which show that different magnitudes o f directional change perceived 
asynchronously. Instead, the present results are consistent with the notion of different 
processing times, a principle that we have previously invoked to explain perceptual 
asynchrony (Zeki & Bartels, 1999).
The recent study of Bedell and colleagues used TOJ for different magnitudes 
of direction change against colour changes (Bedell et al., 2003). On the basis of the 
present results we would have predicted there to be a variable perceptual asynchrony 
for colour and motion depending on the magnitude of the change. However, it was 
found that the changes in colour and motion were perceived to occur at around the 
same time, regardless of the size of the direction change. In their study, the period 
prior to direction reversal was around 353 ms, whereas in the present study this was
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1100ms. Therefore, in the study by Bedell and colleagues this period might have been 
insufficient to induce enough adaptation to affect the TOJ. Another possibility is that 
the perceptual asynchrony for different magnitudes of direction change in a TOJ is 
only apparent when the direct comparison between two changes is made. Therefore 
there may be some, as yet undefined, interaction between colour and motion for TOJs.
While the results for the pairing judgement show a clear negative linear 
relationship between the magnitude of the direction change and the perceptual 
asynchrony, mirroring the neurophysiology described above, the results from the TOJ 
do not. These suggest that, regardless o f the magnitude, the smaller direction changes 
are all seen -125 ms before a complete reversal. Thus although smaller changes in 
direction are judged before larger ones, the exact quantitative relationship is not the 
same for the TOJ. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that other factors, 
in addition to neuronal latency, such as stimulus saliency may affect the temporal 
order judgement. The attentional gate model (AGM) predicts that events that occur 
later in time may be perceived to have occurred earlier if it has a higher attentional 
weighting (Shih & Sperling, 2002). For instance, after viewing a rapid serial visual 
presentation (RSVP) of letters, subjects ordered the items presented in the stream 
according to the attentional strength allocated to each item, rather than the veridical 
temporal order (Reeves & Sperling, 1986). The larger direction changes in the present 
experiments were much more salient that the smaller ones, which could cause the 
subject to orient their attention to the larger change. This may therefore reduce the 
relative perceptual asynchrony for the smaller direction changes, while having less of 
an effect on larger direction changes. While this speculation requires validation, there 
is at least a qualitative agreement between these two psychophysical methods which
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supports our conclusion that smaller changes in direction are perceived before larger 
ones.
Another issue is the difference, in both the pairing task and TOJ, is the lack of 
correspondence between the size o f the latencies for the psychophysical results and 
those in the neurophysiological studies described. For instance, a 45° direction change 
elicits spiking approximately 20 milliseconds earlier than a 180° direction change. 
However, the present psychophysical experiments estimate the perceptual difference 
between such changes to be either 60 or 125 milliseconds for the pairing task and TOJ 
respectively. Therefore there are quantitative differences both between the tasks, as 
discussed in the previous paragraph, and between the tasks and the physiology. This 
may be accounted for by differences in physiology stimuli and those presented here: 
the adapting direction of motion was only lasted for 64 milliseconds compared to 500 
milliseconds used with our stimuli. This would result in less adaptation and may 
therefore be responsible for the discrepancy in results. Alternatively, the latencies in 
neural firing may only indicate when stimulus processing begins, whereas the 
psychophysical tasks reflect when processing ends.
While we interpret the subjects' perception to reflect the neural latencies in 
V5, we assume that other brain areas outwith the visual cortex are required to make 
the judgment in these tasks. It is difficult to conceive of a comparison process 
occurring with V5 between different directionally sensitive cells. As discussed in 
section 1.5.2, it has been proposed that neurons in area LIP ‘read out’ the responses 
from V5 and accumulate evidence for a perceptual decision in response to the 
stimulus: LIP neurons show increasing ramp-like activity, with steeper ramps 
corresponding to higher coherence of stimuli; when this activity crosses a threshold, a 
decision is made (Gold & Shadlen, 2001). This may therefore be considered a
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candidate area making a decision regarding the pairing judgement and TOJ. In 
support of this, a recent fMRI study o f cutaneous temporal order judgements showed 
that temporal discrimination, in comparison with detection, correlated with activity in 
the inferior parietal lobe and other brain areas proposed to be involved in temporal 
processing, such as the cerebellum and the basal ganglia (Pastor et al., 2004). There is 
a further issue of whether the accumulated activity in area LIP is responsible for the 
percept of motion itself; the latencies introduced in the visual pathway at V5 could 
translate into latencies in the parietal cortex, thereby explaining the present results. 
While in theory possible, we believe that such activity in posterior parietal areas are 
attributable to what is reported rather than what is perceived. The issue of dissociating 
perception and report is addressed further in section 3.3.
Our results provide strong support for the supposition that the basis of 
perceptual asynchrony lies in differences in processing times, and suggest that 
perception within a single visual submodality can be fractionated in time, depending 
upon the characteristics of the attributes to be tested. This fractionation goes beyond 
the merely functional and acquires a greater importance because of its implication. 
We have argued elsewhere that activity within an area can acquire a conscious 
correlate (Zeki & Bartels, 1999). Here we suggest that the activity of a group of cells 
within an area can acquire a conscious correlate independently of the conscious 
correlate that the activity of another group acquires. Physiologically, it has been 
suggested that the binding of separate visual attributes occurs through synchronous or 
oscillatory firing in the specialised visual areas (von der Malsburg, 1981; Engel, et al., 
1999), or the selection of attributes through attentional mechanisms (Reynolds & 
Desimone, 1999). While in theory possible, whether such mechanisms are employed 
to bind attributes together in the same visual area is unclear. However, the present
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results provide evidence that such mechanisms could not compensate for different 
processing delays in the processing o f stimuli prior to perception. Rather, different 
groups of cells within a single area can generate their own conscious correlates, which 
are distributed in space and in time.
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2.2 Perceptual compression of space through position
integration
2.2.1. Introduction
Positional localisation of a moving object presents an apparent paradox, 
namely that when a particular location is frozen at a given moment in time, the 
attribute of motion cannot exist at all (Salomon, 1970). This issue has been the subject 
o f more recent debate, mainly due to interest in the ‘flash-lag effect’, which occurs 
when a flashed stationary object is perceived to lag behind a spatially aligned moving 
object (Mackay. 1958; Nijhawan, 1994). It has proved to be a fertile illusion for 
generating theories of visual awareness and the timing of visual perception. As 
discussed in the previous section, temporal aspects of perception have recently gained 
much interest, as it has been recognised that it is important to understand when 
awareness occurs, as well as where in relation to the brain.
While multiple mutually competing theories have been proposed for this 
phenomenon, there is no consensus on the correct account. Each has specific 
consequences for the brain mechanisms of visual awareness. The first proposal 
suggests that to account for motor delays in reacting to a moving stimulus, the visual 
system extrapolates the position o f a moving stimulus to its future positions 
(Nijhawan, 1994). Therefore, such a theory is predictive. In contrast, a couple 
subsequent theories suggest that visual awareness is ‘online’. The first of these claims 
that the flash-lag effect is due to differential perceptual latencies: moving objects are 
perceived before stationary ones thereby account for their differences in relative 
perceived position (Whitney & Murakami, 1998). The second online theory claims 
that this illusion is due to the integration or averaging of position over a period of
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time, leading to the moving object to appear to be ahead o f the flash (Krekelberg & 
Lappe, 2000). In addition to positional averaging, the ‘post-diction’ theory claims that 
the brain is able to ‘reset’ the information it has accumulated for position in response 
to a salient external event, in this case a brief flash (Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000a). 
The subsequent positional information gained is then ‘post-dieted’ to the time of the 
flash. This claim is of greater theoretical interest as it means that the brain is capable 
of time stamping when external events occur and arranging them accordingly in 
awareness in a temporal buffer. Finally, an attentional account proposes that the 
perceived lag in the flashed stimulus is due to an attentional shift across the visual 
field. (Baldo & Klein, 1995) With regard to the neural mechanisms o f visual 
awareness, it is clear that while high-level theories sit more comfortably with either 
motion extrapolation or post-diction, only the online theories, positional averaging 
and differential latency, are able to accommodate the most low-level modular theories 
of visual awareness.
Previous studies of the flash-lag effect have mainly focussed on the relative 
spatial localisation of moving objects at motion onsets or during continuous motion. 
Similarly, in the Frohlich effect, subjects mis-localise the initial position of a moving 
object in the direction o f motion (Frohlich, 1929). Here we investigate relative 
position localisation at both motion offsets and onsets. Using the conventional ‘flash- 
lag’ paradigm and the relative positioning o f a continuously moving bar, we found 
that subjects mis-localise the final position o f a moving object prior to its 
disappearance in the direction opposite to its trajectory. This is consistent with the 
positional averaging hypothesis (Morgan, 1975; Krekelberg & Lappe, 2000): the 
veridical position is averaged over a time period preceding the disappearance, thus 
causing it to be seen to disappear before its veridical final position. Furthermore, this
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offset effect is smaller than onset effects observed with either the Frohlich effect or 
the flash-lag effect, suggesting that this process is weighted to the most recently 
sampled positions. Finally, we demonstrate that the influence of both motion onset 
and offset effects leads to the perceived asymmetrical compression of a moving dot 
array. We are thus also able to account for the compression of moving shapes when 
viewed through apertures, a seemingly unrelated illusion that has been unresolved 
since originally described by Helmholtz (1867) and Zollner (1862). These results 
provide strong evidence for the proposal that the perceived position of a moving 
object is the result of the weighted integration o f signals relating to position over a 
short time window.
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Figure 2.2.1. Schematic diagram of the three main experiments, (a) Flash-lead
effect, (b) reverse-repmo, (c) compression of space. Dotted arrows represent 
motion trajectories.
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2.2.2. Materials & Methods
All experiments were done in a darkened experimental room using a Sony high- 
resolution CRT monitor with a refresh rate o f 100Hz and a viewing distance o f 30cm. 
Stimuli were constructed using a PC running MatLab (Mathworks Inc.) and the 
Cogent Graphics package (fitip://wwwp :> .‘A i huk/' --‘pp)-
Responses were recorded via key-press on a computer keyboard. Points of subjective 
simultaneity were derived by using the method o f constant stimuli in a 2AFC task and 
fitting a Weibull function (2-parameter model: shape and 50% point) to the data. Each 
subject had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Informed written consent was 
obtained before experiments. Three naive subjects and one of the authors (3 male) 
participated in all experiments. During each trial subjects fixated a central square. 
Unless otherwise stated, the stimuli were presented on a black background with a 
luminance of 5 cd/m2.
Experiment 1: Flash-lead Effect.
We modified the flash-lag paradigm to determine the perceived position of a moving 
stimulus at motion offset. We refer to this as the ‘flash-lead’ effect. During flash-lead 
trials, a moving hollow circle (radius: 1.67°, filled with the black background, edges 
luminance of 25 cd/m2) appeared after a random interval of under one second from 
the beginning of each trial and moved in a circular trajectory at a speed of 200° sec'1 
around the fixation point. At a random position, the moving circle was briefly filled 
with a stationary achromatic flash o f one of three luminance values (108, 34, 12.5 
cd/m2). In the following frame, both the moving circle and the flash disappeared 
(figure 2.2.1a). Note that this differs from previous flash-terminated cycles (e.g.
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Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000a) as the moving target actually disappears at the end of 
its trajectory instead of stopping. Subjects had to indicate whether the flash appeared 
above or below the moving circle. These trials were randomly mixed with trials 
measuring the conventional flash-lag effect, using the identical set-up described, 
except that the moving circle continued to move after the flash occurred. By varying 
the position of the flash relative to the moving circle, the psychometric function o f the 
position of the flash was calculated.
Experiment 2: Reverse-repmo.
We modified the classical Frohlich experiment, in which a bar moves in a given 
direction and subjects have to specify its position when it appears, in two ways: 
instead of having one bar, we introduced a second bar and asked subjects to determine 
the relative position of the two bars, at both onset and offset. We refer to the latter as 
the ‘reverse-representational momentum’ or reverse-repmo. More specifically, two 
bars (5.7° x 0.67°), both presented either to the left or right side of fixation 
(randomised trail by trial), moved towards each other vertically (speeds ranging from 
4.2 to 24.7° sec'1) from the bottom and the top of the screen, respectively, towards the 
mid-point where they were horizontally spatially aligned for one frame before 
disappearing. The bars did not overlap, although there was no gap between them 
when side-by-side (figure 2.2.1b). Subjects then indicated whether the bars passed 
each other or not prior to disappearance. We calculated the psychometric function of 
the relative positions by varying the position at which the two bars disappeared 
relative to each other. In a separate experiment we measured the classical Frohlich 
effect by using an identical set-up. In this case the bars were presented aligned at the 
mid-point and moved vertically in opposite directions. Subjects had to indicate
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whether the bars appeared above or below relative to each other. The psychometric 
function was calculated by varying the position at which the two bars appeared 
relative to each other.
Experiment 3: Compression of space.
The above set of experiments led us to ask whether reverse-repmo and the Frohlich 
effect mis-localisations may sum and account for compression o f moving shapes 
when viewed through apertures (reviewed by Rock, 1981). In the first set of 
experiments, we measured the amount of compression that subjects perceived a 
moving diamond shaped array (test array) composed of 4 dots to undergo. Each dot 
was 0.95° in radius. The vertically aligned dots were 2° apart, whereas the 
horizontally aligned dots were 2.9° apart (see figure 2.2.1c). In the main condition, 
the test array briefly appeared as if moving rightwards from under an invisible 
occluder, was completely exposed, before moving underneath a second invisible 
occluder on the right, at a constant speed of 40.6° sec'1. Note that the dots therefore 
just disappeared without being covered by a visible occluder. This set-up was 
reminiscent of the aperture-viewing experiments originally performed by Helmholtz 
(1867) and Zollner (1862), where an object moves through a narrow slit, only 
exposing a small portion at a time. Observers report seeing the stimulus integrated as 
whole, although compressed in the direction of its motion. In our experiment the 
aperture was slightly wider than the moving stimulus (3.4° width), thereby briefly 
exposing the whole array at the same time. If the theory of positional averaging is 
correct, we predicted that the array should still appear compressed in size, as reverse- 
repmo at the leading dot should occur simultaneously with the Frohlich effect at the
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trailing dot. Since the latter effect is larger, our second prediction was that the 
compression effect would be asymmetrical, with the trailing side of the array 
appearing most compressed.
The test array randomly appeared either above or below fixation on each trial. 
In addition to this was the reference array, which matched the exact temporal profile 
of the dots in the moving array, but did not move and appeared on the opposite side of 
fixation to it. We varied the width of the test array by adjusting the distance of the two 
horizontally aligned dots relative to the centre, to derive the psychometric function of 
the compression of it. Subjects then indicated in a force choice if  the moving test 
array was narrower or wider than the reference array. Three additional conditions 
were randomly interleaved with the main one described above; differential offsets, 
where the whole array appeared simultaneously but had differential offsets by 
disappearing underneath the invisible occluder; differential onsets, where the whole 
array had differential onsets by appearing from underneath the invisible occluder, but 
disappeared simultaneously; and simultaneous onset/offsets when the whole array 
appeared and disappeared simultaneously. This last condition acted as a control since 
motion smear (Burr, 1980) could cause subjects to bias responses, overshadowing the 
effect of differential on-/offsets. It should be noted that in the last three conditions that 
when the dots appear or disappear simultaneously, they all appear or disappear on the 
screen in the same frame as if no invisible occluder was present. This is in contrast to 
the main condition where the dots appear and disappear as if from behind an invisible 
occluder.
The second set of experiments measured the asymmetry of the arrays, and 
took the same structure as those described above. There was no reference array and
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subjects were asked to indicate what side (left or right) appeared most compressed. To 
derive the psychometric curve we multiplied the X co-ordinates using:
X ' = X (l+ K e x) (1)
where K is a constant with thirteen values from -12  to 12. This manipulation distorted 
the layout of the dot array so it appeared compressed on either the left or right sides. 
We also quantified the asymmetry of the compression effect using a set-up similar to 
those traditionally used in aperture viewing experiments (see review Rock, 1981). 
Two achromatic rectangles (both 8.5° by 6.7°) were displayed on either side o f a 
central fixation spot leaving a slit of 1.3°. The diamond shaped dot array moved 
across this slit from underneath the occluding rectangles either above or below the 
fixation spot at a speed of 40.6° se c 1. Subjects had to indicate which side appeared 
most compressed as before.
Experiment 4: Flash-lead effect using bars of different widths.
A recent study of Kanai et al. (2004) found that using foveally presented stimuli in 
which both the moving cursor and a spatially aligned flash disappeared in the frame 
after the flash appeared, there to be no significant flash-lead or flash-lag effect. This is 
surprising given the present flash-lead effect that we report here. However, the width 
of the stimuli used in this previous study were much wider than those used in our first 
experiment. Given that the subjects’ task of detecting the offset of the flash and the 
cursor is essentially a Vernier judgement, it seemed plausible that the negative result 
reported previously could be due to a lack o f sensitivity with the thicker stimuli used. 
Previous studies (e.g. Levi et al., 2000) have shown that the width of stimuli affects 
the ability of subjects to detect offsets in a Vernier task. Therefore, using similar
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stimuli to Kanai et al., we wanted to determine whether the width of the moving and 
flashed bars could affect the subjects’ ability to perceive the flash-lead effect.
One author and three subjects who did not participate in the experiments 1-3 
took part. Two moving rectangular bars (length: 1.26°, separation of 1.3°) appeared 
after a random interval of under one second from the beginning of each trial and 
moved upwards from below fixation point at a speed o f 17.9° sec1. The width of the 
bars on each trial was one of three values (0.042°, 0.168°, 0.265°), randomly selected. 
After an interval of under a second, the gap between the bars was briefly filled with a 
stationary achromatic flash with the same width as the moving bars. In the following 
frame, both the moving bars and the flash disappeared. Subjects had to indicate 
whether the flash appeared above or below the moving bars. By varying the position 
of the flash relative to the moving bars, the psychometric function o f the position of 
the flash was calculated.
Experiment 5: Attentional bias for foveal and peripheral moving targets.
Given the substantial literature on representational momentum, we wanted to 
distinguish our results from this previously known effect. A series of experiments by 
Kerzel and colleagues have established that under steady fixation, representational 
momentum is due to an attentional overshoot in the direction of motion (see review, 
Kerzel, 2005). This is thought to only occur with apparent motion and not smooth 
motion, as used in our experiments. However, to ensure that an attentional overshoot 
or undershoot was not occurring in our experiments, we used the same reaction time 
paradigm introduced by Kerzel (2003) to examine the deployment of attention after 
implied motion stimuli. This previous study found that reaction times (RTs) to a
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probe stimulus presented in the direction o f implied motion were faster than those to a 
probe presented in the direction opposite to the implied motion.
The same subjects who took part in experiment 4 participated. On each trial 
after a variable delay a smooth moving bar (speed: 17.9° sec1, width: 0.63°, length: 
1.47°) appeared 1.98° ± fixation point and either left or right of fixation by 0.04° 
(central), 2.94° or 5.88° (peripheral). On trials in which the bar appeared above 
fixation, it moved vertically downwards and vice versa. After an interval o f 350ms ± 
jitter of 170ms, the target disappeared. A probe stimulus (either a ‘x ’ or a ‘+ ’ symbol) 
was then presented 1.9° either before or after the moving stimuli’s final position along 
its trajectory. Two of the subjects were instructed to respond using the left key as soon 
as they saw the ‘x* stimulus and the right key as soon as they saw the ‘+ ’ stimulus. 
The probe stayed onscreen until a response was given. This stimulus-response 
mapping was reversed for the other subjects.
2.2.3. Results
Experiment 1: Flash-lead effect.
Subjects perceived the moving object to lag behind the flash before both stimuli 
disappeared (figure 2.2.1a). This is consistent with the positional averaging 
hypothesis: the veridical position is averaged over a time period of 100ms or so, as 
previously suggested by integration times for detecting moving objects (Burr, 1981) 
preceding the disappearance, causing it to be seen to disappear before its veridical 
final position. We found that, like the conventional flash-lag effect, this effect varies 
with the luminance of the flash, occurring with the maximum amplitude if the 
luminance is high (a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of flash 
luminance (F(2.6) = 12.46, P O .01 ; figure 2.2.2), consistent with previous
psychophysical evidence suggesting that higher luminance reduces perceptual 
latencies (Roufs, 1963). The earlier in time the flash is perceived relative to the 
moving cursor because of higher luminance, the earlier in the course of the trajectory 
of the moving cursor is it co-localised with. But the lead is significant even at low 
flash luminance. We can infer the existence of such a lead effect from previous data 
(Miisseler et al., 2002), although it was attributed to response bias and not interpreted 
to be a genuine perceptual effect. However, the effect o f flash luminance makes that 
interpretation improbable.
-0.2
5 . -0-6
g -0.8
8  - 12
-1.4
- 1.8
10 40 50 6030 70 80 100 11020 90
Luminance of flash (cd/m2)
Figure 2.2.2. Group average data for the flash-lead effect at three different 
luminances of flash. Negative values indicate that the moving cursor is perceived 
to lag behind the flash. Error bars represent ±  1 SE across subjects.
Experiment 2: Reverse-repmo.
All subjects mis-localised the final relative position of the two bars in the direction 
opposite to their motion trajectories prior to disappearance (figure 2.2.1b, 2.2.3a),
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with the magnitude increasing with stimulus speed over the range used. The same 
effect was observed with a moving stimulus when one of the bars was stationary and 
aligned with the final position of the moving bar (mean: 0.31°, one sample t-test 
across subjects at 95% significance: p < 0.0001). We quantified the Frohlich effect 
using this same stimulus set-up and found it to be substantially larger than reverse- 
repmo (figure 2.2.3b). A t-test at 95% significance revealed that both effects were 
significantly different from zero across all speeds (P<0.0001, df: 3).
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Figure 2.3.3. Group average data for the Frohlich effect (a) and reverse-repmo 
(b) as a function of stimulus speed. Values on the Y-axis indicate the subjects 
PSS in relation to the moving bar’s veridical first (a) or last (b) position in the 
direction of its trajectory. Error bars represent ±  1 SE across subjects.
Experiment 3: Compression of space.
The results given above show that the trajectory of a moving stimulus appears to start 
later and end earlier than it does veridically, causing the perceived length of its 
trajectory to be compressed. Can both of these effects be observed simultaneously? 
Our results show significant compression effects over the control condition in both the 
differential on-/offsets conditions and the simultaneous offsets condition (figure
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2.2.4a). The simultaneous onsets condition gave a small insignificant compression 
effect. This is consistent with the larger mis-localisations observed at motion onsets 
than at motion offsets (figure 2.2.3). A repeated-measures 4 x 4  ANOVA with 
subjects and conditions as factors revealed significant compression effects over the 
control condition in both the differential on-/offsets condition and the simultaneous 
offset condition (F(3,9) = 33.6, P < 0.0001; using Tukey’s honestly significant 
difference criterion for post hoc comparisons. P < 0.01). Note however that using 
subjects as a factor limits inference o f the effect at the population level. Neither the 
simultaneous onset nor simultaneous offset conditions were large enough to be able to 
account for the compression effect observed in the main condition alone, although the 
sum of them approximates it in each subject adding to a combined compression of 
1.27, which is not significantly different from the observed compression of 1.32 (p > 
0.41 one sample t-test at 95% significance across subjects), and therefore suggests that 
this is due to a contribution from both onset and offset effects.
To quantify the asymmetry o f compression, subjects performed a forced 
choice test to report which side o f the array appeared to be the most compressed, i.e. 
on which side the middle dots appeared closest to the outer dot. Consistent with our 
predictions, the main condition showed a slight asymmetry in the compression to the 
trailing side compared to the control, which we presume is due to the larger influence 
o f onset effects. The identical result (mean: 6.1 deg., one sample t-test at 95% 
significance across subjects: p < 0.0001, df: 3) was also observed with a stimulus set­
up similar to those traditionally used in aperture viewing experiments and to our 
knowledge has not previously been reported. This was also apparent in the second 
condition when all the dots disappeared simultaneously and only differential onsets 
had an influence. In the third condition with only differential offsets, a significant
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asymmetry in the array was found, although this time the leading side was judged 
more compressed compared to the control condition, as expected by the small 
backwards mis-localisation observed at motion offsets of the leading dots. In contrast 
to the results of the absolute compression of the array, our results were not consistent 
with a quantitative prediction of the main combined onset and offset condition from 
the simultaneous offsets and onsets conditions. We would have predicted the 
asymmetry index to be smaller in the main condition than in the simultaneous onsets 
condition, and not the reverse, which is what we observed. All conditions were 
significantly different from the control as shown by a 4 x 4 ANOVA (F(3,9) = 61.16, 
PO.OOOl) using Tukey’s honestly significant difference criterion for post hoc 
comparisons (P < 0.01).
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Figure 2.2.4. Group average data for the (a) size of compression, (b) the 
asymmetry of the moving array  in the three on-/offset conditions. Values greater 
than the control indicate tha t the trailing side of the array appeared more 
compressed. E rro r bars represent ± 1 SE across subjects.
Experiment 4: Flash-lead effect using bars of different widths.
A flash-lead effect was observed for the two narrower stimuli (t-test at 95% 
significance, P < 0.01, df: 3) across subjects, but was not apparent for the widest 
stimulus (P > 0.2). We therefore replicate the previous result of Kanai et al. (2004),
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and show that by using narrower, more sensitive stimuli, the flash-lead effect is a 
robust phenomenon.
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Figure 2.2.5. Group average data for the flash-lead effect at three different 
widths of stimuli. Negative values indicate that the moving cursor is perceived 
to lag behind the flash. Error bars represent ±  1 SE across subjects.
Experiment 5: Attentional bias for foveal and peripheral moving targets.
We excluded trials in which RTs were less that 100ms or more than 1000ms. Using a 
2 x 3  ANOVA with eccentricity of stimulus (central, middle and peripheral) and 
probe location (before and after final line stimulus) as factors, we found there to be a 
significant effect of eccentricity (F(2,23) = 24.3, P<.001) and probe location (F(l,23) 
= 9.2. P<0.001). Moreover, the interaction effect o f probe location and eccentricity 
was also significant (P < 0.001). Post hoc comparisons using Tukey’s honestly 
significant difference criterion reveals quicker responses when the probe appeared in
0.042 0.168 0.265
Width of bars (deg.)
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the direction for both peripherally presented stimuli (P < 0.01), but not when 
presented foveally (P >0.1).
By using the same reaction time paradigm introduced by Kerzel (2003), we 
found there to be significant attentional overshoot with smooth motion in the direction 
of the moving cursor for the peripheral stimuli only. Therefore, we can be confident 
that the effects we describe in our main experiments are not subject to asymmetrical 
attentional shifts (either an undershoot or overshoot). A recent study of Kanai et al. 
(2004) found for peripheral stimuli only, the flash-lag effect occurs when the moving 
cursor disappeared in the same frame as the flash disappeared, which according to the 
averaging model should result in the flash-lead effect. Given the present result, this 
lead effect of moving stimuli described by Kanai et al. (2004) for the peripheral 
moving stimuli may be subject to the same attentional overshoot in the direction of 
the moving stimuli, and could therefore be considered another example of 
representational momentum. Our new results therefore fit with those of Kerzel (2005) 
in explaining why a perceived forward momentum can be obtained through 
attentional overshoot.
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2.2.4. Discussion
The results that we report provide strong evidence in favour of the averaging 
hypothesis for localising the position of a moving object at a given moment in time, 
and are therefore consistent with a low-level modular theory of visual awareness 
(Bartels & Zeki, 1998). The new experiments that we have introduced have provided 
results which show that (a) when a moving object disappears, it is perceived to lag 
behind a spatially concurrent flash; (b) two moving objects aligned at their final 
positions with respect to each other are perceived to be mis-aligned in a direction 
opposite to their direction of motion; (c) a moving shape with both leading and 
trailing edges is perceived to be asymmetrically compressed. Together with the 
variants that we have given in the results, the most plausible interpretation of these 
experiments is that the brain averages the positions occupied during the last 100 ms or 
so. Note however, that the magnitude of reverse-repmo is much smaller than the 
Frohlich effect. We suggest that although positional averaging is taking place, it is 
weighted towards the most recently sampled positions.
The position averaging theory may also explain the flash-lag effect if we 
assume that during a period o f time after the flash, corresponding to the integration 
window, the average position o f the moving object is calculated, resulting in the 
moving object being seen after the flash. This process may also take into account 
positions of the moving object that occurred prior to the flash, in line with data 
showing that the flash-initiated cycle can produce a larger flash-lag effect than during 
continuous motion (Ogmen et al., 2004). Similarly, the Frohlich effect can be 
explained if after a certain time period from the appearance o f the moving object, its 
average position is calculated, causing the object to be seen ahead of the veridical
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initial position. This enables us to account for all four o f these effects within a single 
overall framework.
Our results cannot be accounted for by alternative explanations o f the flash-lag 
effect, as offset effects for moving objects place tight constraints on possible 
explanations of positional localisation. The motion extrapolation (Nijhawan, 1994), 
attention (Baldo & Klein, 1995), latency difference (Purusothaman et al., 1998; 
Whitney & Murakami, 1998) and ‘post-diction' hypotheses (Eagleman & Sejnowski, 
2000a), at least in their simplest forms, would all predict that the flash should be 
perceived to lag, or at the very least be concurrent, with the moving cursor. The flash- 
lead effect described here shows that these predictions do not hold true. Furthermore, 
the revised version of post-diction (Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000b) would predict that 
the relationship between the size of the lead effect and the luminance values of the 
flash should be reversed, as the more salient the flash, the more the positions of the 
moving cursor before it should be devalued, thereby producing a reduced or annulled 
flash-lead effect. A recent version of the differential latency hypothesis (Ogmen et al., 
2004) is able to accommodate the flash-lead effect with a ramped response function 
for the position computation of moving stimuli. However, our second experiment 
shows that this mis-localisation is not specific to moving versus stationary objects. 
Their model would predict that reverse-repmo should not exist: the two bars would 
eventually be seen to disappear at their veridical positions and be spatially aligned, 
given the assumption that they both have equal perceptual latencies.
It important to distinguish the present results from related previous findings. 
Firstly, the backwards mislocalisation at motion offsets is surprising, given the 
previous ‘representational momentum' literature which shows that subjects mis-locate 
manually the position of a moving object to a point beyond the final position of the
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moving object (Freyd & Fink, 1984). A series of experiments by Kerzel and 
colleagues (Kerzel, 2003; reviewed in Kerzel, 2005) has established that under steady 
fixation representational momentum is due to an anticipatory overshoot in attention in 
the direction of the moving target. This occurs even when the motion sequence has 
terminated and the stimulus disappears, which according to our model should not lead 
a perceived forward displacement of the final position. For example, in a previous 
study using smooth motion stimulus, observers judged the final position o f a moving 
object to be after its veridical final position (Hubbard & Bharucha, 1988). However, a 
subsequent study using the similar stimulus parameters (Kerzel et al., 2001) found 
that when smooth eye movements are controlled for by making the subjects perform 
the task under steady fixation, the perceived forward displacement disappears. Thus, 
representational momentum in this case is due to an over shoot in overt attention. In 
the present study, we find that an attentional overshoot, or even undershoot, does not 
occur with smooth motion foveally. Therefore such an attentional effect is not 
responsible for the effects described in our main experiments.
However, we did find such an overshoot to occur with smooth moving 
peripheral targets. This may account for the apparent discrepancy between the present 
findings and recent results that show a forward mis-localisation of the moving object 
in a flash-terminated condition where both the moving and flashed object disappear in 
the frame after the flash (Kanai et al., 2004). Their effect was contingent on the 
moving stimulus presented peripherally, which does cause an attentional overshoot, 
and could therefore be due to the same attentional overshot which underlies 
representational momentum. The lack of lead effect for foveally presented stimuli by 
Kanai et al. (2004) may be explained by the lack of sensitivity in using thicker 
stimuli: narrower stimuli, like the moving cursor used in the present experiment,
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allows greater vernier sensitivity (cf. Levi et al., 2000) and therefore greater 
sensitivity in detecting this subtle lead effect. Our fourth experiment confirms this 
hypothesis. Furthermore, we believe the present flash-lead effect to be distinct from 
the motion extrapolation effect described by Fu, Shen and Dan (2001), who found, 
using a stimulus set-up similar to our reverse-repmo experiment, the final position of 
a moving blurred object was mis-localised in the direction of motion. Firstly, as 
acknowledged by the authors, it is clear that their effect depends on the blurring of 
targets, unlike the sharp edges used in our experiments, which they account for by the 
properties of biphasic temporal responses o f visual neurons. Secondly, their effect 
peaked at low speeds; this is unlike the present effect, which increases with velocity 
over a comparable range of values. Finally, their sharp edged targets remained at the 
final location for 100ms. According to our explanation, this would result in no 
mislocalisation in either direction, which is what they found; the crucial difference is 
that the present stimuli disappeared in the frame after reaching their final position.
We further extended these observations with a novel dot array stimulus to 
investigate the simultaneous effects of motion onsets and offsets. Consistent with our 
predictions, we found that the array appears to be asymmetrically compressed. 
Moreover, exclusively differential motion onsets produced larger compression effects 
than offsets, and did so on the trailing side of the array, whereas exclusively 
differential motion offsets had a smaller effect and compression occurred on the 
leading side of the array. The larger effects of motion onsets than offsets may explain 
the asymmetry in the differential on- and offsets condition, and the asymmetry we 
observed under normal aperture viewing conditions. Therefore the weighted 
averaging of position is also able to account for how the sequence of parts o f an object 
viewed through an aperture is integrated into a whole and why the image appears
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compressed (Rock, 1981). Each position o f the component of the object is averaged 
over 100ms or so, thereby allowing the image to be integrated as a whole. This same 
integration causes the mislocalisation at motion onsets and offsets effect to sum, as 
demonstrated by the present experiments, which leads to the overall compression of 
the shape. Moreover, we are able to confirm our novel prediction, which directly leads 
from the weighted averaging hypothesis, that this compression effect is asymmetrical. 
Our explanation also accounts for the increase in compression previously observed 
(Morgan, Findlay & Watt, 1982) with object speed and the narrowing of aperture size. 
We suggest that the averaging process corresponds to the hypothetical ‘post-retinal 
storage mechanism’ proposed to account for the effects of aperture viewing (Parks, 
1965), in contrast to a ‘retinal painting effect’ caused by eye-movements, since the 
compression effects observed here occurred under steady fixation.
A neurophysiological explanation for the flash-lag effect has previously been 
proposed by Berry and colleagues (Berry et al., 1999) based on results from retinal 
recordings. It was found that in response to a moving bar stimulus, the population 
activity precedes the stimulus arriving at that particular location. Comparable 
neurophysiological responses have recently been found in the temporal cortex of the 
macaque (Perrett et al., 2005). The simple model put forward (Berry et al., 1999) 
suggests that this is due to the high-contrast stimuli desensitising the responses of 
ganglion cells after a short time delay, which in turn causes the ganglion cells just 
ahead o f the bar to be strongly excited as the edge begins to enter their receptive-field 
centre. However the response gain reduces and the firing rate declines shortly after. 
This feature of the model may be able to explain the weighting of position of moving 
objects that we have proposed here; as the response to current position is reduced, the 
anticipated response future one is in turn enhanced, leading to a weighted neural
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response with regard to the object position. Such a mechanism, combined with the 
relatively long integration time of human vision (Barlow 1958; Burr, 1981), may 
therefore account for the weighted averaging of the position of moving objects
In the context of the present thesis, this positional averaging mechanism is 
most consistent an ‘online’ view of visual awareness; that is, a stimulus is perceived 
as soon as it is processed. This is in line with the findings in the section 2.1 where it 
was suggested that neural latencies translate into perceptual latencies, and the general 
theory that visual awareness is due to low-level processing in the visual cortex.
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Functional brain imaging
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3.1 Bistable and stable figures: top-down and bottom- 
up interactions assessed with dynamic causal 
modelling.
3.1.1. Introduction
Ambiguous or bistable figures have been used throughout the last couple of centuries 
in perception research as they offer keen insights into how the visual system interprets 
the outside world and represents it in awareness. Observers perceive such stimuli to 
be in one of two states, which periodically ‘flip’ from one state to another, despite the 
stimulus remaining constant. Perhaps the best known of these is the Necker cube 
(Necker, 1832), where a wire frame picture of a cube can be perceived to be in one of 
two planes of depth. These fluctuations are thought to occur because the image 
provides ambiguous information that could be interpreted as one of two equally 
probable three-dimensional objects, which compete for dominance over time. 
However, despite the wealth of research with bistable figures over the last couple of 
hundred years, the mechanisms underlying this phenomenon are still under debate.
Currently the main theories o f the mechanisms underlying perceptual reversals 
fall into two camps: ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’. Bottom-up theorists posit that 
relatively automatic, stimulus driven effects trigger the figure reversals: neural 
channels that support the dominant interpretation become passively adapted, allowing 
the other interpretation to then dominate. Evidence for such a mechanism includes 
the increasing reversal rate over viewing time (Brown, 1955), adaptation and stimulus 
effects on figure reversals (Nawrot & Blake, 1989; Cipywynk, 1959) and recent 
electrophysiological evidence showing early disambiguation of the figures
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(Kommeier & Bach, 2005). In contrast, advocates of the top-down hypothesis suggest 
that the reversals occur due to a ‘high-level' cognitive interpretation of the stimulus. 
More recent formulations (e.g. Leopold & Logothetis, 1999) suggest that influences 
from higher cortical areas, such as the parietal or prefrontal cortex, influence lower 
areas of the visual cortex, such as those representing objects, through top-down 
modulations. Evidence for such an account comes from behavioural literature 
showing volitional and attentional effects on reversals (e.g. Meredith, 1962), and from 
fMRI studies showing a large ‘fronto-parietal network' o f areas active during such 
changes (Kleinschmidt et al., 1998). In addition to these main accounts, there are 
hybrid theories that incorporate both bottom-up and top-down influences on figure 
reversals (e.g. Long & Toppino, 2004), with the relative contribution of each effect 
varying according to both stimulus conditions and cognitive set. However, a causal 
role for either a bottom-up or top-down mechanism has yet to be demonstrated.
Bistable stimuli have recently proved popular for the study of the neural basis 
of visual awareness since, not only do they show the areas o f the brain which correlate 
with the observers' subjective experience (Lansing, 1964; Logothetis & Schall, 1989; 
Tong et al., 1998), but also regions active during the transition from one perceptual 
state to another. Functional imaging studies have found that during perceptual 
changes a right-biased fronto-parietal network to be active; in particular the 
dorsolateral prefrontal and the superior parietal cortex (e.g. Lumer et al., 1998, 
Kleinschmidt et al., 1998), areas previously associated with working memory and 
shifts in spatial attention (Corbetta et al., 1993; Kastner et al., 1999). Further studies 
have emphasised the role of frontal and parietal areas in change detection (Beck et al., 
2001; Shulman et al., 2001) and perception in general (Rees et al., 1999; Dehaene et 
al., 2003). These studies are consistent with the view that to be aware of a visual
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stimulus, or at least to be aware of a change in a visual stimulus, there must be a 
causal influence from the fronto-parietal network. This type of theory, often referred 
to as the ‘global workspace theory' as reviewed in section 1.6.6, posits that the top- 
down modulations are key in selecting and maintaining the contents of awareness. A 
prediction of such a theory is that even non-ambiguous stimuli will require activation 
of this workspace to enter awareness. In a previous fMRI study of binocular rivalry 
(Lumer et al, 1998), the pattern of perception during rivalry was mimicked with 
stimulus induced perceptual changes between each eye, and these transitions 
correlated activity in frontal operculum and right inferior frontal gyrus, in addition to 
activity in visual areas. Thus, a contribution from higher areas such as the frontal and 
parietal cortices may not only be needed to perceive internally generated changes in 
bistable figures, but also externally induced events that occur during normal viewing, 
as predicted by a recent computational model (Dehaene et al., 2003).
It was these issues that motivated the present study and our aim was three­
fold: we wanted to (1) measure the contribution of both ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ 
effects on the perceptual reversals of bistable figures; (2) quantify the different 
contributions that these influences have on different types of figures; (3) assess 
whether similar neuronal dynamics occur during externally induced perceptual 
transitions. To answer these questions we measured brain activity with functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in humans during perceptual transitions while 
viewing a Necker cube, which subjects perceive to be in one of two planes of depth 
(Necker, 1832), and the Rubin’s vase (Rubin, 1915), which subjects perceive to be 
either two faces or a vase. In addition, subjects were presented with stable analogues 
of these figures that did not undergo rivalry and were alternated externally (stimulus- 
induced changes). We analysed the results using conventional analysis to examine
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regionally specific effects, and dynamic causal modelling (DCM; Friston et al., 2003) 
to examine how perception of both bistable and stable figures modulate neuronal 
dynamics between areas. This is therefore the first study to measure changes in 
effective connectivity between brain areas during perceptual rivalry. We were 
specifically interested in whether forward or backward connections modulate the 
lateral occipital cortex (LO), an area thought to represent the perceived shape o f an 
object (Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2001), during bistable and stable figure transitions.
3.1.2. Methods 
Subjects
Nine healthy volunteers (six women and three men; mean age 23.3 ± 1.85) with 
normal, or corrected to normal vision, participated in the study. All subjects gave 
informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki, and the Ethics 
Committee of the National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery, London, UK, 
granted ethical approval for the study.
Stimuli
All stimuli were constructed using COGENT 2000 Graphics (available at
 - : —_ * _ i . ) running in MATLAB (Mathworks Natick, MA). The stimuli
were presented centrally and projected onto the screen by means of an LCD projector. 
They consisted of two bistable figures, the Necker Cube and the Rubin’s Vase, and 
two stable analogues for each of these, which do not undergo spontaneous perceptual 
alternations (figure 3.1.1). These consisted of two cubes in two unambiguous planes 
of depth, and a simple vase and two face silhouettes. Care was taken to design these 
stimuli to resemble the perceptual interpretations of the bistable figures as much as 
possible, without being bistable themselves. The bistable figures were presented in a
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random order for a period of 25 seconds. Subjects were required to make a right-hand 
button press in response to each perceptual alternation. Following presentation of the 
bistable figures, the exact pattern of alternations was recreated using the stable 
analogue using the timing reported through the key reports. Subjects were still 
required to report perceptual changes o f these stable figures via the button press to 
control for motor responses. Each subject participated in two sessions, each lasting 
approximately 14 minutes, with 7 presentations of the 4 stimulus types (two bistable 
and two stable).
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Bistable stimulus (25 secs)
Fixation (5 secs)
Time
Stable stimulus (25 secs)
(b)
Stable StimuliBistable Stimuli
Figure 3.1.1. Trial structure and stimuli, (a) Subjects fixated a central cross on a 
blank screen and viewed the bistable stimulus for a period of 25s while reporting 
perceptual transitions via key-press. Following another short period of fixation,
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subjects were presented with stable versions of the percepts which followed the 
same time-course of perceptual transitions, (b) The bistable stimuli and stable 
analogues. 
Imaging and Image processing
Functional images were processed and analysed using Statistical Parametric Mapping 
(SPM2; Wellcome Department o f Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK) implemented 
in MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA). A 1.5-T Siemens SONATA system 
(Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) equipped with a head coil was used to acquire 
functional images with a gradient echo-planar T2* sequence using BOLD (blood 
oxygenation level dependent) contrast, with a repetition time (TR) = 3.6 s. Each 
functional image comprised 40 transverse slices [2 mm thickness; 1 mm gap; 64 x 64, 
3 x 3  mm pixels echo time (TE) = 40 msec] covering the whole brain volume. A total 
of 240 sequential volumes were acquired during each of the two separate sessions 
with the first four volumes of each session discarded to allow for T1 equilibration 
effects. Images were realigned, slice-time corrected, normalised to a standard echo- 
planar image template and smoothed with a Gaussian kernel with full-width half 
maximum of 12 mm in order to make comparisons across subjects. Serial 
autocorrelations were modelled using an AR (1) method. A structural MRI scan using 
a standard three-dimensional T1-weighted sequence was acquired from each subject 
and co-registered to the functional scans and transformed into the same standard 
space.
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Data Analysis
Brain activation for each experimental condition was estimated according to the 
general linear model for each voxel in brain space (Friston et al., 1995). The stable 
and bistable stimulus transitions for both stimulus types onsets were modelled as 
events using the canonical haemodynamic response function to capture the BOLD 
onset. For the DCM analysis, the periods o f presentation of the stable and bistable 
figures were modelled as blocks by a box-car waveform of 25s convolved with the 
haemodynamic response. This analysis was still in effect modelling the differences in 
the type of perceptual transitions, as we were comparing between blocks in which the 
only difference was the type of perceptual transition (internal for the bistable, external 
for the stable), with duration, alternation rate and task instructions identical. Also 
included for each session were six covariates to capture residual movement-related 
artefacts (the three rigid-body translations and the three rotations determined from 
initial registration), and a single covariate representing the mean (constant) over 
scans. The data were high-pass filtered with a frequency cut-off at 128. We performed 
a random effects analysis; images o f parameter estimates for each contrast of interest 
were created for each subject (first-level analysis) and were then entered into a 
second-level analysis using a t-test for each contrast. This analysis considers both 
within- and between-subject variance and allows generalisations to be made about the 
population from which the subjects were taken. This contrasts with a fixed effects 
(first level) analysis, which uses within subject variance, providing inferences for the 
subjects used in the study only (Holmes & Friston, 1998).
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Dynamic causal modelling (DCM)
We then analysed the data using DCM (Friston et al., 2003) to estimate the probability 
that one brain area exerts an influence over another, and how this is affected by 
experimental condition. Three distinct sets of underlying parameters are estimated. 
The first set represents the direct relation between brain states and any particular 
region, and are the primary motivation for conventional analysis of regionally specific 
activations in brain imaging experiments. The second set of parameters called 
‘intrinsic connections’, refer to the influence that one brain region has on another in 
the absence of experimental context. The third set o f parameters, called bilinear terms, 
is the postulated change in the ‘intrinsic connections’ due to experimental 
manipulations.
In contrast to classical analyses of neuroimaging data, these parameters allow 
one to make inferences about the effect of experimental manipulation on active 
connections between brain regions, instead of the region itself. DCM estimates the 
underlying neuronal activity from the haemodynamic response using a previously 
validated biophysical model of fMRI measurements (Friston et al., 2000; Mechelli et 
al., 2001). The estimated underlying neuronal activity is then used to derive the 
connectivity parameters (for details, see Friston et al., 2003). In brief, these two steps 
are iteratively repeated and correspond to the expectation (E) and maximization (M) 
steps of an expectation maximisation algorithm. This finds the maximum likelihood 
estimates of the parameters in the DCM, which are unobserved. The algorithm 
alternates between performing the E-step, which computes an expectation of the 
likelihood by including the unobserved latent variables, and the maximization M-step, 
which estimates the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters by maximizing
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the expected likelihood from the previous E step. These parameters from the M step 
are then used to begin another E step, and so on (Dempster et al., 1977).
The intrinsic connections estimate the rate o f change o f neuronal activity in 
one area induced by activity in another. Contrasting with purely correlative measures 
o f functional connectivity, DCM thus makes use o f the temporal information 
contained in fMRI time series to assess effective connectivity', i.e.. the causal 
relationships between activity changes in different brain regions (Friston et al., 2003: 
Stephan, 2004). This characterization does not depend on the units o f activity, but the 
speed or rate o f interregional coupling. It is therefore possible make inferences about 
feed-forward and feedback connectivity, which is particularly relevant in the present 
study.
Subject specific regions (6 mm-radius) were selected on the basis o f the 
regions activations detected with statistical parametric mapping. The peak voxel 
activations within the regional activity' were selected and defined in terms o f the 
principal eigenvariates. These values were entered into the DCM to estimate 
independently for each subject the forward and backward intrinsic connections', the 
influence that one region has over another in the absence o f an experimental factor, 
and the ‘bilinear term s', the modulation o f the intrinsic connections by each type of 
figure. For statistical analysis, we adopted a two-stage procedure that is formally 
identical to the summary statistic approach used in random effects analysis o f 
neuroimaging data (Holmes & Friston, 1998). The first level consisted o f the 
coupling parameters between regions (intrinsic connections) and the modulations o f 
these induced by experimental manipulation (bilinear terms). The conditional 
expectations or modes o f these parameters were taken to the second level for classical 
inference using t-tests. Each separate t-test o f our connections entailed multiple
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comparisons and we therefore report our results at two levels. First descriptively at P 
< 0.05 (uncorrected), and second using corrected statistics with the Bonferroni 
procedure for multiple comparisons, corresponding to corrected P-values o f P < 
0.0083 for the intrinsic connections and P < 0.0125 for the bilinear terms.
Using regions that were significantly active in the SPM analysis, we 
constructed three alternative dynamic causal models within each subject. This enabled 
us to use Bayes factors to compare DCMs with different intrinsic connectivity 
patterns in order to determine the most likely intrinsic connectivity pattern o f a model 
given our observed functional data set (Penny et al., 2004). The first alternative model 
was composed o f a bidirectional hierarchical netw ork (figure 3.1.3a) consisting o f the 
primary visual cortex (V I). the lateral occipital cortex (LO), the superior parietal 
cortex (SPC) and the prefrontal cortex (PFC). For computational simplicity, we 
restricted our analysis o f these areas to the right hemisphere only. The second was 
identical to the one described above, with the addition o f a backward connection from 
SPC to V 1. This was motivated by previous studies that have established attentional 
modulation occurs as early as VI (Somers et al.. 1998), through feedback connections 
from the parietal cortex (Buechel et al.. 1998). The third alternative model was 
identical to our first one. w ith the addition o f bidirectional connections from LO to the 
PFC. This was dictated by macaque anatomical studies showing connections between 
analogous areas such as TE and area 45 (Chavis & Pandya, 1976; Webster, et al., 
1994).
We were then able to compare these models using a Bayesian model selection 
procedure to identify the most likely model for our data (Penny et al., 2004). In theory 
the best model should be a compromise betw een the fit o f the model to the data and 
the complexity o f the model, which depends on the prior covariance o f the intrinsic
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connections. However given that the covariance is defined in a model specific 
fashion, models with different numbers o f connections cannot easily be compared. 
Fortunately two methods are available that offer appropriate approximations in this 
case: Akaike's information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) 
which have different complexity terms shown by:
BIC  = accuracy(m) — deJnN  
A IC  = accuracy(m) -  do_
(2)
Where do is the number o f model parameters and N is the number o f scans. Given that 
almost all fMRI studies are more than 8 scans, it is obvious that BIC is reduced for 
larger data sets. Correspondingly, it has been shown that empirically that AIC is 
biased towards complex models, whereas BIC is biased towards simple models (Kass 
& Rafter} . 1993). If  the evidence using both o f these models at the single-subject 
level is in agreement, we calculate the Bayes factor for each o f model comparison of 
any pairs o f models (m, and m,) given by:
B„ p(y|m,) p(y|m )
(3)
To determine if  a model is optimal at the group level, we then take the product of the 
individual Bayes factors (Stephan & Penny, 2006). Therefore for each subject, we 
first performed pairwise comparisons between all models and then computed the 
group Bayes factors across subjects.
After establishing the most plausible anatomical architecture, we analysed the 
changes in regional connectivity. Our first analysis was performed to investigate the 
effects o f the stable and bistable figures on interregional connectivity. We collapsed 
the time course o f brain activity during perception o f these figures together giving
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only bistable and stable blocks. The aim o f a second analysis was to determine 
whether there were any differences in interregional connectivity between the two 
bistable figures. The stimulus function for the DCM analysis that encoded either the 
perception o f  both stable and bistable figures (first analysis) or the perception o f each 
o f the bistable figures only (second analysis), entered the dynamic causal model 
through V 1, which allowed the resulting perturbation to propagate through the model 
via interconnections with LO and the other regions. The same network was used with 
both stimulus types. We specified bilinear terms to look at the influence o f figure 
types (either between stable and bistable, or different bistable types) on all backward 
connections and the forward connections from VI to LO. This is because we were 
specifically interested in testing whether backward connections from the higher areas 
or forward connections from VI have a causal influence on LO under these 
conditions.
3.1.3. Results
Statistical parametric mapping
The data from nine subjects were submitted into a random effects analysis to identify 
activity in brain regions during perceptual transitions while viewing two types of 
bistable figures and their corresponding stable analogues. At the uncorrected level of 
significance, we observed increased activity around area V3 for perceptual reversals 
o f the Necker Cube compared to those o f the Rubin’s Vase. However no differences 
were observed at the corrected level. Therefore, it appears that the neural activations 
observ ed during the transitions with both o f these bistable figures are largely common 
to each. Next, we collapsed activity for both types o f bistable transition and compared
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this with externally mediated changes o f both stimulus types. By subtracting the 
activity measured during transitions between the stable figures from activity measured 
during the transitions between percepts while viewing the bistable figures, we were 
able to localise activity in areas that may responsible for selecting percepts when 
multiple interpretations o f the retinal input are possible. For both the Necker cube and 
Rubin's vase figures, this contrast showed activity in the superior parietal cortex 
(SPC) bilaterally (peak voxel co-ordinates [34 -5 6  62], Montreal Neurological 
Institute (MNI) space), the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; [52 14 10]) 
and the frontal eye fields (FEF; [-32 -8  60]). In addition, lateral occipital areas, which 
may include the V3 complex and LO showed activity (left: [-44 -72 -12], right: [48 
-78 2]). Threshold controlling false discovery rate (FDR; Genovese et al., 2002) at 5% 
gave peak voxel activations bilaterally in LO, SMA, superior parietal lobules, and the 
right DLPFC. The reverse contrast, external transitions versus bistable transitions, 
revealed activity mainly in the medial frontal cortex [6 10 -16], bilateral inferior 
parietal lobules (left: [-58 -58 20], right: [58 -64 32]) and medial temporal lobes (left: 
[-60 -12 -16]. right: [52 -12 -12] and were significant at 5% threshold controlling 
FDR.
Finally, we looked for modulation o f activity for both external and internal transitions 
above and below baseline (figure 3.1.2). For internal transitions this revealed almost 
identical areas to those observed when contrasted against externally mediated changes 
at uncorrected level and correcting for FDR. Areas that showed event-related 
modulations below baseline during internally mediated transitions at 5% FDR 
included large regions o f the posterior cingulate cortex [6 -5 8  30], the medial frontal 
cortex [-6 24 -2 ] . bilateral inferior parietal lobules (left: [-40 —68 42], right: [ 48 -6 6  
38] and the superior colliculus [-10 -40 -10]. Comparing events where brain activity
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for externally mediated transitions occurred above the intrinsic baseline showed right 
biased visual areas including LO [54 -74 -4]. the V3 complex [36 -9 6  8] and left­
sided motor and somatosensory activations [-30 -22  54]. This is consistent with 
subjects reporting a perceptual change with a right-hand key-press. However, none of 
these activations were significant at 5% threshold controlling FDR. No regions 
showed significant modulations below baseline at 5% FDR for externally mediated 
stimulus transitions. However, at the uncorrected level modulations were observed in 
the superior parietal lobules and primary and somatosensory areas.
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A m b > Base Stab > Base
Base >  A m b Base > Stab
Figure 3.1.2. Event related modulations during perceptual transitions above and 
below baseline. Amb = bistable transitions. Stab = Stable transitions. Base =
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Intrinsic baseline. Data are displayed with a statistical threshold corresponding 
to P < 0.001, uncorrected, in a random effects analysis of 9 subjects. 
Dynamic causal modelling
Firstly, we sought to establish the most likely model architecture, given our data set 
using a model selection procedure. In each subject, we found consistent evidence in 
favour o f our first model. AIC showed highest evidence for model 1 in 8 out o f 9 
subjects (we therefore exclude the single subject not in agreement from the rest o f the 
analysis), and using BIC model 1 evidence was highest in all subjects (table 1). The 
group Bayes factor for model 1 over the other models was greater than 108 for both 
AIC and BIC. corresponding to a probability o f p < 10'8. Model 1 is therefore the most 
likely model for our data and we only consider this architecture for the rest o f the 
analysis.
Intrinsic connections
Intrinsic connections refer to the influence that one cortical region has on another in 
the absence o f experimental manipulation and can therefore be regarded as a baseline 
measure o f connectivity. At the group level, all forward and backward connections 
throughout the network (figure 3.1.3), with the exception o f the backwards connection 
between LO and V I, were found to be significantly greater than 0 at the corrected 
statistical level (P < 0.0083).
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Modulations during figure presentation
Our group analysis revealed that during the presentation o f the bistable figures there 
were significant positive modulations at the corrected level (P < 0.0125) from VI to 
LO, from PFC to SPC and SPC to LO (figure 3.1.3). Figure 3.1.4 shows the observed 
and predicted BOLD response from a typical subject. During perception o f externally 
changing stable figures, the backward connections from PFC and SPC to the SPC and 
LO respectively, showed significant negative modulations at the corrected level of 
significance. Given that we found both forward and backward connections to LO to 
be significantly modulated by presentation o f bistable figures, we wanted to assess 
whether one pathway has a greater influence than the other. We therefore took both of 
these modulatory terms from the individual subject level for the backward and 
forward connections to LO and compared them at the group level using a paired t-test. 
The VI to LO connection was found to be significantly larger (P < 0.001). Finally, we 
assessed the differences in interregional connectivity between the Necker cube and 
Rubin's vase bistable figures: no significant differences were observed, even at the 
uncorrected level o f significance.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC
1 0.49 0.84 0.42 0.13 0.092 0.028
2 0.75 0.94 1.7e-27 1.2e-26 0.25 0.05
3 0.47 0.83 0.17 0.055 0.35 0.11
4 0.74 0.94 0.26 0.06 4.7e-05 1.1e-05
5 0.47 0.84 0.16 0.049 0.37 0.11
6 0.64 0.93 0.27 0.069 0.086 0.0039
7 0.61 0.91 0.31 0.082 0.078 0.0036
8 0.44 0.96 0.54 0.037 0.02 2.4e-05
9 0.38 0.84 0.37 0.15 0.25 0.017
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Table 3.1.1. Evidence for all nine subjects for the three DCMs using Akaike’s 
inform ation criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC).
(a)
(b)
Stable:
Bistable:
0.0385
0.4516*
significant at corrected level: J  J V o S S )
Figures-----
(extrinsic input)
0.70350.4359’ 0.4771
0.12 0.3521 0.2875’
Bistable:
Stable:
0.0179
-0.0357
0.2315**
-0.1819**
0.2469**
-0.2481**
Figure 3.1.3. (a) The intrinsic connections of the dynamic causal model 
comprises a bidirectional hierarchy from VI to PFC, via LO and SPC (filled
arrows). Dotted arrows represent additional connections of alternative models 
considered, (b) Group results for the DCM analysis. Values refer to the coupling 
coefficient between regions. The extrinsic input coding ‘figures’ comprised 
presentation of both stable and bistable figures and was entered into the model 
through via VI. All intrinsic connections, with the exception of the backward 
connection from LO to VI, were significant. During perception of bistable 
figures significant positive modulations of backward connections were observed 
from PFC to SPC and SPC to LO, as well as the forward connection between VI 
and LO. Negative modulations of the backward connections from PFC to SPC, 
and SPC to LO were observed during perception of stable figures. Units 
represent the coupling co-efficient between different brain areas (Hz).
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Figure 3.1.4. Fitted responses in the four regions of interest in a single subject. 
Blue lines represent observed BOLD response; red lines represent predicted 
BOLD response from DCM.
3.1.4. Discussion
In the present study we investigated the neuronal networks that underlie the 
perception of both bistable figures and normal stable figures. Our motivation was 
three-fold: to (1) asses the contribution o f ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ influences on 
the perceptual interpretation of bistable figures, (2) quantify the differences that these 
influences may have on different types of figures, (3) observe the relative
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interregional dynamics that occur during stimulus induced transitions. To address 
these issues, we examined both regionally specific responses and interregional 
coupling using DCM.
Consistent with previous studies, internally mediated perceptual transitions 
with both the Necker Cube and Rubin’s Vase elicited regionally specific activations in 
bilateral LO and a right-sided fronto-parietal network encompassing areas previously 
associated with spatial attention (Corbetta et al., 1993; Kastner et al., 1999) and 
perceptual transitions during bistable perception (Lumer et ah, 1998; Kleinschmidt et 
ah, 1998). Deactivations were observed in the posterior cingulate and medial frontal 
cortices, and the superior colliculus, areas implicated in spatial orienting. Our DCM 
analysis revealed that during bistable figure transitions there was a significant positive 
modulation o f both forward connections from V 1 and backward connections from 
SPC to LO, an area known to represent perceived object shape (Kourtzi & Kanwisher,
2001) and therefore the likely area underlying the interpretation o f these figures. 
Given that we instructed the subjects to simply view the figures, we can only 
speculate on what initiates these top-down signals. Previous behavioural studies have 
provided good evidence for attention, either overtly through eye-movements (Boring, 
1942; Ellis & Stark, 1978) or covertly through spatial or even feature-based attention 
(Meredith; 1962; Struber & Stadler 1999), to be a major factor in initiating bistable 
figure reversals, both o f  which could initiate the top-down influence to LO. In the 
present case we believe the latter to be the most likely, as the subjects maintained 
steady fixation throughout scanning. It could be argued that the V 1 to LO modulations 
are caused by top-down modulation o f VI activity by higher areas. However, our 
model selection procedure demonstrated that the model with backward connections 
from SPC to LO, and not V I, was the most likely model for our data. It would be
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interesting to see whether this also holds for binocular rivalry, in which VI is 
modulated according to perceptual state (Polonsky et al., 2000; Lee & Blake, 2002). 
Overall, our results support a hybrid theory o f bistable figures that incorporates both 
top-down and bottom-up effects (Long & Toppino, 2004). Such a proposal suggests 
that these effects are not mutually exclusive, rather they simultaneously influence 
figure reversals across multiple processing stages. This result is therefore consistent 
with the seemingly disparate psychophysical literature that provides evidence for both 
mechanisms influencing figure reversals. Although such mechanisms have previously 
been hypothesised on the basis o f psychophysical and conventional neuroimaging 
analyses, this is the first study to directly demonstrate them.
We also found no significant differences in the regionally specific effects or 
interregional coupling between the Rubin's Vase and Necker Cube. These 
observations are consistent with the notion o f a common mechanism for perceptual 
selection underlying multistable phenomena regardless of stimulus type (Andrews & 
Purvee, 1997: Logothetis, 1998). In addition, our analysis shows that the forward 
connections from VI to LO to be significantly more modulated than the backward 
connections from SPC. suggesting that bottom-up effects are more dominant, at least 
with the figures we used. However, we are cautious in generalising to all types of 
bistable figures as these may have different contributions. It is known that increasing 
the luminance o f a figure increases the rate o f reversal, suggesting that the bottom-up 
effect has a stronger influence with increasing stimulus strength (Cipywnyk, 1959). 
Moreover, the present study only addresses reversible figures and not other forms o f 
perceptual bistability such as ambiguous (Muckli et al., 2002) or illusory motion 
(Sterzer et al.. 2002), or binocular rivalry, which may have different mechanisms. For
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instance, a recent psychophysical study suggested that binocular rivalry is more 
stimulus-driven and less susceptible to attentional effects (Meng & Tong, 2004).
During the stimulus-induced transitions o f the stable figures, we observed 
regionally specific activations in visual areas including the lateral occipital cortex, 
which may correspond to activity in retinotopic areas such as V3A and anterior lateral 
occipital areas known to be involved in form processing. Regions that showed event- 
related modulations below baseline included the SPC and medial areas o f the visual 
cortex, with only visual areas surviving correction for multiple comparisons. 
Correspondingly, the DCM analysis shows a negative modulation o f the connections 
between PFC and SPC, and SPC and LO. It should be noted however that these 
modulations are in relation to the collapsed effect o f modulation due to both bistable 
and stable figures. This is therefore a measure o f these connections during perception 
o f stable compared to bistable figures, suggesting that stable figures do not evoke the 
same top-down modulations. Many authors have interpreted the fronto-parietal 
activations observed during bistable stimulus transitions as evidence for the necessity 
o f top-down influences for visual awareness (e.g. Lumer et al., 1998; Dehaene et al., 
2003). In such a framework, activity in the visual cortex alone is not sufficient for 
awareness of a stimulus; these higher areas, which select stimuli to be consciously 
perceived and enhance the sensory processing o f the stimulus, must accompany it. For 
example, an fMRI study o f semantic priming found that when words were presented 
unconsciously, only ventral areas were active, whereas conscious unmasked words 
additionally activated frontal, parietal and cingulate areas (Dehaene et al., 2001). In 
contrast to such a view, it has been suggested that activity in the visual area 
processing an attribute is sufficient to be aware of it (Bartels & Zeki, 1998; Tse et al., 
2005). The present results are more consistent with the latter view. While top-down
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connections are positively modulated during bistable figure transitions, they are in 
comparison negatively modulated during stimulus mediated reversals o f the stable 
figures, and no other regions aside from those in the visual cortex are activated during 
externally mediated perceptual transitions. Therefore, in the present case at least, 
these top-down influences do not seem to play a role in the awareness o f stable 
stimuli.
Overall, our findings can be summarised as follows: (1) both top-down 
connections from PFC via SPC to LO, and bottom-up connections from VI to LO 
were positively modulated while viewing bistable figures; (2) no significant 
differences between the Necker Cube and Rubin's Vase were found for either the 
regional activations or the interregional coupling; (3) top-down influences from the 
PFC to SPC, and SPC to LO were negatively modulated while viewing stable figures. 
These results support a hybrid mechanism of multistable perception that incorporates 
both bottom-up and top-down factors which are common to all figures types. Recent 
fMRI results show that during binocular rivalry neural activity as early as the lateral 
geniculate nucleus correlates with perception (Haynes et al., 2005b; Wunderlich et al., 
2005). However, it is not established whether this is due to feedback connections from 
higher areas, or competitive interactions between monocular neurons within this area. 
Therefore, future studies should address the interactions and dissociations between 
top-down and bottom-up processes in the context o f perceptual rivalry and visual 
awareness.
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3.2 Neural Correlates of Conscious Perception in the 
Near Absence of attention
3.2.1. Introduction
As demonstrated by the literature reviewed in the introductory sections, there have 
recently been numerous studies investigating the neural correlates o f visual 
awareness, which in turn have inspired various competing theories o f the underlying 
mechanism (s). A recurring debate in this topic is whether activity in areas beyond the 
visual cortex, such as the frontal or parietal cortices, is required for conscious 
perception. It has been claimed that activity in the visual areas alone can support 
awareness without the need for feedback connections from these higher areas (Zeki & 
Bartels. 1999). In contrast, it has been argued activity in higher areas is crucial; these 
in turn bias activation in visual areas, to select and maintain the contents o f visual 
awareness (e.g. Dehaene et al., 2003).
This issue is mirrored by the debate in the psychological literature, which 
questions the exact relationship between visual awareness and attention (and by 
implication, the top-down neuronal processes that underlie it). Many argue that there 
is a direct one-to-one mapping o f visual awareness and attention, or in the words o f 
William James 'm y experience is what I  agree to attend to ’ (1890). For instance, 
“change blindness' occurs when a subject is unable to detect even very salient changes 
in a visual scene (Grimes, 1996), provided there is a masking o f the motion transients 
produced by the change (e.g. by flicker or saccades). This striking phenomenon 
indicates that although it seems that we have a detailed awareness o f current sensory 
input, in actual fact this representation is very sparse. Moreover, attention seems 
underlie the limit on the changes we are able to detect; for instance, change blindness
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is reduced by exogenous cues (Scholl, 2000) and semantically relevant changes 
(Rensink et al., 1997), and no more than 4-5 changes can be monitored 
simultaneously: a limit known to occur in other attentional tasks (e.g. Pashler, 1998). 
Therefore, this phenomenon, in addition to others such as Tnattentional blindness' 
(Mack & Rock, 1998) or ‘attentional blink' (Raymond et al., 1992), demonstrates how 
crucial attention is to perceiving visual events, and provides strong evidence for the 
direct correspondence between attention and awareness.
However, others have suggested that visual events can be perceived outside 
the focus o f attention. This is perhaps best illustrated by dual-task experiments, 
originally performed by Braun and colleagues (Braun & Sagi, 1990; Braun & Julesz, 
1998), in which the subjects' attention is distracted by a highly demanding centrally 
located letter discrimination task. Simultaneously, they had to either detect or 
discriminate simple visual features presented at a random location in the periphery. 
What is interesting is that performing the peripheral task did not affect performance of 
the attentionally demanding central task compared to when it was performed alone; 
likewise, subjects were able to perform the peripheral task as well with the central 
task as when alone. These results suggest that simple peripheral stimuli such as 
position, colour and orientation can be perceived without the need for top-down 
attention. Remarkably, a recent study using the same paradigm found that even 
complex natural scenes can be discriminated in the absence o f attention (Li et al.,
2002). How can this result be reconciled with those studies described in the previous 
paragraph which suggest a mandatory role for attention in awareness? One possibility 
is that while attention is necessary for visual awareness o f certain stimuli, such as 
during crowding (He et al., 1996), for others, such as natural scenes in the dual-task 
situation, it is not.
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However it must be noted that the very question o f whether conscious 
perception can occur in the absence o f attention is, in itself, a controversial one, even 
with the dual-task paradigms introduced by Braun (1990) withstanding. For instance, 
the detection o f a so-called ‘pre-attentive? pop-out stimulus, in which the target 
orientation differs from the surrounding distractors, is severely impaired while 
performing a central rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task involving letter 
identification (Josephs et al., 1997). While after extensive training subjects can 
eventually perform the task (Braun, 1998), it is argued that this is due to the freeing 
up o f attentional resources as learning increases the efficiency with which the 
stimulus in the RSVP is processed and thereby reduces attentional load (Josephs et al., 
1998). This in turn allows the pop-out stimulus to be detected. By this account, 
conscious perception cannot occur in the absence o f attention, only outside the focus 
o f attention. Given the extensive training required o f subjects in the tasks used by Li 
and colleagues (2002) and Braun (1990) before their performance stabilises, it is 
possible that subjects simply learn to deploy attention to the multiple relevant target 
locations.
To investigate the neural basis o f visual awareness, many imaging studies 
have used paradigms in which attention is already known to play a key role. For 
example, one previous study addressed the neural fate o f events outside the focus o f 
attention (Rees et al., 1999) and found no evidence for the semantic processing o f 
words under such conditions. However, it was already known that words are not 
perceived outside the focus o f attention; this result may therefore not extend to other 
stimuli, which can be perceived under these conditions, such as natural scenes. In 
another fMRI study o f change blindness (Beck et al.. 2001), successful change 
detection compared with unsuccessful change detection (i.e. change blindness)
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correlated with fronto-parietal regions usually associated with visuospatial attention 
(Corbetta et al., 1993; Kastner et al., 1999), and category specific areas which process 
the attribute detected. These results, along with others (e.g. Marois et al., 2000; 
Dehaene et al., 2001) support the ‘global workspace' theory visual awareness 
(Dehaene et al., 2003). However, using these specific paradigms it is unsurprising that 
activity in attentional systems correlates with task performance and conscious 
perception, since it is already known that attention plays a crucial role. Therefore a 
key question is: using a paradigm, in which attention or at least the focus o f attention, 
is not involved, does visual awareness correlate with activity in fronto-parietal 
regions?
The goal o f the following study was to determine whether visual and fronto­
parietal activity correlates with visual awareness when outside the focus o f attention. 
To address this issue we used a dual-task paradigm similar to those described above 
(Braun & Sagi. 1990; Li et al., 2002): subjects were presented with letters in the 
central visual field and were required to discriminate either the characters 
(attentional ly demanding) or the luminance (non-attentionally demanding). 
Simultaneous with this they discriminated the presence o f a place stimulus presented 
peripherally. Thus while performing the luminance task attention would not be 
completely occupied centrally; its focus would be absent from the periphery while 
performing the character discrimination task. Those brain areas critical to visual 
awareness should correlate with conscious perception (i.e. hit vs. miss) for the 
peripheral task while performing both the attentionally demanding or non-demanding 
central task. Whereas global workspace theories (e.g. Dehaene et al., 2003) predict 
that fronto-parietal areas will correlate with perception in both conditions, modular 
theories (e.g. Zeki & Bartels, 1999) predict that visual areas alone will correlate with
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awareness o f the peripheral stimuli while performing the central attentionally 
demanding task. During the central attentionally non-demanding condition the focus 
o f attention will be free in the periphery. Therefore proponents of the modular theory 
would expect fronto-parietal areas, in addition to frontal areas, to correlate with 
awareness, since on trials in which the peripheral stimulus was detected, the subjects 
would be on average paying more attention to the target.
3 .2 .2 . M e th o d s  
Subjects
Four healthy volunteers (one woman and three men; mean age 23.3 ± 1.75) with 
normal, or corrected to normal vision, participated in the study after giving written 
consent. They were trained to perform the psychophysical task and were scanned after 
their performance stabilised. All stimuli were constructed using COGENT 2000 
Graphics (available at mv w. v i s I a b . tt c 1. a i . 11 k) running in MATLAB (Mathworks 
Natick, MA).
Psychophysics
Subjects were seated in a darkened room and fixated a central cross on a computer 
monitor (Sony Trinitron with a refresh rate o f 60 Hz) with a viewing distance of 
40cm. The psychophysics consisted o f three control experiments: (1) an attentionally 
demanding central task (letter discrimination), (2) an attentionally non-demanding 
central task (luminance discrimination), (3) a peripheral ‘place’ detection task, and 
two main experiments: dual-task conditions in which one of the two central tasks was 
performed concurrently with the peripheral task. Each condition required a significant 
training period. It usually took more than 14 hours (approximately 14,000 trials of all
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different tasks combined) in total. All tasks received the same amount o f training to 
avoid bias for any particular one. Trials were organized in the same way and had the 
identical stimuli irrespective o f the experimental condition (single or dual-task).
With both central task conditions each trial started with a fixation cross 
200 ± 50 ms before the onset o f the stimulus. At 0 ms, the central stimulus o f five 
letters was presented. The five letters (T's and L's, either all identical characters, or 
one differing from the other four, and of high or medium luminance, either all 
identical luminance, or one differing from the other four) appeared at nine possible 
locations within 1.2° eccentricity (see figure 3.2.1 for task structure). Each letter was 
randomly rotated. After the central SOA (stimulus onset asynchrony, the time between 
the appearance o f the central stimulus and the onset o f the central mask), the letter F 
masked each stimulus letter. Subjects were instructed to respond by key-press to 
report if  the five letter characters were the same or different in the attentionally 
demanding condition, or if  the five letter luminances were the same or different in the 
attentionally non-demanding condition. The central SOA, starting at 500 ms, was 
decreased after each block o f 100 trials where the performance o f this task exceeded 
85% correct. The procedure was terminated after the subject's performance had 
stabilized and the central SOA was below 250 ms. This value was chosen to limit the 
possibility o f switching attention during stimulus presentation from the attentionally 
demanding central task in the dual-task condition.
In the peripheral task the stimulus (size: 3° x 4.2°) was presented 50 ms after 
the central stimulus onset at a 6.7° eccentricity for 33 ms and was followed by a 
textured mask, consisting o f an achromatic textured mixture o f white noise at different 
spatial frequencies. The peripheral stimuli were either ‘places' (pictures o f natural 
landscapes, houses, indoor scenes) or ‘non-places' (textures and nonsense shapes
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matched for spatial frequency and luminance). Subjects were instructed to respond by 
key-press to report if  the peripheral stimulus was a ‘place' or a ‘non-place'. The 
peripheral SOA was adjusted in the same way as for the central SOA so that 
performance would stabilize at less than 85% correct. Individual peripheral SOAs 
ranged from 50 to 84 ms.
In both dual-tasks, subjects were instructed to focus attention on the central 
task. On each trial, they were supposed to respond to the peripheral stimulus (with 
their right hand) before the central stimulus (with their left hand). The central and 
peripheral SOAs used for each individual subject were those that stabilised at below 
85% correct for the corresponding single task conditions.
In a separate control experiment, we tested our subjects' central performance 
with shortened SOAs on both o f the single central tasks. For each subject, the central 
SOA alternated in four blocks o f 48 trials between two values: the subject's original 
SOA that was reached at the end of the training procedure, and another SOA 67 ms 
shorter.
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Figure 3.2.1. Schematic diagram of stimulus sequence for each trial in all 
conditions.
fMRI Stimuli
After the psychophysical training periods on the dual-task stabilised, subjects 
underwent four sessions o f fMRI scanning during which they performed the dual-task 
conditions with the central character and luminance discrimination, using exactly the 
same SOAs as the final psychophysical training sessions. In each scanning session 
subjects performed one block each, comprising 100 trials, o f the central luminance 
and character conditions. The order o f these was randomised in each session. The 
stimuli were presented centrally and projected onto the screen by means o f an LCD 
projector (60Hz refresh rate).
135
Imaging and Image processing
Functional images were processed and analysed using Statistical Parametric Mapping 
(SPM2; Wellcome Department o f Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK) implemented 
in MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA). A 3-T Siemens ALLEGRA system 
(Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) equipped with a head coil was used to acquire 
functional images with a gradient echo-planar T2* sequence using BOLD (blood 
oxygenation level dependent) contrast, with a repetition time (TR) = 2.6 s. Each 
functional image comprised 40 transverse slices [2 mm thickness; 1.8 mm gap; 64 x 
64, 3 x 3  mm pixels; echo time (TE) = 40 msec] covering the whole brain volume. A 
total o f 2344 sequential volumes were acquired during 4 separate sessions with the 
first four volumes o f each session discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects. 
Images were realigned, slice-time corrected, normalised to a standard echo-planar 
image template and smoothed with a Gaussian kernel with full-width half maximum 
o f 6 mm. A structural MRI scan using a standard three-dimensional T1-weighted 
sequence was acquired from each subject and was co-registered to the functional 
scans and transformed into the same standard space.
Data Analysis
Brain activation for each experimental condition was estimated according to the 
general linear model at each voxel in brain space (Friston et al., 1995). The 
presentation times for the peripheral stimuli were modelled as discrete events with the 
canonical haemodynamic response to capture the BOLD onset. For the two conditions 
(central character and luminance discrimination), performance (hit, miss, false alarm 
or correct rejection for place detection) for the peripheral task was modelled as 4 
separate regressors on trials in which the central task was performed correctly, giving
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8 regressors in total. Stimuli on trials in which the each o f the central tasks were 
performed incorrectly were modelled as 2 separate regressors, irrespective of 
peripheral performance. Also included for each session were six covariates to capture 
residual movement-related artefacts (the three rigid-body translations and the three 
rotations determined from initial registration), two regressors for the peripheral and 
central key-press responses, and a single covariate representing the mean (constant) 
over scans. The data were high-pass filtered with a frequency cut-off at 128s. Images 
o f parameter estimates for each contrast o f interest were created for each subject and 
were analysed as single-subject case studies.
Retinotopic mapping
Sessions o f phase-encoded retinotopy were performed at the end o f the four 
experimental sessions. See APPENDIX 1 for methodological details.
3.2.3. Results
Psychophysics
We investigated the role o f attention in place detection by using a dual-task paradigm 
in which a peripheral detection task, where a target was defined by the presence o f a 
place stimulus, was performed concurrently with a central visual task that was either 
attentionally demanding (letter discrimination) or attentionally non-demanding 
(luminance discrimination). Consistent with previous behavioural studies (Braun & 
Sagi. 1990; Li et al.. 2002). we found that for each subject in both o f the dual-task 
conditions, central task performance showed no difference (p > 0.05, paired t-test) 
from performance under the single task condition (figure 3.2.2). Furthermore, each 
subject performed the peripheral place detection task under both dual-task conditions
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at a performance not significantly different from performance in the single task 
condition (p > 0.05). These results suggest that the place detection can still be 
performed outside o f the focus o f attention.
In the separate control experiment, all subjects performed both o f the single 
central task conditions with an SOA shortened by 66 ms. Their average performance 
dropped from an average o f 77% to 58% (individual /-test for each subject, p < 0.01) 
in the character discrimination task, but did not differ significantly for the luminance 
discrimination task (p > 0.05). This confirms that results o f the dual-task with the 
central attentionally demanding task do not reflect a switch o f attention between the 
two tasks; if  this did occur then the central performance would have dropped 
significantly, as shown by the reduction in performance through a reduced SOA. It 
also suggests that there may be attention allocated to the peripheral task when 
performing the central luminance task in the dual-task situation.
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Figure 3.2.2. Individual subjects’ results for dual vs. single task performance. 
Each dot represents a single subject’s performance after stabilisation on the 
dual-task normalised against performance on the single task condition. Error 
bars represent standard error for each subject.
Retinotopic mapping
We used standard retinotopic procedures (Engel et al., 1994) to map the organisation 
o f the occipital lobes o f  all four subjects and all were found to have standard angular 
retinotopic organisation in visual areas V I, V2d/v and V3d/v. Each subject also had 
an entire hemifield representation o f the contralateral visual field lying beyond V3d in 
the posterior part o f the intra-parietal sulcus, consistent with area V3A (Tootell et al.,
1997). Similarly, in the ventral occipital cortex all subjects had an entire hemifield 
representation beyond V3v consistent with human V4 (McKeefry et al., 1997; Wade 
et al., 2002) and inconsistent with the definition o f V4v and V8 (Hadjikhani et al.,
1998). We did not isolate V3B or V7 as our maps in these areas were inconsistent 
across subjects. Examining the maps o f stimulus eccentricity we found a large, single 
map encompassing V I, V2, V3 and bordering on V4 and V3A. The data from V4 
suggested that it shared the same eccentricity map as these early regions, as suggested 
by others (Wade et al., 2002).
fMRI
To ensure that attention was successfully manipulated on each trial we only analysed 
trials in which the central task was performed correctly. We then partitioned the trials 
according to the peripheral performance, as dictated by signal detection theory (hit,
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miss, false alarm, correct rejection). To isolate the neural substrates of visual 
awareness of the peripheral stimuli in the dual-task paradigm with both the 
attentionally demanding and non-demanding central task, we compared brain activity 
during hits versus misses of the peripheral stimulus on trials in which the central task 
was performed correctly. Since both the task and stimuli are identical, activity 
revealed by this comparison must be related to the underlying subjective perception of 
the stimulus. As shown in figure 3.2.3, conscious detection while performing the 
central attentionally non-demanding task correlated with activity across the cortex in 
the frontal, superior parietal and occipital lobes, with the exception of subject CG, 
where activity was only observed in the parietal and medial sensorimotor cortices 
(statistical threshold at p < 0.001, uncorrected for multiple comparisons).
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Figure 3.2.3. Main effect showing areas in which activity was higher for hits 
compared to misses on the peripheral task while performing the central non- 
attentionally demanding task (luminance discrimination). Results are displayed 
at a statistical threshold of p < 0.001 (uncorrected for multiple comparisons).
By contrast, successful conscious detection while performing the central attentionally 
demanding task yielded activity localised to the occipital lobe only (figure 3.2.4). 
Three subjects also showed activation around Broca's area in the left hemisphere, 
which may correspond to the pars triangularis or par opercularis; areas implicated in 
word processing (Price & Mechelli, 2005), and could be related to the letter task 
performed. Voxels in the parietal and frontal regions activated by conscious detection 
while performing the attentionally demanding task were not active even at a lowered 
statistical threshold (p < 0.05. uncorrected). For both o f these contrasts in all subjects, 
areas of the medial fusiform gyrus near to the ‘parahippocampal place area' (PPA; 
Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998) previously associated with conscious detection o f places 
(Beck et al., 2001) were found to be significantly active (p < 0.05, family wise error, 
small volume correction).
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Figure 3.2.4. Main effect showing areas in which activity was higher for hits 
compared to misses on the peripheral task while performing the central 
attentionally demanding task (letter discrimination). Results are displayed at a 
statistical threshold of p < 0.001 (uncorrected for multiple comparisons).
The interaction effect (figure 3.2.5), delineating regions more responsive to conscious 
detection of the peripheral stimulus in the presence of attention than the absence, 
showed activity across frontal, parietal and occipital areas. This therefore confirms the 
contribution of the front-parietal cortex in detection in the presence, but not the 
absence of attention. However, it should be noted that there was very little 
consistency in the activations across subjects. This is in line with previous fMRI
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studies that show variability between both subjects and studies when using identical 
paradigms (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000) and may be due to individual differences in 
functional anatomy or cognitive strategies employed during the task (Nadeau et al.,
1998).
Figure 3.2.5. Interaction contrast comparing showing areas in which activity was 
higher for successful peripheral detection (i.e. hits com pared to misses) while 
perform ing the attentionally non-demanding task, than with successful detection 
while perform ing the attentionally demanding task. Results are displayed at a 
statistical threshold of p < 0.001 (uncorrected for multiple comparisons).
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Finally, we contrast the main effect of the central letters task with the central 
luminance task. This was to address the possibility that fronto-parietal activations for 
the peripheral detection task in the central letters task were not apparent because there 
is a baseline high level o f activation in these areas due to the demands o f the difficult 
task. Therefore any variation between the peripheral hit and miss performance are too 
small to be detected. In contrast, while performing the easier central luminance task, 
the task demands are low leading to relatively lower baseline level o f fronto-parietal 
activity. This in turn should lead to larger differences (and therefore detectable 
differences) in activity in fronto-parietal areas between peripheral hits and misses. 
However, this contrast revealed very few and sparse activations at an uncorrected 
level o f significance (p < 0.001) in each subject only, with no activations in the 
fronto-parietal areas.
We then overlaid the contrast images for the hit-miss comparisons described 
above onto flattened retinotopic maps in order observe the pattern o f activations 
across the occipital cortex (figures 3.2.6-8). Due to technical difficulties, this was not 
possible for the left hemisphere of subject WY. For the conscious detection while 
performing the attentionally non-demanding task, this gave the strongest activations 
in dorsal visual areas, in particular V3 and V3A. However, there was no consistent 
pattern and most o f these activations were only significant at a lowered statistical 
threshold (p < 0.005). Likewise the same contrast while performing the attentionally 
demanding central task and the interaction effects showed no real consistency across 
subjects. The large inter-subject variability in activations may be explained by a 
couple o f factors. Firstly, it may be due to differences in anatomy (Cabeza & Nyberg, 
2000) or cognitive strategies (Nadeau et al., 1998) as discussed above. Secondly, our 
results are displayed as a percentage o f the global signal without any statistical
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threshold applied and may therefore simply reflect noise in the BOLD signal (Zarahn 
et al., 1997; Turner et al., 1998).However, in each subject at a very low statistical 
threshold (p < 0.05) we did observe significant voxel activations across all visual 
areas. Table 3.2.1 lists the p-values and z-scores for the most significant voxels. This 
reveals a significant activation o f VI (P < 0.004) in all subjects for conscious 
detection in the presence o f attention (central luminance condition). However, a 
corresponding activation in the absence o f attention (central letters condition) was not 
observed at the same threshold. Only at a much lower p-value was this apparent (p < 
0.04) suggesting a lack o f activation for this contrast.
Given that both the central and peripheral tasks were performed 
simultaneously, it is not clear if activity observed in these activation maps can be 
attributed to either alone. While the contrasts related to performance variation (hit- 
miss) in the peripheral task, with the central task performance constant, interaction 
between the tasks may have occurred. One possibility may have been to partition the 
activation maps according to either eccentricity (central and peripheral) or quadrant, 
according to where the peripheral stimulus was presented on each trials. However as 
noted in the previous paragraph, there was no real consistency or statistical 
significance in the activation maps either centrally or peripherally, apart from a few 
voxels at a low significance in V 1. In addition, due to technical reasons, we were not 
able to retrieve the location o f the peripherally presented stimulus on each trial.
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Luminance Letters
AREA Z-score T P Z-score T P
VI 3.38 3.38 0.0004 1.84 1.83 0.033
V2 3.15 3.15 0.001 2.39 2.39 0.008
CG V3 3.39 3.4 0.0003 3.12 3.12 0.001
V3a 2.7 2.69 0.004 3.12 3.12 0.001
V4 2.26 2.26 0.012 2.39 2.39 0.008
VI 2.81 2.81 0.002 2.83 2.83 0.002
V2 2.99 3.00 0.001 3.06 3.06 0.001
BR V3 3.01 3.01 0.001 2.4 2.4 0.008
V3a 2.98 2.98 0.001 2.47 2.47 0.007
V4 2.62 2.62 0.004 4.24 4.24 0.0005
VI 3.02 3.02 0.001 2.46 2.47 0.007
V2 3.03 3.03 0.001 2.71 2.71 0.003
HE V3 2.9 2.9 0.002 2.48 2.48 0.006
V3a 3.25 3.26 0.001 2.05 2.04 0.02
V4 2.49 2.49 0.006 2.57 2.57 0.005
VI 2.77 2.77 0.003 1.89 1.88 0.03
V2 2.35 2.35 0.009 1.76 1.75 0.04
WY V3 2.22 2.22 0.013 2.63 2.63 0.004
V3a 1.84 1.83 0.033 1.90 1.90 0.029
V4 1.66 1.65 0.049 1.92 1.92 0.028
Table 3.2.1. Most active voxel in retinotopic regions for conscious detection in 
each subject while performing the central luminance and letters discrimination 
tasks. P stands for p-values and T for the t-values.
3.2.4. Discussion
The aim o f this study was to test contrary predictions o f the global workspace 
(Dehaene et al., 2003) and modular (Zeki & Bartels, 1999) theories o f visual 
awareness. To this end. we investigated the neural correlates o f conscious detection in 
the presence and absence of the focus o f attention. We correlated event-related fMRI
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responses with detection performance o f subjects in a dual-task paradigm. Our results 
may summarised as follows: (1) consistent with previous studies (Braun & Julesz, 
1998. Li et al., 2002) we found that a peripheral target, in this case a ‘place’ stimulus, 
can be detected outside the focus o f attention; (2) fronto-parietal and occipital areas 
only correlated with conscious detection o f a visual stimulus in the presence of 
attention. In its absence, only occipital areas correlated with the observers' 
perception; (3) VI correlated weakly with correct detection only in the presence of 
attention.
These findings demonstrate that frontal and parietal regions usually associated 
with spatial attention (Corbetta et al., 1993; Kastner et al., 1999) only correlate with 
visual awareness when attention is actually present; in its absence activity in only 
occipital areas is observed. This dissociation suggests that these fronto-parietal areas 
are not essential for subjective perception, consistent with the modular view o f visual 
awareness (Zeki & Bartels. 1999). By contrast, these results are inconsistent with the 
‘global workspace' view (Dehaene et al., 2006; Rees et al., 2002; Baars, 2002), which 
would predict widespread brain activation for the conscious detection under all 
experimental conditions. In the search for the neural mechanisms o f awareness it 
seems that activity in areas outside o f the occipital lobe is not strictly necessary. The 
consistent correlate o f the subjects’ perception across both central task conditions 
were medial areas o f the occipital lobe, which were near the PPA, an area known to 
process place stimuli (Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998; Epstein et al., 2003), and 
previously shown to be active during the conscious detection o f places (Beck et al.,
2001).
Previous imaging studies demonstrating activity in frontal and parietal areas 
correlating with visual awareness may have been subject to a number o f attentional
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confounds. Firstly, by not controlling for trial-to-trial fluctuations in attentional state, 
observers will have performed better on trials in which they were more alert than on 
trials in which they were not. For instance, a recent fMRI study o f metacontrast 
masking showed that awareness o f the target stimulus correlated with activity in later 
visual and fronto-parietal areas (Haynes et al., 2005a). However, previous 
psychophysical experiments show that visibility of targets with metacontrast masking 
is subject to attentional modulation (Ramachandran & Cobb, 1995), with attention 
improving visibility7. We would therefore expect that on average the trials in which the 
target is detected, the subjects are attending more; with the corresponding attention 
related brain areas in the fronto-parietal cortex showing increased activity. Another 
factor to consider is that attention may be diverted to the target stimulus only after it is 
detected. Thus in the fMRI study o f change blindness by Beck and colleagues (2001), 
subjects may orient their attention to the target only if the change is detected. This 
could explain why fronto-parietal areas are more active on 'seen' trials. Finally, it is 
also not clear if trial-to-trial attentional fluctuations cause these fronto-parietal regions 
to correlate with awareness: on trials in which the subjects' attentional state (and 
hence activity in fronto-parietal regions) happens to be higher, the stimulus is more 
likely to be detected, without being absolutely necessary. While the present study 
cannot distinguish between these possibilities, we can be confident that the 
attentionally demanding central character discrimination task used presently 
controlled for these confounds. It was only when attention was not adequately 
controlled for in the central luminance task condition that fronto-parietal areas 
correlated with visual awareness.
Note however that these conclusions should not necessarily be taken to 
generalise to the neural correlates o f awareness for all tasks or stimuli. For example,
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Dehaene et al. (2001) found neural correlates o f word-priming masking outside o f the 
occipital lobe. The complexity o f such stimuli may require higher brain areas than 
those in the visual cortex. Moreover, awareness o f multiple items across space seems 
to require the parietal cortex. Patients who suffer from visual extinction typically have 
lesions to the right parietal lobe. While awareness for single items presented in their 
visual field is normal (Mesulam, 1985), when an item is placed in each hemifield the 
patients usually fail to report the presence o f the stimulus on the contralesional (i.e. 
left) side o f space. Hence, in this situation, even though the visual cortex is intact, 
there is a deficit in visual awareness. However these lesions do not render the subjects 
blind -  they are still visually aware. It is only in this specific instance o f multiple 
items across space that a deficit is apparent. In addition, attention is typically required 
for binding across features (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Simple targets such as two- 
tone colour discs cannot be correctly discriminated while performing the attentionally 
demanding central task described here (Li et al.. 2002). It is therefore likely that top- 
down influences from the frontal and parietal cortex are also mandatory for this task.
In section 3.2.1 we discussed whether attention is really absent from the 
peripheral stimulus while performing the central attentionally demanding task. The 
aim o f our study was not to address this issue; we simply sought to find the neural 
correlates o f conscious detection while performing such a task. However, the present 
results provide strong imaging evidence that attention was not present in the periphery 
(see Henson, 2006 for discussion on inferring cognitive processes from neuroimaging 
data). Areas associated with visuo-spatial attention, such as the superior parietal and 
the prefrontal cortex (Corbetta et al., 1993; Kastner et al., 1999), are employed when 
attentional resources are free, although when the central load is high these areas do 
not correlate with performance on the peripheral detection task, suggesting an absence
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of attention. Therefore, the argument that extensive psychophysical training proposed 
by Joesphs et al (1997) frees up attentional resources does not hold for the present 
experiment at least.
Another intriguing aspect o f the present results is the involvement o f VI 
during detection in the presence, but not absence, o f attention. As reviewed in section 
1.5, both neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies have shown that VI can 
correlate with subjective perception, possibly through feedback connections from 
higher visual areas (Super et al., 2001) or non-visual areas associated with attention 
such as the parietal cortex (Buechel & Friston, 1997). These previous studies have 
typically used stimuli which cells in VI are optimally tuned to, such as simple line 
stimuli (e.g. Super at al., 2001). unlike the complex place stimuli used presently, to 
which only higher visual areas in parahippocampal areas selectively respond to. 
Therefore, it may be surprising that V 1 correlates with detection of places. However, 
a couple o f factors may be involved. Firstly, bottom-up noise resulting in a stronger 
neural signal generated before VI may improve the quality o f representation o f the 
target stimulus in higher visual areas, such as the PPA, which in turn allows correct 
detection o f a place. According to this hypothesis, VI would show increased activity 
on hit versus miss trials. Secondly, as outline above, feedback from visual higher 
areas may increase the activity in VI on detected trials. The present data cannot 
measure feedback, although it does rule in favour feedback from higher areas, as V 1 
only correlated with visual awareness when the parietal cortex was active. Therefore 
similar criticisms o f attentional confounds like those described above could be levied 
at previous studies which find VI correlates with awareness, especially if  the 
modulation is late in the neuronal response (e.g. Super et al., 2001). In other words, 
this could simply be a by-product o f the observer orienting its attention to the target
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stimulus, which has previously been shown to modulate VI (Somers et al., 1999). 
Consistent with this interpretation, a recent fMRI study o f monoptic and dichoptic 
masking which controlled for attention found that only visual areas downstream of VI 
correlate with the subjects' perception (Tse et al., 2005). However, the lack o f VI 
activity in the no-attention condition in the present experiment should be taken 
cautiously: our peripheral targets only covered a very small proportion o f the visual 
field. Consequently, any subtle modulation of firing rate may only encompass a small 
proportion o f VI neurons, which may be missed due to limited the spatial resolution 
o f the BOLD signal.
Overall, our findings can be summarised as follows: (1) ‘place' stimuli can be 
detected outwith the focus of attention; (2) fronto-parietal and occipital areas only 
correlated w ith conscious detection o f a visual stimulus in the presence of attention. In 
its absence, only medial occipital areas correlated with the observers' perception. (3) 
VI correlates with correct detection only in the presence of attention. The present 
findings converge with others in demonstrating that it is the level o f activity within 
the visual cortex that is the deciding factor in whether this activity contributes to 
awareness (Zeki & ffytche, 1998; Dehaene et al., 2000; Moutoussis & Zeki, 2002). 
However, the physiological processes underlying this remain poorly defined. For 
example, this may correspond to increased firing rate, recurrent intra-areal 
connections, the recruitment o f addition neurons or neuronal synchrony. Therefore 
future studies should address these issues with high-resolution techniques such as 
single-cell electrophysiology or even in vivo fluorescent labelling (Stettler et al.,
2002).
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Figure 3.2.6. Flattened cortical activation maps from each subject, showing activity for the contrast of hit > miss for the peripheral
stimulus while performing the attentionally non-demanding central task. The colour bars represent %  global brain mean. Flattened 
cortical surface diameter is 75mm.
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Figure 3.2.7. Flattened cortical activation maps from each subject, showing activity for the contrast of hit > miss for the peripheral 
stimulus while performing the attentionally demanding central task. The colour bars represent % global brain mean. Flattened cortical 
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Figure 3.2.8. Flattened cortical activation maps from each subject, showing activity for the interaction effect of successful peripheral 
detection and attention. This contrast revealed areas more active during conscious detection in the presence of attention over detection in 
its absence. The colour bars represent % global brain mean. Flattened cortical surface diameter is 75mm.
3.3 Modularity of response modes and visual
awareness
3.3.1 Introduction
It has been well established by signal detection theory (SDT) that to make a 
perceptual decision as to the presence or absence o f a stimulus in the environment, 
observers rely on an internal sensory representation evoked by either the absence or 
presence o f the stimulus (Green & Swets. 1966). Evoked responses below a certain 
criteria will be classed as absent and those above classed as present. This established 
viewr states that the sensitivity of psychophysical judgements about the presence of a 
stimulus, such as a luminance increment, are limited by the noise and separation of 
the two internal representations represented by neuronal signals in early visual 
cortical areas. For instance in figure 3.3.1 the noise o f the present and absent response 
distributions clearly dictate the accuracy o f the observ ers' response. In (a) the noise of 
the internal representations are very' low. resulting many ‘hits' and "correct 
rejections', but very few ‘misses’ or ‘false-alarms’. However, as shown in (b). when 
the noise o f these distributions increases, the perceptual sensitivity is reduced, 
resulting in more incorrect responses and less correct ones.
In conflict with this prevailing view, Marcel (1993) showed that subjects’ 
sensitivity, as measured by d-prime (d '). on a simple detection task varied according 
to the response modality used to give their response. Eye-blinks were found to be 
most sensitive, followed by finger-presses and then verbal reports proving to be the 
least sensitive response modality. Significantly, there was no difference in response 
criterion between each of these report modalities, indicating a genuine difference in 
sensory sensitivity. This result echoes earlier clinical studies showing that patients 
may have access to different levels o f sensory information, depending on which
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response modality they use. For instance, patients with visual extinction after brain 
damage to the right hemisphere were found to be significantly worse at detecting a 
contralesional stimulus when using a key-press report than when using a verbal report 
(Bisiach et al., 1989). Similarly, it was found that in patients with VI damage, eye- 
blinks gave a more accurate response than key-presses (Zihl & von Cramon, 1980). 
Related findings have recently been reported in a patient with a focal anterior 
cingulate cortex lesion whose performance demonstrated on Stroop and divided 
attention tasks depended on the response modality7 used (Turken & Swick, 1999). 
These results pose pertinent questions for the SDT view -  in particular the internal 
representation o f response distributions: why are there different d-primes when the 
internal representation is the same? Is that noise introduced in the visuomotor 
pathway after the read-out o f these internal representations? Could there be a different 
distribution (and therefore neural populations) for each response modality? Or is one 
report mode more sensitive to levels o f activity in early visual areas than other report 
modes?
Transforming a sensory stimulus into a motor act is a computationally 
complex process, involving multiple stages including co-ordinate transformations, 
response selection and a decision process. Past neurophysiological studies have 
demonstrated patterns of activity in neurons of the frontal and parietal cortex in 
monkeys consistent with both prospective and retrospective sensory' and motor codes 
(see review Andersen & Buneo, 2002). The posterior parietal cortex in particular is 
thought to play a critical role in integrating sensory information with subsequent goal 
directed behaviour. Moreover, this area is subdivided into different subregions 
representing sensorimotor transformations for different response modalities, such as 
LIP for saccades and the parietal reach region (PRR) for reaching movements
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(Andersen & Buneo, 2002). For example. Snyder and colleagues (1997) found that 
during a saccade task in which a monkey was required to make a delayed saccade to a 
target, cells in LIP responded to the target stimulus and fired during the delay period, 
with their activity corresponding to the location of the planned saccade. Significantly, 
the same response profile o f neurons in this area was not observed for the task with 
reaching movements -  these were found in the PRR. Therefore the response 
dissociation described by Marcel (1993) may reflect these distinct sensorimotor 
transformations for different response modes.
Studies o f sensory awareness have typically equated subjects' report with 
subjective perception, as we seen have in the review section and previous experiments 
o f this thesis. However, there is good evidence that this assumption may not be 
justified. Firstly, the stimulus may be consciously perceived, but is not strong enough 
to cross the response criterion and is therefore classed as ‘not seen'. Therefore visual 
awareness may be graded and not binary, as the ‘hit' versus ‘miss' paradigms would 
suggest. Secondly, as the response dissociation discussed above shows rather than 
accurately reflecting the neural basis for visual awareness, subject reports may simply 
reflect the neural basis for a successful report. It is interesting to note that a fronto­
parietal network o f brain regions similar to those previously implicated in visual 
awareness (Rees et al., 2002) has been described in maintaining sensory spatial 
information and sensorimotor transformations (Sakai et al., 2002; Brown et al., 2004). 
On theoretical grounds it has been suggested that there are two types o f awareness: 
phenomenal, that which the observer actually experiences, and access, that which the 
observer is able to report (Block, 1996; 2005). Conceptualised in these terms, could 
be argued that rather than reflecting the neural basis of phenomenal awareness, these 
past studies confound both phenomenal and access. Moreover, in addition to the
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modularity o f phenomenal awareness (Zeki & Bartels, 1999) that we have explored in 
previous chapters, there may be modularity in access consciousness, which is 
reflected in both the different report mode sensitivities and the possible separate 
pathways for each o f these. Therefore separate neural pathways may underlie the 
capacity to report with different response modes.
The aim o f this study was to investigate the neural basis o f successful 
detection in two response modalities. We wanted to test for a dissociation in the 
sensitivities of two different response modes and investigate whether the neural basis 
for visual awareness was distinct for each o f these. Any differences would suggest a 
sensorimotor component to visual detection for subsequent report rather than purely 
sensory processes per se. To do this we scanned subjects with fMRI while they 
performed a simple luminance detection task in which they were required to report the 
percept w ith either a saccade or a kev-press.
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Figure 3.3.1. Internal response distributions for two stimuli with different levels 
of noise. The standard deviation of (a) is less than (b). The red and blue outlined 
response distributions represent the absence and presence of the stimulus 
respectively.
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3 .3 .2 . M e th o d s  
Subjects
12 healthy volunteers (4 female and 8 male; mean age 23 ± 0.6 years) with normal, or 
corrected to normal vision, participated in the study after giving written consent. All 
subjects gave informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki, and 
the Ethics Committee o f the National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery, 
London, UK, granted ethical approval for the study. Subjects viewed stimulus on a 
grey background. All stimuli were constructed using COGENT 2000 Graphics 
(available at w w w . v i s I a b . u d . a c . u k) running in MATLAB (Mathworks Natick, MA). 
The stimuli were presented centrally and projected onto the screen by means of an 
LCD projector (60 Hz refresh rate). A continuous trace of horizontal eye position, 
vertical eye position, and pupil areas was recorded at 120 Hz using an ASL 5000 eye- 
tracker.
Psychophysics
Prior to scanning subjects performed a simple detection task in order to obtain their 
psychometric performance as a function of stimulus luminance for both the saccade 
and manual key-press conditions. These were performed in separate blocks of 220 
trials. In both response conditions the stimulus was identical. Target present and 
absent trials were randomly interleaved. Throughout the entire trial two white dots 
(radius: 0.25° visual angle) were present on the left and right periphery. The 
appearance o f a central white fixation point on an achromatic background indicated 
the start o f the trial (see figure 3.3.2 for stimulus configuration). After 800ms plus 
random jitter time, either a circular achromatic ring of variable luminance (radius of 
6.2°, with inner circular gap of 0.3°) appeared for 48 ms (present trial) or did not
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appear at all (absent trial). The exact luminance o f the stimulus was not known due to 
the fact that for safety reasons we were not able to use a photometer near the high 
magnetic strength o f the scanner. Shortly after presentation (1 sec plus jitter), the 
fixation dot disappeared and subjects had a 1.5 second period in which to give their 
response (present or absent). For the key-press condition this consisted o f a left or 
right button-press on a keypad with the index fingers o f the left and right hands 
respectively. For the saccade condition, subjects moved their eyes to the left or right 
peripheral targets dots and returned to fixation. The side representing each response 
(present or absent) was counter-balanced across subjects. After deriving the 
psychometric function for both report modalities o f each subject, the threshold 
luminance value (75% detection accuracy) of the manual key-press condition was 
calculated.
(a)
(b)
Stimulus
Presentation
(3 frames)
Response period 
(15 secs)
(1 sec + jitter) (1 sec + jitter)
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Figure 3.3.2. (a) Representation of stimulus. Subjects were required to detect the 
parafoveally presented luminance defined disc, (b) Trial structure. 
fMRI Stimuli
After the initial psychophysical period subjects underwent two sessions o f fMRI 
scanning during which they performed the identical detection task with each subjects 
threshold luminance value from the manual key-press condition used on target present 
trials.
Imaging and Image processing
Functional images were processed and analysed using Statistical Parametric Mapping 
(SPM2: Wellcome Department o f Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK) implemented 
in MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick. MA). A 3-T Siemens ALLEGRA system 
(Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) equipped with a head coil was used to acquire 
functional images with a gradient echo-planar T2* sequence using BOLD (blood 
oxygenation level dependent) contrast, with a repetition time (TR) = 2.6 s. Each 
functional image comprised 40 transverse slices [2 mm thickness; 1.8 mm gap; 64 x 
64. 3 x 3  mm pixels; echo time (TE) = 40 msec] covering the whole brain volume. A 
total o f 550 sequential volumes were acquired during 2 separate sessions with the first 
four volumes o f each session discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects. Images 
were realigned, slice-time corrected, normalised to a standard echo-planar image 
template and smoothed with a Gaussian kernel with full-width half maximum of 8 
mm. Serial autocorrelations were modelled using an AR (1) method. A structural MRI 
scan using a standard three-dimensional T1-weighted sequence was acquired from
162
each subject and were co-registered to the functional scans and transformed into the 
same standard space.
Data Analysis
Brain activation for each experimental condition was estimated according to the 
general linear model at each voxel in brain space (Friston et al., 1995). The 
presentation period for the central disc were modelled as discrete events with the 
canonical haemodynamic response to capture the BOLD onset. Each trial type (hit, 
miss, false alarm, correct rejection) for both report modes were modelled as separate 
regressors, as were the motor responses, giving 10 regressors in total. Also included 
for each session were six covariates to capture residual movement-related artefacts 
(the three rigid-body translations and the three rotations determined from initial 
registration), and a single covariate representing the mean (constant) over scans. The 
data were high-pass filtered with a frequency cut-off at 128 s. Due to the limited 
number o f subjects, in order to increase our statistical power we performed a fixed 
effects analysis, whereby all subject sessions are included in the same first-level 
analysis. This analysis uses within-subject variance allowing inference for the 
subjects used in this study only, in contrast to a random or mixed effects analysis 
which considers both within- and between-subject variance (Holmes & Friston, 1998).
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3.3.3. Results
Psychophysics
The results from 3 subjects were discarded, as the eye-position data was not of 
sufficient quality to reliably estimate their responses on each trial. In the pre-scanning 
behavioural sessions we obtained the psychophysical thresholds for the detection task 
using both response modes and found them to be nearly identical in each subject. 
Figure 3.3.3 shows data from 4 representative subjects. Comparing across saccade and 
key-press response modes o f the behavioural data from the scanning sessions, we 
found no significant differences in d‘ (paired t-test, p = 0.5421) or response criterion 
(p = 0.5154) across subjects. However, some subjects showed large differences in d? 
according to response mode. While this is not consistent across the subjects, it does 
cast doubt on whether d' is a reliable measure o f perception and suggests the 
involvement o f other factors, such as sensorimotor noise. Table 3.3.1 shows the hit 
and false alarm rates, d ' and the response criterion (c) for all 9 subjects.
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Figure 3.3.3. Psychometric functions of the detection task from 4 representative 
subjects. The curves for the saccade and key-press conditions were identical in 
both slope and 50% point. Crosses and circles represent real data from the 
saccade and key-press conditions respectively. Solid lines represent the fitted 
cumulative Weibull function.
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Saccade Key-press
Hit False d' c Hit False df c
1 0.991 0.009 4.72 0.002 0.991 0.009 4.74 -0.0004
2 0.933 0.009 3.86 0.434 0.938 0.009 3.91 0.415
3 0.990 0.018 4.44 -0.119 0.939 0.077 2.97 -0.06
4 0.846 0.011 3.31 0.635 0.938 0.009 3.90 0.413
5 0.944 0.070 3.06 -0.058 0.958 0.009 4.10 0.317
6 0.891 0.018 3.34 0.437 0.867 0.018 3.22 0.499
7 0.917 0.270 2.00 -0.387 0.878 0.160 2.16 -0.086
8 0.762 0.129 1.84 0.209 0.899 0.025 3.23 0.340
9 0.861 0.094 2.40 0.116 0.911 0.039 3.11 0.212
Mean: 0.904 0.07 3.22 0.014 0.92 0.039 3.48 0.23
S.E. 0.025 0.029 0.339 0.11 0.013 0.017 0.25 0.074
Table 3.3.1. Performance measures (hit rate, false-alarm rate, d’ and response 
criterion) for both report modes during scanning sessions. None of these were 
significantly different across subjects for the two report modes (p > 0.05).
fMRI
The fMRI data from 9 subjects were submitted into a fixed-effects group analysis. To 
localise brain areas responsive to the presence o f the target stimulus, we compared 
brain activity on trials in which the stimulus was presented with those in which it was 
absent, collapsing across task performance and response modality. As shown in figure 
3.3.4, threshold controlling false discovery rate (FDR; Genovese et al., 2002) at 5% 
revealed activity localised to the occipital lobe, encompassing early visual areas, 
which may include VI/V2 (peak voxel co-ordinates [4 -78  -6 ], Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) space), the right V3 complex [28 -88  28] and lateral 
occipital areas (left: [-50 -74 2], right: [52 -68 -8]).
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Figure 3.3.4. Main effect of stimulus presence. Results are displayed with a 
statistical threshold on p < 0.001 (uncorrected for multiple comparisons).
By comparing trials on which the stimulus was successfully detected, with those in 
which it presented but missed, we were able to delineate the brain areas underlying 
the subjective perception of the stimulus, since in both cases the stimulus is identical, 
but only the subjective perception differs (figure 3.3.5). Moreover, by looking at the 
effect of report mode, we are able to investigate the interaction of report and visual 
awareness. In the saccade report condition at a corrected statistical significance (5% 
threshold controlling FDR), this reveals the bilateral inferior parietal cortex (left: [-50 
-60  46, right: [52 -56 52]), the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex [42 56 10] and the 
middle frontal gyrus bilaterally (left: [42 12 56], right: [-50 -60  46]). To then ensure 
that these activations were not simply due to a main effect of subsequent saccade 
direction, we performed the same comparison but used an exclusive mask (p = 0.05, 
uncorrected) with the contrast that compared all trials in which the subjects looked 
left (‘present’) with all trials in which the subjects looked right (‘absent’). Therefore 
those activations that remain after masking should be specifically related to the 
conscious detection of the stimulus. This showed activity in the same areas at a 
corrected level of significance (5% threshold controlling FDR).
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In contrast, conscious detection o f the stimulus in the key-press condition gave 
activity in the right precentral gyrus [34 -2 0  54], the left cerebellum [-24 -54 -26], the 
bilateral hippocampus (left: [-32 -30 -6 ], right: [26 -4 -20]), right middle temporal 
gyrus [38 -6 4  2], the medial thalamus [2 -14  2], right posterior putamen [34 -6 -8], 
right caudate nucleus [14 12 20] and early occipital areas [8 -9 0  6] at a corrected level 
of significance 5% threshold controlling FDR. To visualise the effects o f conscious 
detection rather the motor intention or planning for the left key-press, we used an 
exclusive mask (p = 0.05, uncorrected) on this comparison with the contrast o f all 
'present' trials with all 'absent' trials in the key-press condition. This gave significant 
activations in the left posterior hippocampus, right primary motor cortex, the right 
middle temporal gyrus, the medial thalamus, right posterior putamen and the right 
caudate nucleus, at a corrected level of significance 5% threshold controlling FDR.
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Figure 3.3.5. Brain activations revealed by the contrast of ‘h it’ versus ‘miss’, for 
the saccade and key-press conditions shown in red and green respectively. 
Results are shown with a statistical threshold of p < 0.001 (uncorrected for 
multiple comparisons).
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Figure 3.3.6. Interaction effect for conscious detection with saccade report over 
activity with conscious detection for key-press report. Results are shown with a 
statistical threshold of p < 0.001 (uncorrected for multiple comparisons).
The interaction effects revealed differences in activations between these contrasts. 
Correspondingly the contrast showing areas more activated by conscious detection in 
the saccade condition than the key-press condition revealed the bilateral inferior 
parietal cortex, bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, the right middle and superior orbital 
frontal gyrus and the left superior middle gyrus (5% threshold controlling FDR; figure 
3.3.6). The opposite contrast identified activations, at an uncorrected level of 
significance only (p < 0.001), in early occipital areas, the medial thalamus, left 
cerebellum, right posterior putamen, the right middle cingulate cortex, the right
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primary motor cortex, the right middle temporal cortex and the right posterior 
thalamus (figure 3.3.7).
Figure 3.3.7. Interaction effect for conscious detection with key-press report over 
activity with conscious detection for saccade report. Results are shown with a 
statistical threshold of p < 0.001 (uncorrected for multiple comparisons).
In addition, we performed a conjunction analysis (Nichols et al. 2005, Friston et al., 
2005) of the SPMs of the minimum T-statistic over the two orthogonal contrasts ‘hit 
versus miss' for the saccade and key-press conditions. This should reveal brain areas 
underlying awareness, independently of response modality. However, no voxels were 
found to be significant, even at a low statistical threshold (p < 0.05, uncorrected for 
multiple comparisons).
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3.3.4. Discussion
The aim o f this study was to investigate the interaction between visual awareness and 
response modality. We used a simple detection task in which subjects were required 
to report their perception with two response modes, in conjunction with event-related 
fMRI. Our results can be summarised as follows: (1) contrary to previous behavioural 
studies (Marcel, 1993), we find that two different report modes, saccades and key­
presses. have no significant differences in sensitivity while performing a detection 
task, (2) two completely distinct brain networks were revealed for conscious detection 
o f the stimulus specific to the response mode consequently used. Overall, our findings 
suggest that despite equality in different report mode sensitivities, separate neural 
networks determine whether a visual stimulus can be subsequently reported. These 
results therefore demonstrate a sensorimotor component to the neural correlates of 
visual awareness specific to the response modality being used that is distinct from 
purely perceptual processes. Unlike previous studies, by using different response 
modes we were able to tease out brain areas responsible for successful conscious 
report.
As discussed in section 3.3.1. according to SDT to make a perceptual decision, 
the sensory evidence is matched to a response criterion (Green & Swets, 1966). 
Neurobiologically. the process o f making a motor act in response to a sensory 
stimulus involves a complex interplay between cortical and subcortical regions, 
matching the appropriate motor response to sensory input. The visual system provides 
sensory evidence for the decision, which is then integrated in sensorimotor regions 
such as LIP in the posterior parietal cortex in preparation for making a saccade. or in 
PRR for making a reaching movement (Andersen & Buneo. 2002). Lying at the apex 
of the sensor>r and motor pathways are the so-called ‘executive' mechanisms o f the
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prefrontal cortex, providing a flexible rule-based behavioural and cognitive 
organisation (Shallice, 1998). Anatomically, these are organised into cortico-thalamo- 
basal ganglionic loops and are thought to select the behaviourally relevant response 
appropriate for the context (Goldberg, 1985; Passingham, 1993). Our results, taken as 
a whole across both o f the response modes, show that successful detection and report 
o f the stimulus, as shown by the hit versus miss comparison, correlates with brain 
activity in all o f these regions. However, the surprising aspect to these results is that 
this contrast for each o f the response modalities have no areas in common, indicating 
that the critical stages for detecting a reporting the presence of a stimulus lie at 
distinct phases o f the sensorimotor pathway. In terms o f SDT (Green & Swets, 1966), 
these areas may be considered the stages at which noise arises along the pathway.
The conscious detection in the saccade condition revealed a network o f areas 
including the frontal eye fields, the right inferior parietal lobe and bilateral middle 
frontal gyrus (figure 3.3.5). Both electrophysiological studies in monkeys (Andersen 
& Buneo, 2002) and human imaging studies (Prado et al., 2005) have implicated the 
posterior parietal cortex in sensorimotor roles and the maintenance of spatial 
coordinates for action. Moreover, similar fronto-parietal areas are believed to have a 
role in response selection (Rowe at al., 2000). Thus these areas can be regarded as 
selecting a subsequent response after conscious detection. Our results indicate that 
these areas are critical for sensory information to translate into appropriate saccadic 
response. In contrast, successful detection and subsequent key-press response 
revealed activity in the posterior thalamus, left cerebellum, right posterior putamen, 
the right middle cingulate cortex, the right primary motor cortex, left posterior 
hippocampus and the right middle temporal cortex (figure 3.3.5). With the exception 
o f the latter two regions, it is interesting that these areas are the same as those
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associated with response preparation and execution in previous fMRI studies (Kim et 
al., 1993; Allison et al., 2000). Therefore it may be the case that the critical stages in 
reporting the presence o f a stimulus for the key-press response are downstream in the 
perception-action cycle o f those areas involved in the saccade response. A role for 
medial areas o f the temporal cortex, especially the hippocampus, in action and 
visuomotor processes has been suggested by previous fMRI studies using delayed 
performance task. Activity in these areas was found to be time-locked to the response 
cue during ‘G o' and negatively during ‘no-Go’ trials, ruling out any associative roles 
(Theonissen et al., 2002) and is thus consistent with the proposed role o f the 
hippocampus in voluntary movement (Halgren, 1991). Therefore, the increased 
activity in the posterior hippocampus and temporal cortex in the present results for 
detection and report with key-press is consistent with a role for selecting the correct 
response for the stimulus.
Surprisingly, the main effect of conscious detection of the stimulus did not 
correlate with early visual activations in the saccade condition, unlike the key-press 
condition which shows a band of activity along the calcarine sulcus, most likely 
corresponding to the primary visual cortex. As reviewed in section 1.5, many studies 
have shown early visual activity to correlate with awareness in tasks similar to the one 
used here. For instance, in a simple grating detection task, hit trials were found to 
correlate more with activity in early visual areas than miss trials (Pins & ffytche, 
2003). However, this and other studies have invariably used key-press reports to 
probe subjective perception, and are therefore consistent with our results. The 
intriguing aspect is the lack o f correlation in the saccades condition. This suggests that 
the role played by VI in visual awareness (Tong, 2003) may be contingent upon the 
subsequent response mode, at least in humans. Previous macaque studies have
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demonstrated a correlation between visual awareness and VI activity with detection 
(Super et al., 2001) and visual search tasks (Roelfsema et al., 2003), while using 
saccades as a response mode. However, as far as we are aware, the present study is 
the first human neuroimaging experiment to use saccades to probe the correlates of 
subjective perception. This lack of correlation shown presently may represent a 
genuine species difference for the role that early visual areas in detecting stimuli and 
reporting with saccades. Alternatively, methodological differences may also account 
for this, such as the difference between fMRI and single-cell physiology (Logothetis 
& Wandell, 2004).
However, one possible confounding factor for the lack o f activity in early 
visual areas for the saccade condition in our results is the effect o f saccadic 
suppression. Psychophysical, electrophysiological and neuroimaging studies show 
that neural responses to visual stimuli, particularly in low-spatial frequencies (Burr et 
al.. 1994). can be suppressed during or even prior to saccades. In humans, this was 
recently shown to occur as early as VI and the LGN (Sylvester et al., 2005). Due to 
the low temporal resolution of the BOLD signal, it was not possible to disambiguate 
the influence o f these oculomotor effects from purely stimulus related activity. 
Therefore, the lack of correlation o f VI with subjective perception in the saccades 
condition may be due to the fact that extra-saccadic signals reduce early visual 
responses. While we cannot completely discount this possibility, a couple o f lines o f 
evidence make it unlikely. Firstly, a recent combined fMRI and psychophysical study 
demonstrated that the reduction in BOLD signal in area VI due to saccadic 
suppression only occurs when the saccade and stimulus are less than 80 ms apart 
(Vallines & Greenlee, 2006). Therefore a reduction in activity related to suppression 
of stimulus processing can be discounted given that the separation in our experiment
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was over 1 second. Secondly, since we were primarily interested in the interaction 
between the response modes and specifically in the differences in activity between the 
hit versus miss contrast between the two response modes, we believe that any 
saccadic effects would be controlled for. Assuming the effects of the saccades are the 
same for both responses, these should drop out in the hit versus miss contrasts, 
leaving only the correlates o f visual awareness elicited by the stimuli. Importantly, the 
gap between the stimulus and the response, rules out any non-linear interactions 
between saccadic and stimulus signals, which are known to occur on a smaller time- 
scale (Huettel & McCarthy, 2000) that could confound this contrast.
In contrast to the previous work o f Marcel (1993), we failed to show a 
consistent difference between the d-prime of the response modalities across subjects. 
Two explanations for this apparent discrepancy may be considered. Firstly, 
methodological differences between the two studies make direct comparisons 
difficult. The previous study o f Marcel did not use saccades as a response mode, only 
eye-blinks, verbal reports and key-presses. In addition, the stimuli subtended only 2° 
o f the visual field and were presented for 200ms in the previous study, in contrast to 
the larger 5.5° diameter stimuli on-screen for 50ms used presently. Future behavioural 
studies are needed to determine whether this discrepancy is due to response modes, 
stimuli or an interaction between these factors. Secondly, our psychophysical 
measurements may not have been sensitive enough to detect a difference in 
performance between the two report modes. It could be considered a ceiling effect, as 
during the detection task the hit rates were high for both modalities, thereby masking 
differences in sensitivity. While the identical psychometric functions obtained prior to 
scanning for these modalities underlines the equality in psychophysical performance, 
we are still cautious in completely discounting the existence of such as dissociation in
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the sensitivities o f the report modes. Our psychometric functions shown in figure 
3.3.3 were extremely steep. This may conceal more subtle differences in thresholds. 
Due to the limited time available for the initial psychophysical testing for each subject 
in the scanner, it was not possible to explore a thorough range of luminance values for 
the detection task that may have revealed significant differences in the psychometric 
functions.
While these behavioural results are inconsistent with previous studies in 
normal subjects, our fMRI results do find some consistency with previous studies 
showing a response dissociation in patients with neglect (Bisiach et al., 1989). While 
the symptoms o f neglect have traditionally been categorised as sensory or motor, 
recent proposals have emphasised the sensorimotor transformations involved in these 
deficits (e.g. Pouget & Driver. 2000). Damage to the inferior parietal cortex, in 
addition to perceptual deficits, impairs initiating movements towards targets on the 
contralesional side (Mattingly et al., 1998). Moreover, many of the brain regions 
implicated in neglect include the posterior parietal cortex, the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex and sub-cortical regions such as the basal ganglia (Kamath et al., 2002). The 
heterogeneity in the deficits may be explained by distinct damage to multiple stages 
along this sensorimotor process. Physiologically, it has been demonstrated that 
distinct areas o f the parietal cortex, such as LIP and PRR, underlie sensorimotor 
transformations for saccades and reaching respectively (Andersen & Buneo, 2002). 
Moreover, the present results implicate exclusive sensorimotor regions in the 
successful report of the stimulus specific to the response mode used. Significant 
differences in the detectability o f targets between report modalities in neglect patients, 
such as those described by Bisiach and colleagues (1989), may therefore be due to 
selective damage to these different areas underlying the different response modes.
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How do these results stand with current theories of visual awareness? Firstly, 
they identify components to the neural correlates o f awareness that are related to the 
motor report and not to the percept. Such findings have resonance with the theoretical 
suggestion that awareness can be broken down into two components: ‘phenomenal 
consciousness’ in which corresponds to the subjective percept or qualia; and ‘access 
consciousness’ which is related to the ability to make voluntary report about what is 
perceived (Block. 1996; 2005). While many theories o f awareness do not make a 
distinction between these or specific predictions for their neural underpinnings, two 
contradictory proposals have been made. On the one hand, the global workspace view 
(Dehaene et al., 2003) suggests that once a percept is phenomenally conscious it is 
then available for report -  there is not distinction between phenomenal and access. By 
contrast, it had been hypothesised that activity in the visual cortex is sufficient for 
phenomenal perception whereas the fronto-parietal areas are required for access 
(Lamme, 2004: Block, 2005). This is consistent with the results presented here. 
Moreover, we are able to identify sub-components specific to each response mode.
In summary, we find networks of brain areas correlating with visual awareness 
that are contingent upon the response modality used to subsequently give a 
behavioural report. One striking aspect to our results is that conscious detection with 
each report modality did not have any brain areas activated in common. Given the 
reliance o f studies of visual awareness on behavioural reports, in light o f the current 
findings, the significance of many o f these results may have to be reassessed to 
accommodate this sensorimotor component. By using different report modes, for the 
first time we have been able to fractionate the neural correlates o f consciousness into 
those areas responsible for successful conscious report. We suggest that the present
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findings have gone some way to demonstrating the neurobiological basis o f conscious 
‘access' for different response modes.
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Conclusions
The aim o f this thesis was to test the hypothesis that low-level neural 
mechanisms underlie visual awareness. To do this, we use a two-pronged strategy 
with: (1) psychophysical studies to measure the timing o f visual perception, (2) fMRI 
to measure brain activity whilst tracking subjective reports o f perception. The two 
psychophysical experiments investigated temporal aspects o f visual perception -  in 
particular these addressed the issue of whether the timing of awareness is ‘online' 
rather than integrated into a temporal buffer zone prior to perception. We measured 
the relative perceptual times o f different magnitudes o f direction change and 
investigated the ‘flash-lag' effect (Nijhawan, 1994) and related illusions o f positional 
localisation. The first two fMRI experiments examined the necessity o f frontal and 
parietal areas for visual awareness in the context o f bistable figures, combined with 
dynamic causal modelling (Friston et al.. 2003), and perception outside the focus of 
attention. Finally, we looked to extend the concept o f modularity of awareness to that 
o f 'access consciousness', that is the ability to give a report of a conscious experience 
(Block, 1996), in addition to the previous studies that have investigated the neural 
correlates o f phenomenal consciousness. To this end, we combined psychophysics 
with fMRI to investigate the interaction between report modality and visual 
awareness.
In one sense the experiments were successful, with our findings largely 
compatible with our initial low-level theory o f visual awareness. We found the results 
consistent with an online view o f the timing o f awareness, good evidence that visual 
awareness does not require the frontal and parietal cortices, and finally, we 
demonstrated that the modularity o f awareness may be extended to access 
consciousness. However, in another sense the entire undertaking was naive, as the 
mechanisms underlying conscious visual perception are unlikely to be delineated in a
181
single thesis. Despite the vast number o f experiments on this topic, the theories for 
the neurobiological candidates o f visual awareness seem to be just as numerous and 
we were unable to explore them all. For instance, we have not investigated the 
putative role for neuronal synchrony (Engel & Singer, 2001) or the brainstem 
(Magoun, 1954). Each o f these issues in themselves would require more than a 
lifetim e's work. However, in the context of the present thesis, we believe that the low- 
level view of visual awareness embodied in the microconsciousness framework (Zeki 
& Bartels, 1999) stands up to direct tests of its predictions. Moreover, our results 
directly contradict predictions o f integrated global theories o f consciousness (Dehaene 
et al., 1998: Rees et al., 2002) and suggest that awareness may be disintegrated across 
both space and time. Therefore, in our small way, we hope to have contributed to the 
answer o f one o f the most fundamental scientific questions asked, and helped solve 
the 4easy' problem of consciousness (Searle, 1993).
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Object Localisers
The aim o f this experiment was to determine the location o f regions involved in the 
processing o f the local visual environment (‘places*) and faces to act as a localiser of 
for experiment 3.2. Previous studies have characterised functionally specialised 
regions that respond selectively to these stimuli: the ‘parahippocampal place* (Epstein 
& Kanwisher. 1998; Epstein et al.. 2003) and the ‘fusiform face’ (Kanwisher et al., 
1997) areas respectively.
Stimuli & Task
We used a simple block based design in which the four subjects from fMRI 
experiment 3.2 viewed 5° by 7.5° monochrome pictures o f faces or places. The face 
stimuli were overlaid onto a rectangular textured background to match the place 
stimuli for spatial frequency and size. Each block lasted 22.5 seconds, with each 
image presented for 1 second, with a 0.5 seconds gap in-between with a random jitter 
o f 0.2 seconds. Blocks with places alternated with blocks o f faces for a total o f 20 
blocks in total. Subjects were instructed to fixate a dot in the centre o f the screen and 
perform a one-back memory task with the stimuli within each block and to press a 
button with their index finger to indicate an identical match between two subsequent 
stimuli.
Imaging & Image processing
Functional images were processed and analysed using Statistical Parametric Mapping 
(SPM2: Wellcome Department o f Imaging Neuroscience. London, UK) implemented 
in MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA). A 3-T Siemens ALLEGRA system 
(Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) equipped with a head coil was used to acquire
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functional images with a gradient echo-planar T2* sequence using BOLD (blood 
oxygenation level dependent) contrast, with a repetition time (TR) = 2.6 s. Each 
functional image comprised 40 transverse slices [2 mm thickness; 1.8 mm gap; 64 x 
64, 3 x 3 mm pixels; echo time (TE) = 40 msec] covering the whole brain volume. A 
total o f 161 sequential volumes were acquired during each session with the first four 
volumes o f each session discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects. Images were 
realigned, normalised to a standard echo-planar image template and smoothed with a 
Gaussian kernel with full-width half maximum of 6 mm.
Data analysis
Brain activation for each experimental condition was estimated according to the 
general linear model at each voxel in brain space (Friston et al., 1995). The face and 
place stimuli were modelled separately as blocks by a box-car waveform of 22.5s 
convolved with the canonical haemodynamic response to capture the BOLD onset. 
Also included for each session were six covariates to capture residual movement- 
related artefacts (the three rigid-body translations and the three rotations determined 
from initial registration), and a single covariate representing the mean (constant) over 
scans. The data were high-pass filtered with a frequency cut-off at 128 s. Images of 
parameter estimates for each contrast of interest were created for each subject (first- 
level analysis).
Results
To functionally localise areas involved in the processing of face stimuli we compared 
activity from the face blocks with the place blocks. This revealed FFA activity 
unilaterally in 3 o f the 4 subjects; the occipital face area (OFA) unilaterally in 2
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subjects and face selective regions in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) bilaterally in 
3 subjects, and unilaterally in 1. The opposite contrast was performed to localise areas 
associated with place stimuli. All 4 subjects showed activity in the bilateral 
parahippocampal cortex with the (place > face] contrast.
Subject FFA OFA STS PPA
CG R: [40 -46 -30] R:[42 -82 -10] R: [54 -54 6] R: [-28-40-10]
L:- L:- L:- L: [-24-56-12]
WY R:[40 -56-20] R:- R:[52 -62 0] R: [28 -36 -22]
L:- L:- L: [-50-50 8] L [-20-46-10]
HE R:- R: [48-68-10] R: [58-54 14] R: [24-34-22]
L:- L:- L:[-42 -548] L: [-20 -42 -14]
BR R:- R:- R: [62 -4210] R: [30-46-10]
L [-46 -54 -24] L:- L: [-46-36 8] L [-24-46-12]
Table A.1.1. MNI co-ordinates of the FFA, OFA, STS and PPA of each subject.
Figure A .l .1 shows the localised face selective areas and PPA o f subject one in axial 
saggital and coronal slices, superimposed onto the normalised structural brain image. 
Figure A. 1.2 shows the time course o f the BOLD signal of the peak voxels from the 
PPA and FFA of subject 1 during the first 150 seconds o f the localiser scan. Overall, 
the results confirm the functional selectivity of areas processing these mid-level 
object categories.
186
(a)
(b)
Figure A.1.1. Axial, saggital and coronal slices of contrasts (a) [places>faces] (b) 
[faces>places] for subject CG superimposed onto a normalised T1 weighted 
structural image, (a) shows bilateral PPA activity, while (b) shows FFA and OFA
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activity unilaterally only. Functional image corrected for multiple comparisons 
with family-wise error (FWE) p < 0.05. Colour bars represent t-values.
n Face stimuli Place stimuli ""|____ |   PPA
£
’ >
*6re
Q
Oco
100 150
Time (seconds)
Figure A.1.2. Time-course for BOLD activity of the most selective voxel of the 
left PPA for places and FFA for faces of a single subject during the localiser 
session.
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Appendix 2: Retinotopic mapping
Stimuli & Task
Sessions o f phase-encoded retinotopy were carried out on all 4 subjects after the 
experimental sessions of experiment 3.2. Six sessions of each stimulus type were 
carried out. Two types of retinotopic stimuli were used: a large rotating-wedge 
stimulus to map angular representation (figure A.2.1a) and an expanding ring- 
stimulus to map eccentricity (figure A.2.1b). Each wedge session consisted of six 
complete rotations o f a 45° checkerboard w^edge o f maximum contrast extending from 
0.7° to 10°. Each complete rotation lasted 30s. The contrast of the checkerboard 
reversed continuously at 4Hz. The ring stimulus consisted of an expanding, reversing- 
contrast. checkerboard ring, which changed from 0.36° wide at the innermost radius 
o f 0.67° to 2.47° at a radius o f 8.78°. Each complete expansion lasted 30s. Each 
stimulus was shown six times and the total duration was identical in the wedge and 
ring sessions. In all cases the subjects' task was to fixate a central red dot.
Figure A.2.1. Screen shots of stimuli used for phase-encoded retinotopic 
mapping. Dotted arrows represent trajectory of stimulus, (a) rotating wedge, (b) 
expanding ring. 
Imaging & Image processing
Functional magnetic resonance data were acquired on a Siemens 3T Allegra scanner 
(Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) fitted with a head-coil. Subjects viewed a screen via 
an angled mirror onto which stimuli were projected using an LCD projector. This 
display extended 15° horizontally and 10° vertically from the fixation cross. BOLD 
contrast weighted echoplanar images (EPIs) were acquired for all functional scans. 
Each complete volume was acquired as a series of 30 axial slices o f 2mm thickness 
with 1mm gaps in between, tilted so that they were parallel to the calcarine sulcus. 
The in-plane resolution was 3x3mm. Each slice was acquired in 65ms (TE = 30ms) 
meaning that the entire volume was acquired in 1.95s. There were no gaps between 
volume acquisitions. The first 8 volumes were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration 
effects. A T1 weighted anatomical image was acquired from each subject after the 
second functional session. Each anatomical image was segmented into gray and white 
matter using mrGray software (Teo et al., 1997). The occipital lobes and neighbouring 
cortical structures of each subject were flattened for further visualisation (Wandell et 
al., 2000).
Data analysis
All images were pre-processed using SPM2 (available from the Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience at ). Images acquired
for retinotopy were realigned to the first volume of the first session o f experiment 3.2
190
using sine interpolation. These images were then resliced to produce a final voxel 
resolution o f 3x3x3 mm. All images were temporally filtered with a high-pass filter 
with a cut-off o f 128 s. Serial autocorrelations were modelled using an AR (1) 
method. The anatomical image was coregistered to the mean, realigned functional 
image for each subject.
Definition of Regions of Interest (ROIs)
Retinotopic data was analysed in a standard fashion (Engel et al., 1994) using SPM2. 
Only voxels that had significant correlations with the wedge/ring stimuli are reported 
(P < 0.01, uncorrected for multiple comparisons). ROIs were drawn by eye on a 
flatmap o f the angular representation. The fovea and eccentricity lines were overlaid 
on these flatmaps to guide the drawing (figure A.2.2). Using this technique we could 
reliably delineate the fovea. V I, V2d/v, V3d/v, V3A and V4 (figure A.2.3). Any 
voxel that was assigned to two different ROIs was removed from both o f them. 
Individual subject variation in the topography and size o f visual areas were consistent 
with results from previous studies (e.g. Andrews et al., 1997; Dougherty et al., 2003), 
where it has been show that the surface area of visual areas may vary between 
individuals by up to a factor o f two.
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KEY:
Eccentricity 
in deg. visual 
angle of 
stimulus
.78°
HE WY
CG
LEFT
RIGHT
Key*: __________
RIGHT LEFT
‘Left and right keys are reversed for subject BR
c
O n
Figure A.2.2. Flattened representation of phase and eccentricity maps for 4 
subjects from experiment 3.2. Radius of flattened cortical area is 75mm. The 
occipital lobe was segmented into grey and white matter automatically (Teo et 
al., 1997) and then further edited by hand. These data were used to construct a 
representation of the grey-white matter boundary and this was used to produce a 
flatmap of the cortex (Wandell et al., 2000). Overlaid on this map are results 
from the phase-encoded retinotopy analysis. Only areas which had a significant 
correlation (p < 0.01) with the wedge/ring stimuli are shown. The colour codes 
the visual angle that best stimulates that part of the cortical sheet. Identification 
of visual areas is shown here. Due to technical reasons the left hemisphere of 
subject WY was unavailable.
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(a) (b)
V2
V3A
Figure A.2.3. Visual areas shown on the right occipital lobe. Four views, (a) 
lateral , (b) dorsal, (c) ventral, (d) medial, of 3D reconstructions of the cortical 
surface of subject HE. Overlaid on these are the visual areas identified using this 
subject’s retinotopic maps.
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